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I am supposing that our very ways of being with other people,
thinking and speaking, hoping and wishing and opining and
despairing, are tied up with the presumption of representation:
that what we are doing with language is abstracting from
reality, from what there is in nature, and describing those fixed
items. For the most part, it is rather as if this notion assumes
us, takes us up into itself like the atmosphere; it is part of the
air that sustains us. There is fresher air. In Saussure's picture of
language, we may begin to breathe it.
2 CARTESIAN DOUBT 35
Ln Chapter One it appeared that what we call common sense
may be given by a colloquy, a dialogue. And our contemporary
colloquial context of ideas about knowledge can be seen to
originate with Descartes. If Descartes had read Saussure, what
he might have meant by "I am thinking" is "I am speaking."
And the purpose of Cartesian doubt would then have been to
interrupt the easy and usually harmless assumption that words
refer to things, supplanting it with the notion that the world is
articulation.
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As we have gathered in re-reading Descartes, to look through
an accepted set of ideas is to give ourselves a certain set of
visible objects and relations, to commit ourselves to a vocabu-
lary of the seen. As teachers, we should explore what kind of
power the window may exert. In fixing the identities of natural
and human objects for human subjects to perceive and under-
stand—in cementing the foundations of knowledge—Locke had
catalyzed not only the split between man and his world, but
also a massive retreat from what we might call the responsibility
of Adam: that naming which symbolizes our ever original say
in the world.
4 WITTGENSTEIN'S INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURE 81
We have begun to distinguish between the window of repre-
sentation, with its associated presuppositions about the struc-
ture of reality, and another window, which I have been looking
through in moments of communion with my child and at
other times. What is there about mis second window of being
together that is different from "using language," or just plain
"talking about something"? We are working on bringing about
an extraordinary result: that during the class hour we look
through the window of inventing being with our students
even as we look at what we call the structure of reality.
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arises in our "naming" a world. In this realm of sharing naming,
where an original mutuality sources his gesture and word, a
teacher, as artist, cultivates moments of encounter when he
can share, invent, and bring forth with his students. And in
our dialogue, in the faculty meeting or the teachers' lounge,
we are not describing facts about students or school. We are
inventing our world, the context for our common experience.
6 LANGUAGING AS SHARING 127
We have now re-invented language as languaging, on our
way to re-inventing the wheel of Saying. For one further shift
before we attain that place, though, we turn to Martin Buber. If
Heidegger is the prophet of languaging, and of Being as being-
with, Buber is the prophet of I-You, of relation. He re-invents
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PREFACE
In a dream I had recently, I am in a hilly, rocky field with shacks and farm
sheds. I have come to teach the children of the local population, who don't
even take the trouble to scorn the idea of school. I ask one of the ragged
kids running around to stop and do something like tuck in his shirt—he
complies, then goes right on running and playing with the others. Then I
am in the backyard of the house where I grew up. It has become a muddy,
sloppy fenced pen and there are horses running around frantically. I
overhear a snatch of conversation on a loud CB radio about one of the
current occupants of the house: "...he kilt that feller..." I find several sticks
that look like discarded trash; I pick them up to throw onto one of the
many trash piles lying around. Second thought: maybe the people use
these for something—they seem to be put together with nails or screws,
pieces of wood joined crudely for an unfathomable purpose.
The crisis in our national educational system is old news—though I
would prefer to call it a crisis of schooling, since education is distinct from
what schools have been most loudly called upon to deliver. It is not only
that schools, ill-equipped to bear the burden of the family's predicament,
fail even in conveying to many of their students the basic skills of literate
communication and calculation, so that students come out of school be-
fore they are enabled to lead responsible lives. There is a failure even
more disturbing. A recent study by the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching found that, after nearly a decade of research
and reform, teachers' dissatisfaction with working conditions had actually
increased. A large proportion of our teachers (thirty-eight percent) say
they would not choose teaching as a career if they could choose again.
Thomas Jefferson would be appalled at this statistic. Something is missing—
some connection perhaps between the playing children and the crudely
constructed sticks—and it is not being supplied by most of the current
efforts to reform the American school. About the failure of reform efforts
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at Taft High School in Chicago, one participant said: "Instead of focusing
on what happens in classrooms, we spent time doing the logistics of re-
structuring.'7 Tucking in our shirts. After a massive effort at reform in
Littleton, Colorado, the school board, responding to community pressure,
reinstated the 1984 requirements for graduation from high school. We
may indeed need reform, the rethinking and restructuring of curricula
and scheduling. But reform, as the word suggests, is a matter of reshaping
or reorganizing materials already available. In a reformed room the furni-
ture is rearranged within the shape given by the walls. What would it take
to fransform our living space, so that it provides us with new possibilities
for being together with our communities' children, for engaging in the
play of their lives? What would it take to renew our schooling, rather than
trying to restore it to a supposed prelapsarian integrity?
"Tell me the landscape in which you live," says Ortega y Gassett,
"and I will tell you who you are." As if the human landscape were not
merely geography and climate, Ortega asks us for the contribution of who
we are in what we see and how we experience. The landscape of school-
ing, not only a set of buildings or a creed of teaching techniques, might
grow in the soil of who we are. But here are passages from a special
section of The Wall Street Journal:
Across the curriculum, up and down the grade ladder, a new
wave of teachers is casting out textbooks, cursing standardized
tests, killing drills, and preaching a new creed of "engagement."
As school is usually set up, the kids are supposed to spit back to
the teacher everything the teacher already knows. That would be
considered a senseless waste of time in real life.1
It seems that we are being rather tossed about. Not so long ago the
new wave was rushing back to "basics" and to cultural literacy. At one
end of the pen there is teaching "content," with its oft-derided goal of
memorization and recall; and on the other end, what we call "discovery
learning," with its presumed close connection to "real life."
A substantial body of research... has found that the traditional
view of learning—in which teachers impart knowledge to pas-
sive students—is misguided. Rather, the studies have found,
children learn by actively "constructing" knowledge based on
what they already know, as well as on their environments.2
The horses must need more space, for the pen is muddy; our backyard is
ruined. Maybe what matters, for us and for our students, is not what
position we take but something else. Maybe whatever position we take up
will work to quicken teaching if we take up this something along with it.
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During the eleven years I taught junior and senior English courses at a
small private preparatory school, attending the regular faculty team meet-
ings at which we lamented students' difficulties and failures (both aca-
demic and behavioral), discussed possible remedies and occasionally
implemented an effective one, my feeling grew that too much of the time
we made no headway against the problem, as if, climbing a rope in the
gymnasium, we had run out of arm strength before reaching the ceiling.
But I am not out to provide remediation for teachers, as if bigger muscles
would get us up the same rope to the top. I am out to provide for teaching
as a distinct way of being that goes along with instruction. As it stretches
and limbers other muscles, teaching becomes a different acrobatic. As it
partakes of persons' commitment to each other, teaching is the poetry of
encounter, the inventing of relatedness.
Searching the computer screen in front of us, my child asked me what
my book was about. I caught his eye and told him: "It's about you." He
thought for a moment and asked, hesitantly, hopefully: "...and Mommy?"
I nodded. He brightened. "Ifs about all the people!" he exclaimed. I could
have heard his beaming announcement as cuteness, precocity, or jabber:
how does he know, at three and a half, what the book is about? How
could one who cannot yet read, much less form conclusions logically,
divine the purpose of a book? To be sure, at the moment of his jubilant
insight, I was not called upon to judge whether he could support his
opinion with reasons and evidence. But I did not in fact hear it as an
accidental felicity; I heard it as if he were privy to my own most cherished
intentions and hopes, as if in his most eloquent vocabulary he were giving
voice to me. That moment was a gift: what gave it? Is a simple psychologi-
cal explanation—a father's sentimental pride in his own son—all there is
to it? I am interested in exploring how it is that Being flourishes when we
be together. The word "parent" is from Latin parere, meaning to bring forth.
Though I am the parent, I have no sense that anything I did, consciously
or not, caused that moment of what was really heart-stopping commun-
ion. Then how was that moment brought forth?
Martin Buber would say that teaching has its life in the relation be-
tween people, a relation brought forth by speaking the "basic word I-
You." m his view, only that speaking can elicit the whole being of man,
can give him the sense of being fully alive in the present, can satisfy his
hunger with moments mat make a difference for his fellows. Here then is
one of the epigraphs for this book, a message I shall be endeavoring to
unpack so that its medium becomes ours:
Speech in its ontological sense was at all times present wherever
men regarded one another in the mutuality of I and Thou;
wherever one showed the other something in the world in such
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a way that from then on he began really to perceive it; wherever
one gave another a sign in such a way that he could recognize the
designated situation as he had not been able to before; wherever
one communicated to the other his own experience in such a way
that it penetrated the other's circle of experience and supple-
mented it as from within, so that from now on his perceptions
were set within a world as they had not been before. All this
flowing ever again into a stream of reciprocal sharing of
knowledge—thus came to be and thus is the living We, the
genuine We, which, where it fulfills itself, embraces the dead
who once took part in colloquy and now take part in it through
what they have handed down to posterity.3
Buber speaks here of his central tenet, the primacy of dialogue, the "mu-
tuality of I and Thou." "All actual life," he says elsewhere, "is encounter."
What does Buber mean by "encounter"? Before subject matter is handled
between teacher and student, there is, generating the field in which the
material is handled, this fact of encounter, of being together, a fact that
immerses the concerns of information transfer, of memory, of calculation,
of knowing, flooding them with meaning and value. In a small child's
delighted sentences you can hear that the function of speaking is not just
to refer to things. Speaking is belonging. Speaking brings the child into its
family. But Buber calls it "ontological speech": speaking that embodies
family is also that which generates world. How is that? How does our land-
scape come from who we are?
In our inquiry here, we ask how a teacher speaks the basic word of re-
lation, the ontological word "I-You"? What could that mean? How do we
set the perceptions of another "within a world as they had not been
before"? Buber speaks of such a fulfillment as a mysterious joining of will
and grace, purpose and receptivity, like being in love. I believe there are
steps we can take in its direction, a kind of speaking and listening that will
fit us for encounter, for breakthrough. Listening with Buber, with
Wittgenstein, and with Heidegger, we may be able to listen transitively—
to invent in our listening an arena for being related, for sharing mastery,
sharing apprenticeship. Though I have done my homework, trying to get
the philosophical story as accurate as I can, its accuracy is not finally the
point. I am inventing something here, something that bears on the teacher's
way of being, on engagement in education, on the sharing of mastery. If I
can engage you in the inventing, if I can get you to take it over from me, I
will have succeeded. If you can hear and answer the song of myself—my
enthusiasm, my naivety, my pride in sifting together philosophers, scien-
tists, and poets, my cleverness, my love for my own parents and for the
son that is a miraculous mirror of his father and of mine—then my invent-
ing will have found its home. Where inventing finds its way home, beget-
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ting its answering family, teaching/learning is present. If we are listening
for it, these philosophers speak of an arena where teaching can assume its
rightful magnitude in our culture.
Closer to home, there is another poet of facts, displayer and revealer
and re-inventor of facts, another teacher who opens the world to our
whole hearts. Here then is another epigraph for this book, from that song
which contains the antithesis of selfishness:
This is the lexicographer, this the chemist, this made a grammar
of the old cartouches,
These mariners put the ship through dangerous unknown seas,
This is the geologist, this works with the scalpel, and this is a
mathematician.
Gentlemen, to you the first honors always!
Your facts are useful, and yet they are not my dwelling,
I but enter by them into an area of my dwelling.
Less the reminders of properties told my words,
And more the reminders they of life untold, and of freedom and
extrication...4
That is Walt Whitman at the opening of our century, inviting us to con-
sider the possibility of that something beyond a staked-out position,
something more like a poetry of dwelling together. We teachers use facts,
but facts are not our dwelling. If we are to be poets of our students' school
days, we need temptations for the muse.
Even closer to our lives as teachers, listen to Annie Dillard as she
opens the possibility of living newly, jumping the past like a hopscotch
square:
For it is not you or I that is important, neither what sort we might
be nor how we came to be each where we are. What is important
is the moment of opening a life and feeling it touch—with an
electric hiss and cry—this speckled mineral sphere, our present
world.5
While this book is written for an audience—dare I hope it?—of practising
teachers, I envision also students in education courses, administrators,
school boards, and by extension, anyone who has ever participated with
the young in investigating the nature and possibilities of things. With all
of you, I want to step for a moment beyond our professional identities and
histories, our sorts and conditions and the circumstances we inherit, to
engage in a colloquy concerning that moment when with students we
open the present world to the touch of our living, and the hilly, rock-
strewn field becomes our home backyard.
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INTRODUCTION
When my son was two and a half years old, our speaking together did
not turn on shared vocabulary. Even now, I can explain the virtues of
spinach simply, or recommend it eloquently or sternly—in the presence of
whatever vocabulary or rhetoric, he sometimes eats spinach and some-
times does not. Nor do his actions always result from hunger or satiety; he
has eaten what I offer when full and refused it when empty. When I ask
him if he forgives me for being impatient with him, I do not think he
understands what it means to forgive someone. Yet he does unmistakably
forgive me, then and there. Something in our being together, like a mag-
netic field, calls him to be in a certain way, and it is the way of our being
together that includes his eating or not, that calls forth his forgiveness. The
purpose of my book is to contribute to shifting our cultural conversation
so that teachers are enabled as inventors of ways of being together. Other
professions—medicine, law, engineering—require skillful marshalling of
facts, careful planning according to a vast and developing body of experi-
ence and knowledge, astute observation and management of people. The
profession of teaching requires all this and something more: a willingness,
even a drive, to bring into being that colloquy that waits at the deepest
threshold of our mortal hearts. Our calling is to hold open the possibility
that the human family may be whole, as underneath our exchanges of
information, our structured communications, our methodical lesson plans,
there comes into presence the certainty that we and our students partake
together of the communion of family, and that we can be responsible, as
beings in whose destiny the world lies, for the promise and the dignity of
that sharing.
Something of the scope and import of our calling as teachers sounds
in the thinking of the eminent Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin. His
work springs from the conviction that not only literature, but the whole
range of human concerns, comes out of our mutual responsiveness. "I live
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in a world of others' words/' he says, locating our essential humanity in
the always flowing stream of our communion of speech. (In Russian, the
word is soobschenie: it connotes joining, sharing, becoming together, and not
"communication" or information transfer among discrete individuals in
their separate social roles.) For Bakhtin, it is not language that is primary,
but speaking and listening—that is, particular instances of "utterance,"
which are constructed, he says, not in accordance with rules of grammar
and syntax, but in "anticipation of an active, responsive understanding."
When we write, no less than when we address each other vocally, we
speak into a listening that conditions our utterance.
In the case of writing, this dependence of speaking on listening im-
plies that to study a text as if its language had meaning is to miss its "dia-
logic" nature. As dialogue, as invented utterance, it has power to constitute
a part of the life of those who are engaged in it as speakers and listeners.
To study text instead of utterance is anti-humane: it is to speak about third
parties, rather than with or for each other. And this is justified, Bakhtin
says, "only where the integral and unrepeatable individuality of the per-
son is not required... [when one is acting] not as I myself, but as an engineer,
a physicist..." Bakhtin does not complete the list of professions that may
not require in their performance "the integral and unrepeatable individu-
ality of the person."1
But now suppose, in the case of speech, that one acted as a teacher. How
much of my time with students is spent in this third-person role to the
exclusion of I myself? Lecturing, leading discussions, giving and grading
tests, counselling difficult cases, monitoring study hall...: who am I for the
other participants in teaching/learning? What is it to act as a teacher?
Bakhtin's picture suggests that any role, any set of standard activities, can
come to substitute for the "integral and unrepeatable" presence of the
person in authentic encounter with another person or persons. With
Bakhtin, as with Buber, we are moving from the standard conception of a
separate individual, who may indeed "play a role," toward a notion of the
person as existing by virtue of responsibility—by virtue of his or her
responses to and listenings for other persons. Taking a step along this
path, e.e. cummings says this: "We do not believe in ourselves until
someone else reveals that deep inside of us something is valuable, worth
listening to, worthy of our trust, sacred to our touch. Once we believe in
ourselves, we can risk curiosity, wonder, spontaneous delight or any
experience that reveals the human spirit." Here, individuality partakes of
mutuality, of encounter; it is the power to enter relationship and thus to
touch the world in wonder. Individuality here, rugged or not, is a gift of
another's listening, a creature of Buber's "living We, the genuine We."
Jacques Barzun puts the point this way: "There is no such thing as the
child—at any age. Teaching is not the application of a system, it is an
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exercise in perpetual discretion."2 By discretion I take it he means alertness
to the very particular relatedness developing from moment to moment
between a child or group of children and a teacher. If teachers are trained
in their roles, in the application of systems, and not enabled as beings who
can engage with students, we will not get enough moments of authentic
communion in education to satisfy our craving for genuinely shared being.
Nor will we achieve the kind of education most wanted and needed in a
world that calls more and more urgently on our essential humanity, our
responsibility to and for each other—in a word, on our love. In the class-
room sometimes, do we not feel that delicate blend of teaching with
parenting, the bringing forth of family?
As my son gets older I am beginning to notice how few are the times
when we actually make intimate eye contact—though an image more apt
than "eye contact" would be the old mingled eye-beams, emblem of
communion between beings. What we do instead of becoming together, I
think, is speak our minds. That is, we give our attention to whatever
structure of meaning is currently salient. If I am involved in writing or
reading, say, or preparing for class, I have an agenda: my purpose is to
complete whatever I'm doing before being with anybody, much less with
a small child who demands my unalloyed attention to his every whim. As
his vocabulary and command of sentence structure develop, he, too, has
sharper tools with which to persist in agendas of his own, so that our
interaction becomes not communion of beings but adjustment of agendas.
I can usually get the communion to recur by being on the lookout for it—
by being committed to its occurring, by putting it in if it's out. ("Dustin," I
said once, "I need a hug and a look.") But the experience, if I let myself
have it, is always the exact opposite of "getting to know my son." It is
rather a leap into unfathomed waters; a leap away from knowledge, not
toward it. In gracious moments, one consciously determines to leave the
security and comfort of one's customary agenda, to interrupt the language
that embodies and perpetuates its concerns, to cast off these moorings and
set sail. I sow no more profound risk than this sharing, and reap no more
exalted reward.
What is education, then—that quality so precious and rare in schooling?
In what cases, in the presence of what kinds of experience, do we want to
say "now this is education"? The word points us in two directions by
virtue of its etymology and its contemporary associations. From Latin
educare, to rear or bring up, we get these definitions:
1) to bring up (young persons) from childhood so as to form
(their) habits, manners, intellectual and physical aptitudes;
2) to train (any person) so as to develop the intellectual and moral
powers generally;
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3) to train, discipline (a person, a class of persons, a particular
mental or physical faculty or organ) so as to develop some
special aptitude, taste, or disposition.3
Hence "education" is used to designate "the systematic instruction,
schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of
life; by extension, similar instruction or training obtained in adult age;
also, the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has re-
ceived." I asked Dustin once if he knew what education was. He nodded
confidently. "It means he has to go to school," he said.
So much is familiar—so familiar, in fact, that we may not even see
what it says any more. For the standard definitions spotlight one feature
of our practice in this area of our common life: education as training,
preparation, formation, as transmission and reception of information or
technique; this is education as bending to pattern. But is this what we
envisioned as our job when we chose teaching as a career? What else is
there in our experience of that moment of wonder, elation, and bedrock
satisfaction that we knew as students of a great teacher, and again perhaps
when we caught an illumination in the eyes of our own students, a light
not artificially implanted, or even renewed, but new; a light not of under-
standing only, but of possibility?
The other Latin word, educere, means "to lead or draw forth or out,"
from which we get the word educe, "to bring out, elicit, develop, from a
condition of latent, rudimentary, or merely potential existence." Early
uses of the word suggest its different character, its sense of origination,
creation:
1603 The Heauens are efficients, which educe the forme out of
the matter of the corne.
1669 Chaos was that ancient slime, out of which all things were
educed.
1781 Hope has the wondrous virtue to educe from emptiness
itself a real use.
And in 1816, the poet S. T. Coleridge, blending pictures given by the two
etymologies, says that education "consists in educing the faculties and
forming the habits."4
The Latin teacher at my high school says that educere would have been
used also to describe the leading forth of an army from the city gates, or of
an expedition into the hills. Here, a sense of adventure, of going together
into an unknown world, with a purpose and with supporting equipment,
but also with a sense of reliance on something else than the already
designed equipment, the maps, the provisions. I make it the picture of
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Ulysses leading his drenched mariners into a world that must be to us,
some thirty centuries later, unimaginably new, a world where they invent
a way out of the Cyclops' cave using their native wits and whatever
materials come to hand. Ulysses, we are oft reminded, is "a man never at a
loss." He is certainly a leader. Is he a teacher? When Dustin goes to school,
as indeed he has to, whom does he encounter? What if education means
"he gets to re-invent his world"?
I have spent most of my career in an ideal teaching situation: small
classes, able or brilliant students, committed and caring colleagues. Even
here, our diagnosis of student difficulties often faltered. If we could not
find any personal shortcomings like Laziness or Preoccupation with the
Opposite Sex or Rebelliousness on which to base our findings and our
prescriptions, we were led to blame Lack of Aptitude for the Subject—the
categories being Native Ability, Motivation, and Diligence. Of course,
Native Ability is filtered through influence from the Family Background,
and Motivation may come through several channels, though the most
important of these is likely to be Parental Guidance, if not Parental Pres-
sure. Diligence, of course, is mostly a matter of the cultivation of Good
Study Habits. In my school it was only a few isolated individuals who
had difficulty; they were exceptions who proved a rule. But we assumed
that they had their problems as individuals. Some people, it seemed, were
just wired wrong for our brand of schooling. And if a student was particu-
larly recalcitrant, refusing the extra help we offered, we would say: "Well,
you can't help a person that doesn't want to be helped." With this "rule,"
among others, we constructed the edifice of our practice.
Carefully, conscientiously, soberly, we are dealing with our lives to-
gether in terms of the known world, the familiar borders, the paved roads.
Nothing wrong with paved roads except that, with parking lots and fast-
food shops, they leave precious little terrain for pioneering, for making
way in. What is there in our building together that gets lost in the built?
When asked what she would do to rekindle teachers, Marva Collins says,
"Tell them to stay out of the teachers' lounge in the morning." Why?
What arenas come into being in encounters between educators, and stu-
dents, and parents? Is it possible to shift an arena, to fertilize our encoun-
ters? Can the teachers' lounge, the faculty meeting—the conversations
among educators—be a source not of dysfunction but of breakthrough
results for students?
What paves roads is a paradigm. A paradigm is the medium of our
culture, an open set of beliefs and expectations, open because it faces the
future expecting to incorporate into itself whatever arrives. A paradigm
gives us a set of attitudes and expectations, parameters that actually
determine what we can hear and see, and what we cannot, and it provides
us with rules specifying how to operate successfully on what we see.5 To
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look at it more organically, a paradigm is a duster of rooted metaphors, a
soil from which grows the familiar vegetation—if pavement hasn't suc-
ceeded yet. It is part of this book's aim to shift the paradigm we bring to
teaching and learning, to the training of teachers, and to the initiation of
students into education. What is the currently dominant paradigm in
discourse about schooling or about education? At the Harvard Graduate
School of Education in 1989, Lawrence Cremin asserts that individuals
must learn "how to obtain the education they would like to have at any
given period of their lives."6 So that even if getting educated becomes
continual, self-initiated—even if, as Cremin recommends, students learn
how to learn—education itself, identified with acquired knowledge or
information or skill, remains a quantity to be obtained, a stuff that indi-
viduals have and use. We say of persons and classes of people that they
are "highly educated" or "poorly educated," as if the past participle might
accurately represent a completed state of affairs. Incomplete preparation
threatens our national destiny: "Only an educated America can promise
our country a future in space," we hear the announcer say. And we
applaud the bumper sticker's retort "Education expensive? Try ignorance!"
Though its stentorian challenge has been answered time and again—by
Piaget, by Vygotsky in challenging Piaget, by Dewey—still Thomas
Hobbes' dismal proclamation of this paradigm of education reverberates:
"The minds of the common people are like clean paper, fit to receive
whatever by public authority shall be imprinted in them."
Perhaps even our independent minds receive imprints from authorities
of one kind or another—I know my mind resonates to authoritative diction,
particularly if it's metaphorically delectable. Marching to almost any fife,
even the one that trills "beware of fife and drum!", the mind adopts the
rhythm and cadence of meaning pronounced in the read or the spoken,
and transmits its measure to the hand or voice, which act and react,
mechanical in agreement or rebuke. But what of our hearts? And shall I
couple soul? What we want is a frontier, an edge beyond which the
cadence of the known pauses, its repetition of structured options and
impossibilities fading as the voice of commitment, of our responsibility in
being for each other, sounds. Notwithstanding the slogan of Star Trek, space
is not the final frontier, any more than The West was. Where there suddenly
comes into presence the possibility of authentic sharing, of soobschenie, that
is where the frontier appears, and reappears, beckoning like the bright
crescent of Ithaca. What we want is educere. Even when we present facts,
dates, concepts, formulae, our continuing mission is not to imprint: it is to
share the adventure of being.
My purpose is not to subvert the traditional concerns of schooling, but
rather to renew the background behind them, or better, to notice their
ecology. I will not propose that we watch Star Trek on the TVs in our
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classrooms (though I have observed and participated in classroom activi-
ties of less educative import). Instead I will try out another vocabulary in
which we might hold "education," one that gives us a picture more like
the "becoming together" of Buber and Bakhtin. By developing this other
conversation for the background of our educational practice, I am not
claiming to reveal more clearly the essence of "true education." I am
interested in vocabularies as tools, and the conversational tools at our
disposal in the currently operative vocabulary of education, though still
useful in some ways, are no longer adequate by themselves to deal with
our current crisis. I want to continue to be able to talk about knowledge,
curriculum, subject matter, course content, examinations, grades. I want
all of our students to have the opportunity to share in the heritage of their
culture (or better, cultures), though I agree with E. D. Hirsch that such an
important purpose is not likely to be well served merely by requiring
exposure to items in a content-sequence.7 Thus, I do not propose what Ri-
chard Rorty calls a "final vocabulary7'8 different from the one we now use.
But shared knowledge is at least as much a matter of the sharing as it is of
the knowledge. To have an impact on the knowledge shared by a group
of pupils or a generation, we must be able to engage the sharing they
know. We need another vocabulary, another way of speaking about edu-
cational problems and possibilities alongside the canonical one, a system
of terms including these: speaking, listening, conversation; inventing, de-
claring, committing, sharing; and maybe even being. We should be talk-
ing about the being of teaching. We will talk about it, in Chapter Six, by
reinventing the "wheel of Saying." In Chapter Seven, we will talk about it
with some "terms" that are not verbal but experiential; for the vocabulary
of being articulates activity as well as thought. But to begin developing
this other vocabulary, to find ourselves talking in its terms, we will listen
to the conversations of some of our most powerful recent thinkers—
Saussure and Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Buber, among others.
In Part One we will be conducting the investigation in an arena called
epistemology. When we are in this arena we are committed to asking
questions about how knowledge is possible and how it can be valid: we
are asking how we know what we know. The first modern poser of this
question, Rene Descartes, answered it in a way that has become paradig-
matic, inaugurating a way of distinguishing between subject and object
that enabled the march of science. In his most influential philosophical
works, he proposed a method of authorizing and validating the perceptions
and conceptions—the knowledge—of an individual observer. Thus he
isolated the Knowing Subject. Less than half a century later, John Locke's
writing nailed down the Object side of the distinction, so that we then had
a world composed of individuals and objects that individuals apprehend
more or less truly. Knowledge, for us, is inextricably bound up with this
picture of subjects over against objects. Though Wittgenstein's work does
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not dispute the difference between subject and object, or the difference
between truth and falsehood, it asks us to inquire into the conversation in
which these distinctions are used, and to notice the sociality of their use;
in so doing, it provides us with a bridge into a world where teaching can
assume its rightful magnitude, its world-opening touch.
In Part Two the arena will shift to ontology—though I do not mean by
that a division of philosophical thought. Though the word and the arena
come to me (most recently) from Martin Heidegger, a philosopher whose
massive work is intended to counterbalance the weight of at least four
hundred years of scientific epistemology, ontology for me simply means
being together with others in a world. When we are talking ontology our
interest is in what it is to be present, to and for one another. This does not
mean getting along with one another, being sociable, etc. Indeed, it may
mean the opposite; it may mean trying each other sorely. I am using
"epistemology" and "ontology" to distinguish between arenas that, it
seems to me, we usually conflate. For the phenomena of being together
are all too often masked by our easy acquaintance with phenomena of
knowing together. Thus ontology is a name for a domain of inquiry, an
inclination to question, not for a set of answers.
What I mean by "ontology" suggests itself in all the work of Michael
Polanyi, beginning with Personal Knowledge. That tacit "component" that
Polanyi identifies in the background of personal knowledge has much to
do with the teacher's way of being, as it has to do also with the listening
present in the teaching/learning situation "before" speaking occurs.
But if we know a great deal that we cannot tell, and if even that
which we know and can tell is accepted by us as true only in view
of its bearing on a reality beyond it, a reality which may yet
manifest itself in the future in an indeterminate range of un-
suspected results; if indeed we recognize a great discovery, or
else a great personality, as most real, owing to the wider range of
its yet unknown manifestations: then the idea of knowledge
based on wholly identifiable grounds collapses, and we must
conclude that the transmission of knowledge from one genera-
tion to the other must be predominantly tacit.9
Polanyi affirms the presence in all knowledge of a tacit dimension that
conditions our understanding and use of that knowledge. In one way, the
tacit dimension is an unspoken bargain struck between the participants
about what entities (including themselves) inhabit the world, the ways
these embrace and settle into accord or conflict, what is available or
fruitful to be said about these entities, what concerns are to be addressed...
how the world of the given situation fits together. In another way, it
includes the inclination to question, to launch out into the yet unknown.
INTRODUCTION 9
The passage above suggests, further, that the authority of what is
learned—transmitted to following generations—resides in that tacit di-
mension. So the job of teaching—and thus of teacher training—is to en-
able and empower the tacit. We can do so with a vocabulary of being
together and inventing that will stand alongside (not replace) the vocabu-
lary of representation and transmission of knowledge that uses us. We
want a conversation for commitment or responsibility alongside the vo-
cabulary that acknowledges what is so. I will be exploring what such a
vocabulary might look like.
I am also using the terms "epistemology" and "ontology" as they are
interrelated by Huston Smith, in Beyond the Post-Modern Mind (New York:
Crossroad, 1982). In Chapter Eight ("Beyond the Modern Western Mind-
set"), he postulates a sequence in which our modern motivation to control
nature produces the epistemology of empiricism and ontology of "natu-
ralism," yielding finally the lived experience of alienation. That students
as well as teachers experience alienation from and in the educational
system we have inherited seems clear, beginning at least with the Carnegie
Report, Smith proposes that, starting with another motivation—"partici-
pation"—we might generate a different sequence, through an epistemol-
ogy of "intuitive discernment" and an ontology of "transcendence" to a
lived experience of "fulfillment." Rather than explicating here the meanings
of the terms in Smith's sequences, I merely note that the purpose of this
book is to begin enabling us teachers to shift our motivation toward
"participation," being-together, without losing control of our classrooms.
How is it that students can divine the answer to a question in class by
the way you ask it? At least partially, at least sometimes, you can influ-
ence the direction a discussion will take by having students pick up on
your intentions, no? Or again: one group of students, presented with a
game requiring skill, luck, and participation outdoors, chooses to take it
on as a challenge and an opportunity for fun. Another group, in the same
class section, stands aside talking among themselves as the others perform.
A third group declines even to go outside and watch. Where do the
influences come from here? What different worlds are there here for
students to live into? And when a student consistently makes an effort but
consistently fails, in what world is he or she living? When a student
makes remarkable progress, taking on the challenge of schooling as if his
or her life depended on it, what world has come into being? What world
has been occurring when a teacher burns out?
The question that generates the ontology arena is, "How is it that a
world comes to be? What is it to be?"10 If we had some acquaintance with
that inquiry, we might have some say in the worlds we find ourselves and
our students living in. In this arena, the guides will be Heidegger and
Martin Buber, a philosopher and a theologian whose works, juxtaposed,
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allow us to cross Wittgenstein's bridge into new territory. As you will
have surmised, the crossing is supported also by my own children and
my students.
As the continuing presence of my child reminds me, however, it is not
in using the same vocabulary, once we develop it, that we gain those
moments of being that exalt our lives together. I have had occasion to ask
Dustin more than once if he forgives me, and though forgiveness has
come into presence on each of those occasions, he cannot define the word.
Can 7 define it? I know the procedure for looking the word up, but the
definition is not what is present in our encounter. The definition is like a
picture, an explanation of what happened, after the fact. It is a memory of
forgiveness. In educational practice, too, the landscape of memory might
at some moments be transformed into a listening for inspiration. Vocabu-
lary and grammar alone do not do that—though it is hard to mink what
they could be, "alone." But a new vocabulary and a new way of talking do
open the door to new possibilities. As they gain a foothold, they present
us with the opportunity to ask, "What would it be like to commit ourselves
to that vocabulary? What might happen if we used that network of concepts
instead? What would the landscape look like?"11 These are not questions
that can be answered in solitude. What they require, what they invoke, is
colloquy: speaking together. For a new way of talking means a new way of
listening, too, so that a new vocabulary can call forth powerful conversation:
that turning together, to and with each other, in which possibilities are
invented and then realized. In the present case, it is not mat a philosophi-
cal conversation will do anything to alter the system of instruction we are
immersed in. But it will do something to us, and for us. As the sudden
vista from a farther ridge opens out, in a new colloquy we may find
ourselves inventing new possibilities for dwelling together in the landscape,
for owning the landscape of our dwelling. So I am not talking about
relevance, either. A classroom is a real world. The cry for relevance is
ontologically vacuous; it may even rupture the fabric of shared being, of
encounter, since the very notion of relevance presupposes and trades on
the divorce between content and lived experience. Relevance is the enemy
of teaching.
What is a teacher? A standard, if crude, answer might be "the one
who knows and tells."12 A teacher communicates his knowledge, and maybe
his understanding, to his students; and we listen to the question with this
standard answer in mind—we listen from the answer we have already
heard. This is the teacher as given in the paradigm of epistemology. Of
course, the current cultural picture of what a teacher is derives from
perhaps hundreds of antecedents, including cartoons and popular songs.
(In Wittgenstein's terms, the "grammar" of the word teacher is the
confluence of innumerable semantic rivers.) In this book, though, I want
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to focus on what seem to me two powerful expressions of some notions
bound into our current teaching and education. The writings of Locke and
Descartes, as the source of much of what we have been hearing in the
modern age, provide us with a means of distinguishing or noticing the
background that shapes our current colloquy and practice, distinguishing
it as background, getting a grip on the picture that grips us.
At the outset, then, our task is to establish an unusual kind of rela-
tionship with the pictures that give us our own identity and purpose in
life as well as our views of the nature of the world and society—pictures
that give us ourselves and our students. Like water for a fish, these
pictures remain unremarked, untended in the course of an ordinary life;
they are the unnoticed medium, the background against which all our
experiences occur. My purpose in tracing what philosophers have been
saying recently about the pictures we are living in is not to discover more
correct pictures. Even if some of our pictures are wrong, I have no privileged
position from which to set forth corrections. This is not false modesty; it is
not even modesty. Junior year in high school, I had been an excellent
student of French, so good, in fact, that I would amaze my roommate by
reciting perfectly in class without having cracked the book the night
before. I must have been pretty cocky about that, and maybe even about
something or other besides, for in the hallway one day the French teacher
said to me, as if in passing: "Henry, you don't know everything you want
to know yet." I don't remember what else he said. But what I got was
more than a message about the incompleteness of my knowledge of
French. His remark said something about my way of being, something
that, somehow, I took on as ballast rather than correction. What lasted out
of our encounter was a new distinction: he had provided a background,
and I could see myself against it. He had named the medium in which I
had been being, so that when I noticed it as a medium, as the tacit force
field which had been shaping my participation, a new possibility of being
opened up for me.
One of my students once voiced his dismay at my own failure to fit
the traditional picture: "Dr. McHenry, you never tell us anything!" I took
this mostly as a compliment, if also partly as a tip that I was not meeting
the students halfway. But what if a teacher's authority came from author-
ship, rather than from superior knowledge? What if teachers were the
unacknowledged legislators of the world: poets? Then the normal science
of teaching would be invention and re-invention, instead of instruction.
We would have an art of being together, an art in whose sway our science
of instruction would function, instead of spinning its wheels. Not that it
always and everywhere spins its wheels. Anyway, there is nothing wrong
with instruction, either. Students are, or should be, anxious for us to tell
them things.
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Where I have made a difference with students, I have somehow been
able to be present with them in the teaching/learning arena, rather than off
searching through a mental file cabinet of information about the subject or
about methods of teaching it. We have become together. This extraordinary
moment of shared being cannot happen unless I am prepared, confident
of my command of the subject; but preparation in the subject or content of
the lesson will not necessarily produce it. Where I have made a difference
with my son—where he and I have been partners, sharing in the joy, the
trials, and the mystery of his growing up—there has been that same sense
of perfect engagement, of being together at the front of the train: laying
the tracks as we go, inventing our way with the wind in our faces. It is not
that we arrive at a destination nobody ever heard of before. It is rather
that, coming from this kind of inventing, we arrive at the familiar places
of family life and know them for the first time. Things are brand new here,
not only for him but also for me. And whatever I say or do in this place
contributes to him, and what he says and does educates me: when we are
engaged this way, our world is ours, like Ulysses'.
This is a "basics" we teachers could get back to: it is a kind of engage-
ment that is possible before culture, even before literacy. And it is always
possible between people, not just parents and children. Why did Ishmael
go to sea "before the mast"? He intimates that his life as a schoolmaster
had something to do with it. Why did his civil soul require intimate
contact with Queequeg the tatooed harpooneer? As I jump aboard a New
York City bus, at Amsterdam and a hundred and something street, late in
the afternoon, why does a woman passenger offer me, my tweed pockets
suddenly empty, fifty cents for the fare? Surely there is something more
powerful in being together underneath the trappings, the social-conceptual
webwork with which our lives are framed and buttressed. The "basics" of
engagement not only allow but call forth invention and re-invention.
Invention, as I use it here—in + venire—means coming into a world. Com-
ing into a world together, we are engaged in a promise and a claim. For it
is our world then, not the world. Engagement does not deny knowledge: it
is the soul of knowledge. Literacy is the freight; this is the locomotive. A
teacher may be the one who knows and tells, but teaching/learning is
engagement.
Because this book investigates the ways we talk, and might talk, more
than the way things are, I will make use of etymology rather brazenly.
Heidegger has been criticized for his "largely fake" etymologies.13 Though
the criticism is surely correct, it does not seem to me apt. It may not have
been Heidegger's purpose to produce correct etymologies,14 and, while I
hope I have used the dictionaries conscientiously, neither is it mine. I try
only to suggest the ways in which some of our words, in their usual
senses, may work together to embody and maintain a picture of man's
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relationship to the world, and our relationships in our world, and within
that, of teachers' relationships to students. A picture holds us captive, says
Wittgenstein.15 Perhaps we can release ourselves into an area of our
dwelling together by highlighting some of the currently transparent senses
of our words. We speak of teachers and instructors almost without distin-
guishing between them, but the verb "to teach" in English comes from an
Old English form meaning to show, to let appear. In French the verb is
enseigner, from Latin insignare or insignire, to make known by pointing,
signalling. By thinking of teachers as instructors (L. instruere, to pile up,
build), we may miss the distinction between persons building with mate-
rials and persons being with persons. It is not the specific names but the
vocabularies that are at issue, the constellations of names in the region of
our home galaxy. Even Outward Bound calls its leaders "instructors,"
though their job is to bring present, for and with their students, a new
world to dwell in together. Whatever you call yourself, use this book to
inquire into the vocabulary of your craft, its methods of training you, of
constituting your job, of relating you with your students.
As a record of my own intellectual journey, a sometimes-inspired
student and teacher, and of my not-always-delighted encounters with my
child, this whole book reads a bit like a drive through West Virginia,
twisting between theorizing, inquiry, and observation; philosophy and
diary. I do not know how to ride a motorcycle (just as well, perhaps) so I
will be driving the car I am used to, a 1967 Chrysler station wagon—a
huge rolling condominium of a car, with a luggage rack on top and
crannies inside for all the walking sticks and life preservers I have col-
lected since before my mother died. It was her car before I inherited it. I
can haul lumber and tools inside and a ladder on top, and I love its aura of
expedition. Saved from extinction by care and lucky artifice, it gives a
certain context to my building, to my journey. Dustin says it's the best car
we own.
It may not surprise a veteran teacher to hear that your way of being is
more important in a classroom than what you know. Be careful how you
live, the maxim warns; you may be the only textbook a student ever reads.
But we still have almost no access to our ways of being; hence we have
only hobbled means of making a difference for our students and for
society. How are we to recover those moments of magic that we lose in
our anxiety for the results that the magic makes possible?
A Cincinnati teacher, offered a magic wand by Harry Smith of CBS,
said that the one thing he would wish for to transform his school is a way
of working with each student, one by one. If this project succeeds, so that
the background of teacWng/learning includes the conversation of being—
the listening for being—it will grant him his wish. He will be able, even in
the midst of his class of thirty or fifty or a hundred students, to be with
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each one individually, personally, and intimately, with all the promise
and power available in that communion.
I am aware that this is a tall order, and I am writing scared. "Oh, get
real; you can't manage that!" I hear myself saying. "Be serious! Education
isn't a magic show!"
"Not yet, it isn't," I reply to myself, somewhat shakily. Then, warming
to the possibility of my task: "There were supposed to be more things in
heaven and earth than were dreamt of in our philosophy."
While we seem to have heaven pretty well down by now, there may
yet be marvels available to us on earth. The book will recommend, and
reading it may produce for you, a kind of awareness; and while I will avoid
"steps to better teaching," I will suggest (in Chapter Seven) exercises and
activities for preparing for the classroom encounter and for refreshing its
power in midstream. But the power of a technique arises out of the
listening in which it is used. A technique is not a mechanism, any more
man you or I. (The Greek word tekne meant art.) So I speak into your lis-
tening, and into the listening that uses us bom, hoping for grace to re-
invent our listening for each other.
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Ask one of the children to stand up, and then ask another to get up
and walk around the first. Then have a third child walk around the
first child, only in a larger orbit. Continue this with the whole class
illustrating an orbiting structure. As a next step ask students to
think of different natural phenomena that could be modeled by
their little dance.
But as Hirsch points out, while one group of pupils might take to Kohl's
method, another group, with a different "social background," might not:
They complain that moving around the room in orbits is "too first-
gradish"; they decline to get the larger point; they clown, and feel
uneasy; they resent the whole exercise. Kohl, with a good teacher's
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appropriate adjustments in his mode of proceeding, and would
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that follows, one of Hirsch's "basic principles of teaching," seems to me at
least questionable:
Even in open classrooms, the main work of teaching is conducted
by means of verbal communication between the members of the
class. There is an inherent link between effective classroom com-
munication and effective learning. If Kohl wishes to suggest that
successful classroom learning doesn't depend on students sharing
extensive background knowledge, then, with regard to that par-
ticular issue, I have no hesitancy in saying he doesn't know what
he's talking about.
Hirsch's logic assumes that the reason for their resistance in this case is that,
because their social backgrounds have been different, they do not share
background knowledge. Effective communication, whence learning, is as-
sumed to depend on extensive common knowledge. I am starting my
inquiry with a contrary question: What if the main work of teaching is
conducted by something other than verbal communication, something that
makes verbal communication possible, perhaps? What besides background
knowledge is always present in the classroom as the enabling context for the
verbal communication? Hirsch does not claim here that shared background
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inquiring in this book into the conditions of sharing.
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is compared to the resistance of a rock to the waves that assail it, it
is not necessarily a matter of extending to the rock, through
anthropomorphism, a human behavior, but of interpreting human
resistance petromorphically. Resistance is neither a human privi-
lege, nor a rock's, just as radiance does not characterize a day of the
month of May more authentically than the face of a woman. The
meaning precedes the data and illuminates them. Here lies the
essential justification and great force of Heidegger's etymologies,
which, starting with the impoverished and flat meaning of a term
apparently designating a content of external or psychological
experience, lead toward a global situation in which a totality of
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PART!
EPISTEMOLOGY
What Is Knowing, and How Do We Know?
We continue with another small story about the way my child talks. He
had been playing outside with his "nanny," a third-year law student who
had been coming over three days a week to help my wife after the birth of
our second child. When I overheard a bit of their banter, Andrea was
saying "Why do you get to change your mind so often?" I guess Dustin
had been re-making the rules to some game they had been playing,
whenever it suited his interests at the moment to have different rules—
not a fully ethical practice, but the child is only four now and doesn't
know what is required in adult play yet. After only the minutest of
hesitations, he answered her question with: "Because I say so."
My son the poet, again voicing one of the main things I want to say in
this book. Of course he may have been parroting, adapting something he
heard his mother say in exasperation once, after all her good reasons
failed to persuade him. But his utterance, as heard by his alert father, says
something else than that the devil can quote scripture. He and Andrea
had been having real fun together, and her question expressed not exas-
peration, but amusement. So it seems appropriate that I cite his saying to
introduce my own. Did he know the rides of the game he was playing?
No: he was saying the rules, not just selfishly, but so that the game
worked for both players. So our conversation about knowing begins with
our picture of language. As I hinted in the Introduction and now confess
outright, it is not a conversation that does justice to the two millennia of
epistemological theory and thinking since Plato. What I know of our
investigations of knowledge and knowing is here to be put at the service
of another endeavor than epistemology. I am committed to exploring
what it is about knowing that evokes and involves our mutuality, our
being-together with our community's children. Thus I return again and
again to examine my own being together with my child, reminding us
who teach that, at the moments that matter, teaching is an avatar of
loving.
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OUR PICTURE OF LANGUAGE
Philosophers reduced the scope of their inquiries so much that
Wittgenstein... said "the sole remaining task for philosophy is
the analysis of language." What a comedown from the great
tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to Kant!
—Steven Hawking1
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language users master and then
apply to cases.
—Donald Davidson2
riven such a contemporary master of the use of invented pictures to
handle reality as Steven Hawking still sees language as reality's little
brother. He looks back to the tradition, both empiricist and rationalist, of
investigating a nature independent of and vaster than the human. Even
for us lay people, this tradition is so intrinsic to our way of being in the
world that we seldom see any other possibility. This is why the task of
"analysis" seems so fundamental. If we are given a world, a reality with
the components we recognize (tables and chairs, trees, people...), then the
job of cutting that reality up into appropriate parts and figuring out how
these relate to each other seems like the most important job we can do. But
this job goes along with a particular picture of language's nature and
function. It is not even that we assume the subordination of language to
reality: I am supposing that our very ways of being with other people,
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thinking and speaking, hoping and wishing, opining and despairing, are
tied up with the presumption that what language does is abstract from
reality, from what there is in nature, and then describe it. For the most
part, it is rather as if this notion assumes us, takes us up into itself like the
atmosphere; it is part of the sustaining air we breathe. For a precis of this
state of affairs—our respiration of and in language—see Walker Percy's
essay "The Mystery of Language."3 Percy says that we are breathing cause
and effect; I agree and only add that we are breathing another colorless,
odorless gas as well, called reference.
There is fresher air. Though it has taken the better part of a century, it
is fairly well accepted nowadays in linguistic circles that language works
because of social convention. I can remember the precise moment when I
first got this idea clearly; it was like finding a new walking stick, of exactly
the right length and suppleness and elegance. I didn't know yet where I
might be walking with the aid of this stick, but it looked very useful
indeed. I owe the idea to one of my first teachers in the English Department
at the University of Virginia; he showed it to us in the work of Ferdinand
de Saussure, a linguist working in Geneva during the first decade of this
century. Saussure's work has since served in several intellectual traditions,
most notably as the foundation of what was called structuralism. In
Wittgenstein, to whose conversation Chapter Four is devoted, cousins of
Saussure's ideas shifted the ground underneath philosophy.
To say that meaning occurs because of social convention is to say that
there is no necessary relation between a sign and what it signifies; the
signifier is, as Saussure asserted, arbitrary. (What breathy emphasis my
teacher gave to the word "arbitrariness"! He spoke as if here were the
knot of our whole intricate relation to the world.) Saussure does not mean
that the arbitrariness of the sign results from a kind of willful or capricious
act. His idea might have been better rendered by a word like "accidentality."
(Somewhere P. F. Strawson remarks that a sign gets established because it
works, and then it works because it is established. In the two-year-old's
developing speech, one can watch as this contingency of sign practice
flowers in the milieu of shared human doings.) The arbitrariness of the
sign might be exemplified as follows. Look first at words in different
languages for what we see as the same idea. The word arbre works just as
well for the community that uses it as the word tree does for its users, though
the two words obviously bear no formal relation to each other. Neither
word, then, corresponds in its shape or sound to any characteristic of the
idea that it evokes. Or look at the way we can, on the spur of the moment,
use any sound to serve the purposes of communicating: imagine a child,
alone in his sandbox, building a sand castle. His father comes into the
vicinity, strikes a pose of obvious astonishment, and says "Goo gah!"
Beaming, the child responds "Goo gah goo gah!" In class later that day the
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teacher, as an experiment, asks his students to open the doodahs of the
classroom to let in a little more air.
Locke had seen this much when he looked at language in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding. But in Saussure's use the idea of arbi-
trariness brings more with it. It is not just that we can couple any sound
with a meaning, or with a "referent"—it is also that the sounds do not
work by referring to the objects. It was clear to my students that a doodah
was a window because opening one would let in more air. The cluster of
signs—open, doodah, let in, air—worked together against (or within) a
background of common practice. Saussure's crucial insight was that to
use language is not to arrange sounds or marks so that they correspond
with things in the world and in ourselves. Rather, it is to navigate within a
constellation and among constellations, not of stars but of arbitrary "val-
ues." On this view, the system of tools that comprises our language is like
an immense network of commodities and exchanges among commodi-
ties. Words, sentences, parts of speech, grammatical patterns, shrugs,
even silence—all are commodities with relative value. That is, each of
these commodities has its value neither because of anything inherent in its
structure or essence, nor by virtue of the content of its referent, but be-
cause all the other elements have what value they have. As vowels and conso-
nants define each other in the stream of speech, so do nouns and verbs,
requests and assertions, black and white, red and pink they set each other
apart, imbibing meaning through association and contrast. A value is
defined by its simultaneous similarities to and differences from other
values in the system that the values make up. It would be equally correct
to say the system makes up the values.4 The parts of speech and the whole
of speech arise together interdependently.
We may immediately think: surely some commodities—gold or dia-
monds, say, or wheat—have intrinsic worth, intrinsic value. But how
would we say what that value is? Isn't it what we can buy with the
commodity, what we can exchange it for, compare it with, or use it to do?
Gold is trading today at, say, three hundred eighty-five dollars an ounce.
But what is a dollar worth? Well, it's worth 1/385 of an ounce of gold. In
the system of monetary values as it stands today—in today's state of the
system of monetary values—gold and currency stand in the ratio 1 to 385.
(That, of course, was the ratio when I began this chapter. As I complete the
book, it stands closer to 1 to 335.) We specify one unit in terms of other
units. The money value of wheat is the wheat value of money, and we
measure the prospect of satisfying our appetite just as readily in terms of
our income level as of the level of flour in the bin. Another example or two
will make this notion of a system of values clearer. I will follow Saussure
almost verbatim.
First, consider the case of the express train from Geneva to Paris that
leaves every day at 8:45 p.m. Is this the same train every day? We say so,
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even though locomotive, cars, and personnel may all be different from
one day to the next. "The 8:45 express to Paris" is a name we give to a
place in a system, here the system marked out in the railroad timetable.
What gives the express its identity is the hour of its departure, its origin
and destination, and all the other circumstances that distinguish it from
other expresses, and other trains, and other modes of transportation.
Similarly, if Elm Street is demolished, say to upgrade utilities underneath,
and then rebuilt, with wider sidewalks and a landscaped median where
before there was none, we might remark with pleasure how nicely the city
planners have restored Elm Street, though nothing of the old street remains.
What makes it Elm Street is its position relative to College, Grove, and
High Streets, not anything in its material or even its proportions. We call it
Elm Street because we can use that name to locate ourselves in the city, to
navigate. We have a map of the city, on paper or in our head, and the
name Elm Street holds a unique place in the system of which the map is
one portrayal.5 Or suppose our purpose is to play a game of chess: does it
matter if we have lost one of the knights? Of course not. We simply put
down a bottle cap in the place of the knight, and play on. We call it the
knight without a second thought, simply by continuing our play.6 For my
child, any stick is a sword; any place, inside or outside, Sherwood Forest.
When he pretends, what he's doing is setting up a system of arbitrary
values, defined as elements of the game he wants to play.
All of these are examples of what Saussure calls "semiological systems."
Semiology (from Greek semeion, sign) is the name of a science that Saussure
envisioned and inaugurated, studying our use of systems of values, "the
life of signs within society."7 In any semiological system, as we see, the
elements hold each other in their places in equilibrium—this is what it is
for meaning to be given by "value."
Are scholastic systems semiological systems? Let us look at, for ex-
ample, letter grades. "A" means "Excellent", "B" means "Good", "C"
Fair, "D" Poor, "F" Failure. This system works well, particularly if you
add the possibility of "+" and "-" to the letters. But it works, as we all
know, by comparison within the group of students in a particular class at
a particular school, as well as by reference to more objective standards.
Bill gets a B on his paper partly because Jill's paper earned an A, and
Will's a C, and so on. That is, A means Excellent in comparison and
contrast with other performances, and it is some human speaker who
makes the comparisons. (Standardized "objective" tests are no less exem-
plary of the dependence on human speaking, human judgment, as the
controversy over the fairness of the S.A.T. (Scholastic Aptitude Test) shows.
The test is "objective" and "standardized" for a chosen speech community,
which may coincide with a particular socio-economic class. The question
becomes not "Are they objective?" but "Who chooses to use them, and for
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what purposes?") Someone has to have the final say about what grade is
given—or several someones. This is as it should be. But it does not mean
that so-called "objective" tests are really subjective. I am not really interested
here in the subjective-objective polarity as a scale for measuring educational
phenomena. Instead I am looking at the social context, the semiological
system where, with its myriad correlated distinctions, the subject/object
dichotomy, along with the letter grades and the rest of our vocabulary,
channels our collective practice.
Though my own final say is often influenced by how much effort I
think has gone into a student's work, how much improvement is evident,
I am always grading with one eye on the "objective" (standard) descriptions
of "A work" or "C work" promulgated by my institution and the other on
the particular history of the student in question, sometimes as plaintively
urged by himself. In other words, I am making active use of the system of
values that encompasses the letter grades, the verbal descriptions, and my
conversations with others in my community. I am saying what the case is
for each of my students' work, but I can say it only within, and in the
terms presented by, a system of values. And—this is crucial—that system
comes out of colloquy, conversation: with other teachers, with the students
themselves, with the reputation and aspirations of the institution, including
its published grading standards, and so on. The system not only comes
out of colloquy but lives in it, moment by moment.
If a new category were added to the five conventional ones—say, "S"
for Superlative—I would have to re-calculate everything, for the equilib-
rium between the values would have been disturbed. Middle-grade work
could now be assigned either a B or a C, and I would have to make a new
set of decisions, of comparisons and contrasts. The value of a B would not
be the same in the two systems. How would I go about using the new
system, making those life-or-death decisions about where to rank student
performances? I would find out how other teachers were using it, how the
administration intended for it to be used, how the students expected it to
be used, and so on. I would engage in colloquy to reach some kind of
agreement with my associates.8
The prime fact about any semiological system, Saussure says, is that it
exists only by virtue of the tacit social agreement present in colloquy, in
conversation; this is true particularly of the most pervasive semiological
system, language:
Contrary to all appearances, language never exists apart from
the social fact... Its social nature is one of its inner characteristics...
In fact, every means of expression used in society is based, in
principle, on collective behavior or—what amounts to the same
thing—on convention.9
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It is the working/or us that is the crucial issue. The military has developed
a special vocabulary, and special conventions, for radio communication, a
slang that helps messages get through noise and jamming: it works where
our ordinary language would not. It works, as all languages do, because
its speakers share a system of tools for accomplishing things of interest to
them. Suppose you are piloting a small fighter plane returning through a
thunderstorm to your carrier after a nighttime exercise. As the fuel in your
tanks runs lower, you radio ahead to the unseen control tower on the
ship: "Bingo fuel," you say. In answer, you hear through the popping and
crackling a signal fading in and out: "landing three twenty," it says.
"Report angels three five miles." You or I might not be able to understand
a message from a field radio back to the command post, for we do not
share in the conventions that make it up. Of course, we might be able to
figure it out, decode it, based on our knowledge of English and any
related experiences we may have had with similar codes. But there is a
difference between such an armchair exercise and the airman's actual use
of the system in navigating toward a safe landing. It is not just that more is
riding on the correct interpretation. For in the actual use, Bakhtin would
say, the message is not language but "utterance in anticipation of an active
responsive understanding." Its meaning is shaped not only by the structure
of significations built into the system but by that anticipation, like an
electric circuit where current is set flowing by voltage. Convention is code
plus something. Convention is coming-together, con-venire, the shape of
participation. Convention is child's play. We play the game by setting up
the rules and the pieces, then launching out into the air.
The play tower I built for Dustin in our backyard is a platform raised
on four-by-four stilts, with a railing around three sides. From it depend
certain ropes, swings, and a ladder, providing a fixed number of options
for playing. Up to a point, the child can invent with his playmates different
games using the limited inventory of elements—he can re-invent the
swing and ladder to figure in a different story line. And even though the
structure of the play tower is fixed, so that there comes a time when the
child bumps against its limits, we can (if Daddy feels playful) add a cargo
net or a door, opening new possibilities for his operations. The play tower
is not only a fixed structure; it is an ongoing invention as well. The latest
addition is a pair of wooden pineapples, which he spotted at the building
supply store and mounted on top of the railing on one side, thus framing
a barrier rather man an entry. It is not, architecturally, a fully grammatical
statement, but the whole structure is an improvisation, after all, and the
whimsy of pineapples adds appropriately to its fabric.
Within the system of ordinary natural language, though, the game
feels different. Here, neither the military's outlandish standardization nor
the child's improvisation holds sway. At the beginning of a school year,
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flush with the possibility of breakthrough, we aspire for our students to
take charge of their language, re-inventing the stubborn structure of English
so as to surprise their teachers with brilliant, original, and moving com-
positions. But by about February we are beginning to wish that they
would just learn the grammar, for God's sake, and leave invention off
until they have. They have bumped up against the limits of the structure,
but have no power to break up the agreements nailed into the system of
our grammar—to build a new playhouse—and so have nowhere to go
except into rote memory work, or the pleasant drudgery of Harbrace
grammar drills. And we have nowhere to go along with them.
To help our students cope with language arts, we ordinarily define
the noun as the name of a person, place, or thing, and the verb as desig-
nating action or state of being; it is easy to see those definitions as specify-
ing intrinsic characteristics of nouns and verbs. In the language we speak
and write—we think of it as the language—and particularly in the lan-
guage we teach, there are, in addition to definitions, rules of grammar and
principles of composition and rhetoric; and players cannot make up the
rules, any more than the definitions, by themselves. We must adopt the
conventions, the grammar, the vocabulary, which we find already in play.
We are stuck with a language-game that was already invented when we
joined it. Or so it appears. Saussure's work begins to suggest a way
around the dead end, a way to recover the voltage that makes the current
possible.
To recognize the path he offers, we have to give up the idea that there
is such a thing as language. (Don't worry: after we give it up, we get it
back in a different way.) "Contrary to all appearances/' Saussure says, is
the fundamental sociality of language. Now, ordinarily, we have taken
language to be a structure governed by rules—in Davidson's words, a
"clearly defined shared structure which language users master and then
apply to cases." But in Saussure's picture, language is a system of conven-
tions made by and maintained in usage. Of course, if one wants to com-
municate effectively (especially in school essays) one must conform at
least minimally to the norms set out in the grammar. But Saussure makes
a key distinction between this imperativeness, this compulsion by norm,
and the "principles of regularity" that merely describe the patterns of
usage, the arrangement of arbitrary terms in a semiologic system.10 For a
"law" of language, he says, is "a simple expression of an existing arrange-
ment... [it] reports a state of affairs; it is like a law that states that trees in a
certain orchard are arranged in the shape of a quincunx."11 This kind of law
is not imperative. The trees could have been planted in a circle, if that
shape served the purposes of the orchardist and his family. No imperative,
nothing intrinsic, determines the value of gold; but its price is determined
in a market. Values live in a social matrix. Saussure's picture of the socially
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conditioned interdependence of arbitrary signs throws the apparent
structure of language up like a projection on a scrim in a theater, an airy
luminosity behind which we can see ourselves as the speakers who enact
the language. Now, perhaps it is just these speaker-actors, acting for
themselves rather than abiding by the structure, who can work at master-
ing the rules, the ones for whom grammar is not a barrier but just another
tool. Isn't it as if some students, some of the time, choose to do well? Some
students, even, seem to choose excellence for themselves all of the time.
We are working on enabling that choice.
Now when we are telling students about the rules of grammar, we
may indeed be under the imperative of collective usage: we and they have
no room here to invent anything on our own. Isn't it so in your classes?
The students figure they have to do it the way the book says or they will
get points taken off; and the teacher is obliged to take off points for
mistakes. For once we have agreed on a single set of rules and game
pieces, it looks as if the game must be set up in just the way we have set it
up. "The basics" are bedrock now. Don't some students just seem to opt
out of this game, perhaps with varying degrees of truculence or despair?
Proposing a different basics for us to go back to, Saussure insists on the
way arbitrariness and sociality work together in language:
the arbitariness of the sign helps us understand why it is the
social fact alone that can create a linguistic system. Sociality (la
collectivite) is necessary to establish those values whose only
reason for existence is in usage and general agreement...12
There is available here a different attitude toward the basics of grammar;
for the rules derive from and need our being together, just as the play
tower needs our ongoing invention. Saussure is not proposing that we
abandon the use or the teaching of grammar, nor is he suggesting that we
ought to change the rules every now and then just for fun. Whimsical
pineapples are to be used with caution. The Saussurean teacher will still
take off points for mistakes in grammar. Instead, Saussure is distinguishing
the kind of "basics" that semiology is from the kind of "basics" that
grammar is, just as one can distinguish the dwelling from the house.
There is a way of looking at and dealing with the house that gives it as an
object, a structure of materials; and there is another way of looking that
gives it as a possibility for dwelling in together, for engagement, for
inventing a family life. Both ways are valid; both are useful. But the
Saussurean teacher will take off points in a different way, with a different
glint in her eye.13
Another of Saussure's marvellous analogies amplifies his suggestion
of the way language might be viewed as a human, and humane, system, a
structure of differences (of distinctions] rather than of rules:
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Visualize the air in contact with a sheet of water; if the atmo-
spheric pressure changes, the surface of the water will be broken
up into a series of divisions, waves; the waves resemble the
union or coupling of thought with phonic substance [which is
language]... Language might be called the domain of articula-
tions... Each linguistic term is a member, an articulus in which an
idea is fixed in a sound and a sound becomes the sign of an idea.u
It is easy to study the substance and structure of the waves, the articulated
matter of the grammar as we find it. And we are pulled by our epistemol-
ogy, by the assumptions built into our very vocabulary, to analyze sub-
stance and structure. There is nothing wrong with analysis, of course; it is
our bread and butter. But here we find the possibility of going behind the
grammar, as it were, to ask what is the changing atmospheric pressure
that makes the waves? What wind makes articulation? In Saussure's pic-
ture, it is sociality: being together. This is a different realm than the
description and transmission of structured information; living in the con-
text of sociality, our choices have different import. Here we are not only
correct; we are engaged. Saussure is distinguishing for us a domain whose
dimensions are not marked out in rules at all, but in responsibility, in dia-
logue that is continuing promising, continuing commitment.
Approaching a red light at a busy intersection, we do not need to ask
how it means; we need give ourselves no choice but to obey its imperative.
Confronting the given grammar, we are apt to lose sight of the radical
arbitrariness of linguistic values, which operates within the radical social-
ity of language. Thus a "statement" that reads we have chosen to do things
this way comes to be read things must be done in just this way. Given a wheel
that rolls—words and sentences that allow us to achieve certain of our
purposes—we lose the possibility of re-inventing the wheel. Here, in this
lost realm of possibility, perhaps, is the "comedown" that injures our
freedom, steals our dignity, and blocks us from being with our children.
Once we set up a convention for dealing with each other, we fall into
it. That is, once we agree that a certain set of values works for articulating
things of concern to us, that apples are not oranges and neither is a tree a
street—then we are both free and not free: free to speak now, to articulate
as powerfully as our conventional system provides, but not free to articu-
late anything that lies outside the system. Like children inventing the
game at each moment, we are in Sherwood Forest with our swords at the
ready, and what we are on the lookout for is the Sheriff's men. But just for
this reason, what we are eager to participate in is a sword fight. To us
adults, the language can appear not as an invented game, a system with
arbitrariness and sociality at its heart, but as an index to the very shape
and structure our world, including our relations with each other, must
inexorably take. Of course a tree is not a street; what adult would suggest
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otherwise? But perhaps that is not the most important thing. Letter grades
work well most of the time, but in occasional cases, this sword is too dull
to suit our purposes—or too sharp. We feel we cannot use it to make the
difference we intend to make for a student. In such a case we may either
do the best we can with the system we have inherited, or invent a new
system, some other agreement with our students about how we measure
their performance. And what about our other scholastic systems? How do
they serve our intentions, our commitments? A system gives us a conver-
sational channel that we use to talk with our students and among our-
selves: how educative are these conversations? Perhaps it is not only the
system that nourishes, but the inventing of the system.
It is time to review where we have been so far. Convention, the social
agreement that arises in speaking, gives us a world to live in together. But
the same power of convention can, so to speak, hide itself from speakers,
if not from linguists, while they use the language to communicate in the
ordinary way. By referentiality (or representation), I mean a way of using
language mat gets its authority from a powerful unspoken convention:
the assumption that most words refer to things, and that our job as
speakers is to make our words, and the ways we structure them, conform
as accurately as possible to the nature and structure of the world "out
there." This assumption, this picture, gives us a way of being with lan-
guage; it generates a conversation and a kind of conversation. With this
assumption unnoticed as the atmosphere we breathe, as the background
hum of the city we live in, we talk with each other in a certain way, about
certain things, our being together shaped and guided by a mostly unseen
force. This assumption is at the center of the clearing from which trails
lead off through the forest, trails that make up the culture of referentiality.
It is referential language whose mere "analysis" Hawking decries; struc-
tured language that Davidson says is not there anyway. It is the picture of
language as a referential structure, and its associated culture of knowl-
edge, which I think we need to distinguish from the background and look
at carefully. I am betting that if we do, we will give ourselves the chance to
re-invent our culture.
If I were as bold as Davidson, I would claim that there is no such thing
as knowledge. This might be somewhat self-defeating as well as offensive,
though, since the ultimate claim would have to be that there is no such
thing as anything (any thing)—which may not be a useful conclusion. But
I think is it useful to raise the question of what knowledge is, rather than
take it for granted that we already know. For I do want to claim that
knowledge is not the kind of thing we have been supposing.
So there is a difference between handed-down traditions and made-
up traditions, funded knowledge and discovered knowledge, explanation
and invention. To get at that distinction, in the following chapters I pro-
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pose to investigate teaching and learning conversations: coupled speaking
and listening that have power to lead participants out into a newer world.
And to begin setting up this investigation, we now leap ahead for a
moment to Heidegger, for whom "conversation" means more than taking
turns at the microphone:
It is the custom to put speaking and listening in opposition: one
man speaks, the other listens. But speaking is at the same time
also listening.
Listening accompanies and surrounds not only speaking such as
takes place in conversation. Speaking is of itself a listening.
Speaking is listening to the language which we speak.15
What it means to speak into a listening, while "listening to the language
which we speak," bears much study. For one thing, Heidegger means
something non-ordinary by "speaking," by "listening," and by "language"
here. The language is not a vocabulary plus a set of rules for syntax, not
the object studied by linguistics. It is more like a community, in Bakhtin's
sense of a communion of speakers and listeners: it is a space we live in,
not an object we manipulate. When speakers and listeners are engaged in
languaging, Heidegger suggests, they are breathing a certain air.
For example, contrast what you usually do and say at a cocktail party
with what you usually do and say at a school board or PTA meeting. In
each situation, Heidegger would say, speaking/listening creates and lives
in a community that promotes certain kinds of expression, certain kinds
of talk and actions, and rejects others. As a room with period furniture
calls up certain associations, each situation calls forth certain possibilities
for self-expression. As the terrain of a site and the character of a neighbor-
hood offer possibilities to the architect, so the cocktail party or the board
meeting offer a certain atmosphere; and by living in the house, attending
the event, you breathe its possibilities—whether they give joy or a head-
ache. It is not that you are not free to behave in whatever ways you see fit.
It is that you do see fitting ways of participating in the different atmo-
spheres, and those ways, in normal circumstances, get engaged in your
behavior.
If we ask "What sets the conditions in which students engage in
learning with teachers engaged in teaching?"—the question of the archi-
tecture and neighborhood of teaching and learning—we are led past
concern with the intellectual structure and content of lessons into awareness
of the power of context to shape perception, understanding, and action.
Cocktail party, board meeting, site, and neighborhood—all these are con-
texts in which meaning occurs, and in which action arises. Surely we have
all seen those optical illusions where the outline of a candlestick or a vase
can be made to change into a picture of visages facing each other:
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What happens here is that you shift the context around the drawing—and
you shift it merely by speaking to yourself "face" or "candlestick," perhaps
by tracing the outline with your finger while saying "this is the base of the
candlestick" or "here is the nose." As you shift the context given by your
looking in this way, the structure of the lines—their spatial relationship to
each other—remains constant. But the junction of the lines—their meaning,
what they add up to—shifts with the context, with your looking and
speaking. Let me quote another explanation of one of these "optical illu-
sions" from the contemporary philosopher Hilary Lawson, for there is
more at issue here than an amusing game.
If we draw Wittgenstein's rabbit on the page thus:
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no one will deny that it is a rabbit, even if a magician can produce
a duck instead. What was once a rabbit is now a duck, and just
as we could describe the rabbit with its whiskers and floppy ears,
we can now describe the duck. And how has the magician
achieved this? With the spell that is the word "duck." Are we not
all magicians at play in the spells that we call language?16
In the spell of an atmosphere, a magnetic field, we teach and learn. Does
an educative way of being together arise, like a magnetic field, along with
our way of listening for and speaking with each other? Is there a possibil-
ity and power in classroom languaging, beyond the true picturing of the
world, beyond the effective expression of feelings, a magnetic power like
that of the context-giving word?
"All life is figure and ground," intones a character in a novel by
Samuel Beckett. Did he mean to reduce the overwhelm of modern experi-
ence to the pallid generalization that what we see depends on the context
in which we see it? Or is there some exhausted irony here, as if being alive
involved something more than figure-ground relationships, if only we
could get what it is? What there may be, in addition to figure-ground
relationships, dependence of content on context, is freedom, that is, re-
sponsibility. We need ways of being responsible together. The word re-
sponsibility comes from the Latin spondere, which means to promise, pledge,
or warrant. To be responsible is, then, as for the signers of the Declaration
of Independence, to take up a promise, mutually to pledge that the world
shall be as you say it shall be. The signers were the authors of political
freedom; they made themselves up as the authority in a world that thereby
became their home. True, they were authorized by their position in the
society of the colonies, their shared background, to make themselves
authorities. But what made them responsible! Was it the background in-
formation they shared? How did they invent the country they lived in?
How shall we?
With this question in mind, we may be interested in a story told by
Dostevsky in his Diary of a Writer. Listen for what it says about the atmo-
sphere we breathe when we give up our reliance on structured referential
language.
One Sunday night I happened to walk for some fifteen paces next
to a group of six drunken workmen, and I suddenly realized that
all thoughts, feelings, and even a whole chain of reasoning could
be expressed by that one noun, which is moreover extremely
short. One young fellow said it harshly and forcefully, to express
his utter contempt for whatever it was that they had all been
talking about. Another answered with the same noun but in a
quite different tone and sense—doubting that the negative at-
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titude of the first one was warranted. A third suddenly became
incensed with the first and roughly intruded on the conversation,
excitedly shouting the same noun, this time as a curse and
obscenity. Here the second fellow interfered again, angry at the
third, the aggressor, and restraining him, in the sense of "Now
why do you have to butt in, we were discussing things quietly
and here you come and start swearing." And he told this whole
thought in one word, the same venerable word, except that he
also raised his hand and put it on the third fellow's shoulder. All
at once a fourth, the youngest of the group, who had kept silent
till then, probably having suddenly found a solution to the
original difficulty which had started the argument, raised his
hand in a transport of joy and shouted... Eureka, do you think?
Found it? Found it? No, not Eureka at all; nor did he find
anything; he repeated the same unprintable noun, one word,
merely one word, but with ecstasy, in a shriek of delight—which
was apparently too strong, because the sixth and the oldest, a
glum-looking fellow, did not like it and cut the infantile joy of the
other one short, addressing him in a sullen, exhortative bass and
repeating... yes, still the same noun, forbidden in the presence of
ladies but which this time clearly meant "What are you yelling
yourself hoarse for?" So, without uttering a single other word,
they repeated that one beloved word six times in a row, one after
another, and understood one another completely.
What do you hear as the moral of this story, the point of my quoting it in
the context of schooling? At first I decided I could not use it here, because
it does not quite say what I want it to say, does not accomplish what I
intend here at the end of the first chapter on our picture of language. For it
might be read as demonstrating the banality of how intonation and gesture
can alter a word's meaning. Or as suggesting the dubious proposition that
we should accept profanity as the most basic level of human communica-
tion. Or, considering the purpose of the whole book, will the passage
suggest that teachers should get their students involved with each other
and with the subject by getting them drunk? Like the revel on Pompey's
galley in Antony and Cleopatra, this little vignette might be taken to imply
that being with others, even if they are friends, requires washing the brain
so that it grows fouler.
But if we listen/rom the question, "How do we invent countries to live
in together?"—listen with that question in the background—we can hear
in Dostoevsky's story another story, in which the drunkenness, like the
differences in their ages and temperaments and the fact that it is Sunday
night and they must go to work the next day, is part of the background of
the subjects' being together. Presumably Dostoevsky is recording an ac-
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tual incident here, but the drunkenness of the workers, mentioned in a
word at the outset, seems not to figure in the foreground of the story at all,
as if it were merely a metaphorical marker meant to set up the atmosphere
of the story, like a dark and foggy street lit by a sullen lamp. What
happens on that drunken street then is all the more remarkable: no structure
but being together; communion enables communication. Of course we
immediately ask "Oh, but surely the structure of the language was already
present, so that each repetition of the 'beloved word' was really an ellipsis,
which the listener could reconstitute, just as, after all, Dostoevsky did in
overhearing?" Saussure prompts us to respond to this obviously devas-
tating query: "But where did the structure of the language come from! How
did it get there to begin with? Are the workmen only using a given
structure, or are they also coming together in a function, re-inventing their
colloquy at each step? Perhaps it is too pat to notice that, in the paragraph
before this one, Dostoevsky speaks of the one short word as a whole
language, which "if it were altogether nonexistent, ilfandrait I'inventer." If
we had no beloved words, we would have to invent them. Invented
words are beloved. The story does not have to be solely about drunken
profanity. As I listen to it, it speaks of being together and inventing.
We have already come a long way, partly following and partly in-
venting the road through these mountains. We came by way of Saussure
so as to establish a bit of a roadway to follow, a way leading past the rules
on the surface of language into a domain where dialogue is the modulation
of our relatedness. The word "dialogue" says speaking across and speaking
through: we speak to each other through speaking. While this looks at first
glance like a circular banality, Bakhtin would remind us that in dialogue
we encounter each other as integral and unrepeatable, as authentic persons
(per + sonare, to sound through). We come to be in a colloquy, which may
be as wordless as the brimming glance between parent and child and as
worded as a sonnet. Somewhere between these two kinds of poem we
teachers live among the children. Saussure says nothing about poetry, at
least nothing outright. But he opens a road that can lead us back through
our traditional ways of knowing, as they were established by Descartes
and Locke (among many others), on our way to that bridge that
Wittgenstein built between knowing and being together.
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What we call common sense—the body of widely accepted
truths—is... a collection of dead metaphors. Truths are the
skeletons which remain after the capacity to arouse the senses—
to cause tingles—has been rubbed off by familiarity and long
usage. After the scales are rubbed off a butterfly's wing, you
have transparency, but not beauty—formal structure without
sensuous content. Once the freshness wears off the metaphor,
you have plain, literal, transparent language—the sort of language
which is ascribed not to any particular person but to "common
sense" or "reason" or "intuition," ideas so clear and distinct you
can look right through them.
—Richard Rorty1
What Descartes wants is to acquire means of acting on the
universe—in a word, means of giving orders to the world...
[Descartes' audacity is] to recognize that what is intuitively
evident... is a projection into the physical world of the structure
of the self... This projection enables the will, subduing the
difference between Self and World, joining World and Self.
—Pierre-Alain Cahne2
Oaussure's picture, as we sketched it in the last chapter, places social
colloquy instead of rule-governed structure at the heart of language. If
colloquy, sociality, are more powerful than the "setting" or "affective
climate" in which teaching and learning occur, we teachers might benefit
from inquiring into the colloquial wisdom of our times, as it informs our
speaking and listening, our discourse in the area of education. If indeed
we come to be in colloquy, as Bakhtin hints, contemporary educational dis-
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course may work as much to shape as to comment on our practice. What
skeletal truths are widely accepted in the common-sense colloquy that
houses education?
In his day, at the beginning of modern times, Descartes proposed an
inquiry into the ground of knowing, an inquiry that began by doubting
the accepted truths—the formal structure, the dead metaphors—of then-
current common sense. His purpose was to generate a new colloquy, a
new language, almost to invent a new metaphor of knowledge, so as to
enable human performance—to provide new forms for peoples' life and
work. The magnitude of his success may be measured in the distance
between the medicine man and the nuclear magnetic resonance imager,
and also in the speed with which rain forest is obliterated. Of course,
Descartes had progenitors, and it is not a linear succession of mutually
exclusive positions with which we are concerned. But, starting with
Descartes, we can begin to get a picture of the colloquy which, as it has
developed over four centuries, still envelopes us today. We are re-reading
Descartes, and re-reading him in a particular way, so as to notice that col-
loquy, to bring it up out of the background where in its simplicity and
familiarity it is transparent.3
Lef s say that what we are often doing in our teaching practice is
looking at ideas. We present the Causes of the Civil War, or the terms
used in criticizing fiction, or an example of a geometric proof. We may
write the ideas on the blackboard, so as to create for the students a visual
handle. We expect them perhaps to copy, surely to digest these ideas,
relating them into a growing structure of information and skill. What we
seldom pay attention to is the context of ideas through which we ourselves
are looking. Where does our own common sense or "reason" or "intu-
ition" come from?
Look first, then, at the title of Descartes' first published work:
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason
and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences
Descartes' first word, "discourse," carries with it, by virtue of those
semiological principles that Saussure propounded, a set of relationships
between concepts. ("Concepts" is not quite the right word. For Saussure,
like Wittgenstein after him, was speaking not about mental contents at all
but about the interconnected uses of signs. He begins to let us hear the
chorality of signification.) "Discourse" is a value in a cluster of values, a
conventionally accepted constellation of meaning whose fullest exposition
(in English at least) is to be found in the Oxford dictionary.4 Bahktin would
protest: "Meaning is not found in a dictionary but made in dialogic en-
counter!" I reply, somewhat lamely: Agreed, but the dictionary does give
us hints about those constellations among which we have been living,
charts to aid our navigation.
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Used as a noun, then, "discourse" brings with it "reasoning, thought,
ratiocination; the act of the understanding, by which it passes from premises
to consequences"—this is Samuel Johnson's definition. In addition, Johnson
says, tine word brings "communication of thought by speech; mutual
intercourse of language"; it is a kind of talk, conversation. Discourse, then,
is heard as rational communication: the word links thought with human
intercourse. And it links them into a hierarchical relationship: first comes
thought; then comes language, the vehicle of thought, to carry thought
across to others. (Two questions we might ask ourselves in passing: To
what extent are we teachers of discourse, our professional lives focused
on just this: transmission of thought or understanding through language?
To what actions and interactions does the possibility of such transmission
lead us?)
To continue: the word "method" brings with it a notion of orderly
arrangement, of regular, systematic procedure organized according to a
pre-established, stable, validated plan. A Method for Rightly Conducting
the Reason is one that will lead and guide one of our distinct mental
capacities so that it can be judged to be functioning in accordance with
some standard, some criterion of Tightness. It seeks for Truth, which,
though it may be hidden, is to be arrived at by a rightly conducted
reasoning process. This truth is then to be formulated in the Sciences: "A
branch of study which is concerned either with a connected body of
demonstrated truths or with observed facts systematically classified and
more or less colligated by being brought under general laws, and which
includes trustworthy methods for the discovery of new truth within its
own domain."5
Notice in these interwoven strands of usage the desire to posit or
develop a fixed, secure picture of the scene in which we humans live: to
arrive at correct formulation. By the time Descartes was writing, a new
formula was badly needed. The envelope around the human that had
been sealed by Platonic metaphysics had been torn open. Astronomical
observations had rent the heavens of medieval Christian theology. No
longer could one base one's life on the old verities of faith that had tuned
man and the cosmos alike to God. Speaking of "the sobering crisis in
Occidental mentation" that attended Galileo's invention of the telescope
and the "moment" when mathematical analysis exposed "the mechanical
laws governing the universe," Joseph Campbell says: "At that moment,
nature... became hard and fast and apart."6 Aristotelian scholasticism, los-
ing its linchpin of faith in a Prime Mover above the stars, faltered as there
arose in the Renaissance a celebration of the powers of man, whose mind
could discern and express in those laws the complex but apparently fixed
structure of the natural world. Whether it was a moment or a trend that
still gathers momentum, another contemporary thinker and humanist,
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Huston Smith, identifies this phenomenon of adherence to structure as
one of the controlling features of the Modern Mind: "the path to human
fulfillment," as he describes it, "consists primarily in discovering these
laws, utilizing them where this is possible and complying with them
where it is not/'7 The universe is intelligible, but intelligible in a different
way than before. Now we are not looking for divine guidance to shelter
us from the flicks of an inscrutable divine hand; we are capable of figuring
the laws of nature to ourselves, and thus required to figure them out. By
the beginning of the seventeenth century, then, people's ways of seeing
and being with the world they lived in had begun to alter, perhaps more
radically than at any previous time in history.
Now it has become commonplace that when everything around you
is falling apart, you have to fall back on yourself, to go beyond the failing
common sense to wrest into place a new system. This, Descartes boldly
attempts for his age. We need a new basis for rationality, science, selfhood,
even for faith, he intuits, and since manifestly the God in whom we have
trusted would not deceive His own handiwork, I shall try standing alone
here with my thoughts to see what I can discover of truth unsupported by
these bulwarks of received opinion.
The first principle of Descartes' method of philosophical inquiry seems
straightforward enough. His strategy commits him to subject his every
idea to careful conscious scrutiny,
to receive nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be
so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in
judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was
presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have
no occasion to put it in doubt.8
Good innocuous fatherly advice, perhaps like something Polonius would
say. Neither a borrower nor a lender nor a rash believer be. But what
Descartes is doing here is proposing to flatten, in thought, the whole
superstructure of rationality that Western culture had inherited, setting
up a new standard for certifying belief. "I must once for all," he says, "and
by a deliberate effort, rid myself of all those opinions to which I have
hitherto given credence, starting entirely anew and building from the
foundations up." Assuming the mantle of this pervasive doubt as his
method of knowing surely, Descartes returns again and again to his ques-
tioning of the grounds of his own knowledge: "But what am I now to say
that I am, now that I am supposing that there exists a very powerful, and
if I may so speak, malignant being, who employs all his powers and skill
in deceiving me?" (Though God would not deceive him, of course, the
devil might.) From the platform of this rigorous supposition, he now casts
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about for several alternative answers, looking for one that fits the "I"
whose essence he is trying to discover. Dispensing first with sense percep-
tion (perceptions, after all, can be deceptive or illusory) and with anything
pertaining to his "bodily nature"—the body, too, might be an illusion
produced by a demon—he moves on to consider "attributes of the soul,"
and rejects these too, one by one, until he arrives at "thinking":
Here I find what does belong to me: it alone cannot be separated
from me. I am, I exist. This is certain. How often? As often as I
think... I am therefore only a thinking thing, that is to say, a mind,
an understanding or reason...
Here at last is the famous—and for the modern Western world picture,
seminal—statement; it is an argument known among philosophers as the
cogito: I am thinking, therefore I am. Descartes' line marks out "thinking"
as the ground, the basis, of human being. In reading Descartes over again,
then, we need to get a clearer picture of what he meant by thinking.
For what the solitary "I" of the cogito does, surveying the world from
its subjective platform with the purpose of measuring, ordering, and
reporting on the objective universe, is accumulate knowledge and add it to a
particular kind of storehouse. Cartesian knowledge consists of well-defined
bits of information in a pre-established structure of information. Such a
structure allows and calls for a particular way of looking at, and looking
for, the known. Descartes' program sets places, like place settings on a
dinner table; it offers a replicable format consisting of spots for knife, fork,
spoon, and glass. An instance of knowledge may be a knife or a fork, even
a placemat; but it must appear as a recognizable element of the place
setting. It is not that no new facts may be discovered. It is that new facts, to
be discovered, must fit into the place settings already available. To seek
knowledge, remember, is to rely on a "method for rightly conducting the
reason and seeking after truth."9 It is to be pulled toward closure, final
say: knowledge is the already invented wheel.
Having posited a doubt that dissolves received opinion and accus-
tomed thinking like rain dissolving wheel ruts in mud, Descartes now,
after the cogito, provides for a kind of apprehension, of seeing/ knowing,
that sheds water. This granite, as it seems, is clear and distinct perception, and
it comes to us primarily in the faculty Descartes calls intuition. I am made
human, in Descartes' speaking, by my capacity for apprehending or intu-
iting clear and distinct ideas, "primary data," and reasoning deductively
from them to conclusions. Thinking, mat is, consists of two components,
out of which, in my need for knowledge, I construct orders of ideas. Here
is some of what he says about the first and main component, intuition:
By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the
senses, nor the misleading judgment of a wrongly combining
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imagination, but the apprehension which the mind, pure and
attentive, gives us so easily and so distinctly that we are thereby
freed from all doubt as to what it is that we are apprehending. In
other words, intuition is that non-dubious apprehension of a
pure and attentive mind which is born in the sole light of
reason... thus each of us can see by intuition that he exists, that
he thinks, that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, the
sphere by a single surface, and the like.10
There is a lot in this passage to be unpacked, a lot that bears on Descartes'
picture not only of what it means to think and to know, but, behind these,
of what it is to be human.
The first important thing about this kind of knowing is that it is not
sense perception. The testimony of the senses "fluctuates" and is therefore
unreliable. Let us examine, Descartes proposes, a piece of wax, for ex-
ample, to see what we can know of it by way of the senses:
this piece of wax has been but recently taken from the hive; it has
not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it still retains
something of the odor of the flowers from which it was gathered;
its color, its shape, its size, are manifest to us; it is hard, cold,
easily handled, and when struck upon with the finger emits a
sound.11
He tests the piece of wax with each of the five senses, not omitting the
aural even though sound does not suggest itself as a key to knowing
about wax, and concludes that everything which can assure us that we are
getting to know a real body is present in this one. But then he brings the
piece of wax closer to the fire near which he happens to be sitting, and
describes the result:
What remains of the taste exhales, the odor evaporates, the color
changes, the shape is destroyed, its size increases, it becomes
liquid, it becomes hot and can no longer be easily handled, and
when struck upon emits no sound.
So much for the certainty of knowledge by sense perception. How can we
even refer to the same wax in the two different conditions, since all the
properties by which we knew it changed when its environment changed?
Knowledge must not be based on sensation, even though we are impelled
by habit to speak as i/the deliverances of the senses gave direct knowledge.
Secondly, a related point: we are not to base a claim to certainty on
any image or combination of images. Descartes is suspicious of images
because a substance may take on any number of different attributes, as the
wax can take on many different shapes, sizes, colors, and so on. In fact, a
substance might take on infinitely many different shapes—and might
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thus appear in as many different images. Since we cannot know all of
these different images, we cannot be certain that we know the substance
even when we know several of its images. We might "wrongly combine"
those images we know into a composite idea of the substance. Images are
no more trustworthy than opinions. Indeed, Descartes says that the sciences
of his day, "composed as they are of the gradually accumulated opinions
of many individuals," hit farther from the truth than "the simple reasoning
that a man of common sense can quite naturally carry out respecting the
things which come immediately before him." Thus Descartes dismisses
received scholastic opinion in favor of a more direct and untutored ap-
prehension. But we notice that, here at least, he leaves "common sense"
unquestioned.
So if intuition, the first component of knowledge, is not sense percep-
tion for Descartes, and is not imagination, and is not opinion, what is it? It
comes to us, Descartes says in that passage quoted on page 46, in an expe-
rience of clarity and distinctness, of "non-dubious apprehension," with a
purity like that of deductive reason. Descartes speaks admiringly of the
"easy and simple chains of reasoning" used in geometric proofs to proceed
infallibly from what is given to a "remote" conclusion. He speculates that
"all those things which can fall under the cognizance of men might very
likely be mutually related in the same fashion,"12 and speaks of the data of
intuition as the "givens" to be linked into our picture of the world—our
knowledge—by deductive steps like those in a geometrical proof.
Many things are known with certainty, though not by them-
selves evident, but only as they are deduced from true and
known primary data by a continuous and uninterrupted
movement of thought in the perspicuous intuiting of the several
items. This is how we are in a position to know that the last link
in a long chain is connected with its first link...13
Here seems to be another manifestation of the line Descartes is drawing, a
straight line from intuition to deduction, a line that challenges us to locate
ourselves and our world in our thinking (as he has defined it), and then
proposes ways of validating our thinking once and for all. And here too is
another hint as to what "thinking" might be: it appears in those deductions
from given data that spin out a chain at whose end is certain knowledge.
Never mind for the moment that it might be possible to draw another
line—say, amo ergo sum, or loquor ergo sum. Descartes' position seemed to
open the way for personal knowledge, grounded in clear and certain
principles and represented in a coherent and unified system. Rational
reflection could now proceed with new authority—indeed, a new kind of
authority. We recognize immediately that Descartes is authorizing the
individual to engage in scientific exploration of the world. I now have the
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tools, the methodology to validate the results of my investigations. I seem
to be standing firmly on the fixed ground of my own nature and contem-
plating nature's nature. If I look from here, immutable truths are discover-
able and representable. Descartes had founded, as he had set out to do, a
method for "establishing something firm and lasting in the Sciences."
Or, so we might presume his purpose to have been if we read him in a
certain way; if we read, as I first did, only a translation of the content of
Descartes' meditations in such a way that they conform with a particular
view, one already given by a kind of philosophical/cultural atmosphere.
Of course, who reads Descartes himself anymore, voluntarily at least? We
all know what he said. In the restroom of the Blue Moon Diner there
appears this entry: "I think I thought, therefore I might have been." Every-
body knows cogito ergo sum. Only that is not what he said. That is what we
hear our culture telling us that he said—our culture of abbreviations and
acronyms. In fact, he abandoned the formulation "I think, therefore I am"
after using it once, in the Discourse whose title is dissected above. In its
place, in later work, he put a formulation in which his sense of himself as a
thinking thing is not as strong as his intuition of himself as an existing
thing. Ego sum, ego existo, he now says. Je suis, fexiste. Why would he have
made such a change? What difference does it make in what he is trying to
say? To answer this requires some traveling, some backtracking, and a lot
more looking at ideas. And also some re-inventing.
It is nearly impossible for me to hear Descartes freshly now, but
perhaps I can come closest to him if I read with a non-standard view in
mind—not one that is simply far out, but one that seems as if its light
might reveal a new contour in the topography of his thought. I don't think
that reading Descartes as a Marxist, say, will be worth much. But I think I
see evidence that reading him as a Saussurean might work. That is, I want
to explore some of what he says with Saussure's idea of the network of
linguistic "value" in the background. Of course, this is a flaming anachro-
nism, and I make no claim about Descartes' foresightedness. I am explor-
ing, not arguing. I am not out to get anything right, only to follow some
leads to see if they open up any promising territory for teachers to ex-
plore. (Of course, if I do happen to get something right, I shall graciously
concede this point.) If this dirt road leads out into a new clearing, so much
the better.
To recapitulate: it seemed to Descartes, then, that "thinking" was
bound to lead to and achieve its purpose in knowledge, adding more
spokes, as it were, to the already invented wheel. But let us ask: is it
therefore the main business of being human to discover and formulate
knowledge? If it is, then what would be the main business of teachers and
students? Would it be possible for us to have as our most basic interest the
finding and maintaining of being-together, the welling-up of community?
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Notice that in Descartes' paradigm what comes along with knowledge is
the divorce of Subject from Object: on one side of the paper, knowledge;
and on the other side, being-separate from the world and from each other.
And as the letters on the knowledge side expand to fill more and more of
our field of view, so do the letters on the being-separate side:
Thus the Cartesian cogito, and the settings it prescribes for knowledge,
squeeze out of view the very experience of atonement (at-one-ment), of
communion between man, God, and cosmos, which Descartes had sought
to restore in his time. Re-reading Descartes, noticing the gulf between self
and world in the background of the Western conversation for knowledge,
and speculating on the possibilities of affiliation between his work and
Saussure's, there may appear another possibility for the being of self and
world: perhaps all of it is articulation. Perhaps together we speak world.
Then it becomes possible to ask the question "Whom shall we be for each
other?" and to think that we might have some say in that matter, not as
independent individuals resolving to make a difference for others, but as
listeners in and for encounter.
Let us return for a moment to the question of what "clear and distinct
perception" is. Though, as Descartes said, it requires a "pure and attentive
mind," the case is not that the attention is given to things so that we can
see them without distortion. Rather, the attention of the mind gives clear and
distinct perception, and the character of things/o//ows from that. Descartes
doesn't ask us to imagine a triangle and then to see that it is bounded by
three sides only. Instead, he calls our view to the character of intuition
itself: an experience of clarity and certainty like that which we get, in
geometrical reasoning, from the links between well-defined quantities
and entities. What gives us the intuition that a triangle has three sides?
Well, that is pretty close to the definition of a triangle, isn't it—three sides,
subtending three angles? What this is is a relationship between mutually
defined elements. That is to say, what we get in a Cartesian intuition is a
Saussurean system of values—sides defined by their relation to angles, and
vice versa, and all defined in relation to the background against which the
figure appears.
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What springs to clarity in an intuition—this is Descartes speaking
Saussurean now—is not a sudden and distinct sensory input, but rather a
full-blown, all-or-none relationship between values. To intuit a triangle or
a sphere is to apprehend a network of relationships between what we call
lines and angles, or surfaces and, say, volumes. The pure attention of the
mind in intuition, Descartes says, calls forth a crystallization that gives us
clarity; it freezes the frame of our camera—indeed, it gives us a camera, a
chamber in which to hold a set of relationships between elements. If you
invented a word to characterize the working of intuition—the kind
Descartes places at the heart of thinking and knowledge—it might be
cameropoetic. The intuition that gives us sense data is poetic. It doesn't
represent, it makes. And what it makes is articulation. Now, when we say
we can "articulate" something, we usually mean we can say something
that was already there to be said; "articulation" is often used in almost the
same sense as "pronunciation." But in this Saussurean-Cartesian picture,
articulation is rather the collocation of joints and parts, levers and screws
and slots and bearings, that makes a working machine. Articulation is
when jointed parts arise together. We know, then, by dwelling in articula-
tion.
Now, I like this combination of Descartes with Saussure. I have no
idea whether or not the statement of the connection is true—I haven't
read enough Descartes, let alone studied enough seventeenth-century
history, to assure me that this invented connection is not flatly contra-
dicted by something else he says, or that what he meant by what I have
read is really compatible with Saussure's perspective. I am ignoring for
the moment a crucial difference in the two men's thought: Saussure's
insistence on the social nature of language, even the social nurture of
logic, is absent from the picture Descartes draws of himself, alone in his
study, devising a new founding philosophy for the West in perfect solitude.
But I think the connection of the two men's ideas might do some useful
work, like the coupling of a blast furnace with a rolling mill.
Pursuing this working relationship, let us re-read Descartes' account
of sense perception—that kind of knowing whose articulation of the world
we take for granted—for now something shows up in the Cartesian ac-
count that did not on first reading. When I first encountered his argument,
Descartes seemed to be saying that sense perception might not be reliable,
but thinking could be, and that if you got your thinking into the right
groove, you would not be deluded by the vagaries of sensation. After all,
his announced purpose is to attain certain knowledge, and he says often
that careful thinking can scotch the errors to which commonplace ideas
are prone. It ought to be possible then to perceive truly, to know with
certainty, what that elusive wax is.
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But now read the following passage, asking yourself: is Descartes
talking about perception as a seeing of the wax, or as an "intuition" of a
system of values? The passage comes just after Descartes has demon-
strated the unreliability of sensation as a source of knowledge. Is he
talking about a looking out at something, or a looking into the very way
we look? We are about to embark here on some close textual analysis of
the trees in Descartes' forest, and while I do not intend to deconstruct the
trees, I do intend for us to produce a clearing in which the character of the
forest that surrounds us today may be more apparent. We look carefully
at Descartes' trees so as to see our own forest. Remember the piece of wax:
Now what is this wax which cannot be [adequately] appre-
hended save by the mind? Certainly the same that I see, touch,
image, and in short, the very body that from the start I have been
supposing it to be. And what has especially to be noted is that our
[adequate] apprehension of it is not a seeing, nor a touching, nor
an imaging, and has never been such, although it may formerly
have seemed so, but is solely an inspection of the mind which
may be imperfect and confused, as it formerly was, or clear and
distinct, as it now is, according as my attention is directed less or
more to the constituents composing the body.14
Confusing, is it not? He starts by affirming the very thing that he seemed
to deny two paragraphs earlier, that sensation gives knowledge of objects:
the wax is just what he had been seeing and touching, he says. But then he
denies this once more, saying that [adequate] apprehension is not sense
perception but "inspection of the mind." Does he mean that, as we first
thought, you have to get your thinking straight before you can perceive
adequately? So where does the criterion of adequacy come from? (And
why those brackets around it?) What is Descartes saying about how we
are to make our knowledge adequate? At the end of the passage he seems
to focus again not on the wax but on the quality of mental attention, and
states again that straight thinking is a matter of clear and distinct percep-
tion, clear intuition. And he categorically states that perception has never
been concerned with sensation at all, but solely with "mental inspection."
But then another about-face: the clarity of the mental attention depends
on how closely we direct our attention outward, to the "constituents com-
posing the body"! Descartes seems to want to have perception as a physi-
cal seeing of objects and a thinking, a mental intuiting. What a muddle.
But look What we heard Descartes saying in his most famous dictum
was, we found, at least in part an artifact of our current culturally given
listening. The way we heard what he was saying came out of what we
were listening for. Maybe now if we listen to him in his own language, we
will be able to hear some nuance, some way of shading or coloring the
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thought that will give us a clearer grasp of what he meant by that most
crucial of all his concepts, thinking. Here, then, is the passage as it was
translated into French by Descartes himself from the Latin in which he
originally wrote it:
Or quelle est cette cire, qui ne peut etre con^ue que par 1'enten-
dement ou 1'esprit? Certes c'est la meme que je vois, que je
touche, que j'imagine, et la meme que je connaissais des le com-
mencement. Mais ce qui est a remarquer, sa perception, ou bien
{'action par laquelle on I'apergoit, n'est point une vision, ni un
attouchement, ni une imagination, et ne 1'a jamais etc, quoiqu'il
le semblait auparavant, mais seulementune inspection de 1'esprit,
laquelle peut etre imparfait et confuse, comme elle etait aupa-
ravant, ou bien claire et distincte, comme elle est a present, selon
que mon attention se porte plus ou moins aux choses qui sont en
elle, et dont elle est composee.15
I hope you can read French yourself, or will check with your French
department, because the difference between the original passage and the
translation above is no mere matter of nuance or shading. Now that I am
looking for evidence that Descartes was a Saussurean, I can see things in
the French that are not even present in the Fj\glish translation. The most
obvious is the italicized phrase, which was added by Descartes in his French
"second edition." The sentence, as Descartes rethought it, reads: "But
what is to be noted is that the perception of the wax, or better, the action by
which one perceives it, is not at all a seeing, nor a touching../' Why would he
have added that phrase? What does it do?
We can reveal the answer, I think, by asking a similar question: why
distinguish between what we call "typing at a keyboard" and what we
call "the neural impulses by which typing is made possible"? What the
extra phrase does here is to mark a distinction more clearly: between
typing as a phenomenon in itself and a realm of explanation involving
altogether different phenomena, different parameters. Descartes' added
phrase distinguishes perception, taken as a process or a thing in itself, and
perception as the result of an "action" of a wholly different kind. This
distinction suggests that Descartes was not examining the "adequacy" of
sense perception at all, but the difference between sense perception and
something else. It opens up a whole new realm for the inquiry, just as
Kepler's mathematics had opened up a new realm for the apprehension
of bodies and movements in the universe. There is no mention of the
notion of adequacy in the French passage; this seems to have been added
by the English translator, for reasons of his own.
This cannot be happening, I hear myself saying. Surely the translator
in the venerable Modern Library edition knew what he was doing better
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than I do. I am an English teacher, not a philosophy major. Without
special training I should not even be talking about this stuff. I might better
let the experts teach me more before I go any further. Well, perhaps so, I
admit, but I like the sense of being on the track of a discovery here, one
that might lead me at least into a whole new forest, and maybe to a whole
new realm of relatedness with my students. If this track leads into a briar
patch, I'll just backtrack and start over again. But I wonder if I already
know why the translator imported the notion of adequacy.
My reading of the passage does line up now with a subtlety of trans-
lation. The English version says that apprehension "is not a seeing, nor a
touching..." But the sense of the French "ne... point," not at all, serves to
emphasize the distinction between perception and that "action" which
makes perception possible. Descartes himself seems to have been on the
track of something other than the adequacy of perception, or even the
adequacy of "apprehension" as the English has it. What is this "action by
which one apprehends"? What realm is Descartes really investigating
here? The English translation says that it is the realm of an "inspection of
the mind." Indeed, it goes on to indicate that the mind's inspection can be
either clear or confused, depending on the degree to which the attention is
directed to "the constituents composing the body." Here, it seems, is
another mistranslation. In the French, the referent of the pronoun desig-
nating the object of the narrator's attention is not "the body." The feminine
pronoun "elle" could not refer to the masculine "morceau" (piece), or to
some supposed implicit notion of body, for which the French word "corps"
is also masculine. It might be taken to refer to "cette cire," which is femi-
nine but occurs two sentences before. No, the word "laquelle" and the
later repetitions of "elle" seem each to refer to the immediately preceding
feminine noun "1'inspection." Descartes is not saying that the quality of
his mental inspection depends on how closely he examines the composition
of the piece of wax. What he is saying is that the clarity of his inspection
depends on his focusing attention on the constituents of the inspection it-
self.16 Descartes is not as interested in what composes the piece of wax as
in the act of mind, the inspection—the looking in—through which the piece
and its constituents come to be perceived. Now the word "inspection"
begins to lose its flavor of dispassionate, leisurely examination, and to
take on more the sense of a sudden act of mind—an "inglance." And what
Descartes really meant by "thinking" begins to shift: now it seems that he
was investigating not a phenomenon like a deduction, but one like poiesis.
Now, by looking closely at the trees, we have come to see the whole forest
in a different light—really, we have come out in a different forest altogether.
The march of science has led to poetry.
After knocking politely if somewhat loudly on my office door, Dustin
enters, marching. "Daddy, say 'Come here, Sheriff!"' he instructs me,
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looking at the lighted computer screen and wondering if I will comply.
This is the videotape cartoon of Robin Hood, which he has replayed
sometimes twice or three times a day for weeks. As I realize what game
Dustin is up to I notice that I have two reactions, like flashes of—well, of
intuition. First, I find myself somewhat annoyed at the intrusion. "Do we
have to go through this again?" I hear myself asking. "How could he get
such a charge out of something he knows by heart? Surely he gets his
charge rather from breaking into my solitary musings and making me
pay attention to him instead. Dammit! How many times can this be cute?"
Such are the values that spring up full-blown in my immediate intu-
ition, the first act of mind in which I apprehend Dustin's words and
actions in one particular moment. Though I am also immediately aware
that as an enlightened and energetic father I shouldn't be feeling this way,
our sudden being-together calls up a gestalt, bearing with it intrusion,
rote-rehearsal boredom: burden. On this inspection, this first glance into
the matter at hand, Dustin's having learned something by heart means that
it is a potential headache for me, and I put up with it for a while only
because of his evident delight in having snagged my company.
Though he is immediately aware that as an enlightened and energetic father
he shouldn't be feeling this way, Dustin's sudden entrance calls up a gestalt,
bearing with it intrusion, rote-rehearsal boredom: burden. The child's having
learned something by heart means that it is a potential headache for the parent,
and he puts up with it for a while only because of the child's evident delight in
having snagged his company.
These could serve as stage directions, couldn't they? For they tell me
how I am to act. As a script, then, this meaning-system simply occurs,
without leaving even a split second for my conscious evaluation of it. It is
there, present not like a filter or a haze through which I be with Dustin:
instead it is what gives the interaction between us. For I begin to speak, in
words and body postures and facial expressions, in ways that accord with
this initial and initiating feeling/thought/perception. I follow the stage
directions. It is as if I am at that first moment living in a room of a certain
decor, and having frozen it into a stage setting here, I can describe some of
the constituents of the tableau. I am now going to focus my attention not
on the constituents composing the bodies of my interaction with Dustin,
but as Descartes recommends, on the constituents that compose, at that
first moment, my mental inspection of the interaction. I am going to examine
the decor of that stage setting.
Of these constituents of the decor, the most readily apparent are
generalizations (such as "Why does he always have to interrupt?") and as-
sertions (such as "I'll never get any work done at this rate!"). These gene-
ralizations and assertions are not spoken out loud, of course; and there are
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many more corollaries to these, which are present to me and, as soon as he
sees or hears me react, to Dustin as well, though he would be unable or
unwilling to verbalize them. "I hate interruptions," he might hear me say
underneath whatever I say, and "My time in front of this computer is
valuable to me," and "I am doing something important, which I cannot
continue with you around." He may hear also—though of course I wouldn't
endorse it if it were spoken—a larger declaration behind these generaliza-
tions and assertions: "God, this child is a bother! Leave me alone!"
My interacting with Dustin begins, that is, in the context of a certain
conversation, a set of speakings and listenings that, though not present in
the way our bodies and the physical furnishings of the room are present,
not physically spoken or heard, actually create the character of the space
we inhabit together. An intuition, a mental inspection, is a conversation. Its
constituents are other conversations, bits of conversations, speakings and
listenings that give the space, so to speak, in which perception occurs. As
for how it is that a speaking or listening can be present without a vocal
"realization," I leave that as a question I cannot answer yet. It's like the
question "How is it that gravity attracts?" or "How can gravity act, with-
out a medium, through the void immensity of space?" I may be wrong,
but I don't think there are answers to that yet, either.
Now, as I am reflecting on this recent incident with Dustin, and re-
reading the passages I've already quoted, together with other parts of the
Meditations and of Descartes' other writings, I see more and more things
that fit with the idea that Descartes' philosophical project was not to cast
doubt on sense perception in order to correct it. Instead, he may have
begun by exploring the possibility that perception is not finally a matter of
the senses at all, but rather that it comes out of something like intuition,
the matrix of thinking. Thinking has a maternal character. Perception is
born from "thinking," though he seems to mean something different by
"thinking" than what I would mean if I used it in the ordinary way. He is
interested neither in "perceiving truly" nor in knowing with certainty
what the wax is. He wants to know what thinking is. He is, in fact, looking
into the very way we look. The attendant questions are: How does what is
clear and distinct come to be so? What is this pure attention of the mind that
works such wonders? Is it something we can turn on and off like a
spotlight? How do we get to "non-dubious apprehension"? Or how does
it get to us? What is that which is "born in the sole light of reason"?
So he proceeds as follows. Sense perception doesn't reveal the world
to us; we are just bound by habit to say that it does. What we say is that we
see the wax before us, "the very same which we see and touch," whenever
anyone shows it to us. In the same way we may say that we see men
passing in the street below our window, when what we are seeing is
merely hats and coats moving against the familiar background. Why
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couldn't those vestments conceal automatic machines, Descartes asks.
"But I judge that they are truly men," he says, "and thus I understand,
solely by the power of judging which resides in my mind, that which I
had believed I had been seeing with my eyes."17 We judge that the same
wax persists through apparent changes in its physical appearance. We are
always right about the men, and the fact that our judgment works—that
the wax can be said to be conserved—masks the fact that we are relying in
both cases on judgment, a mental act, an "inspection of the mind." The
wax isn't waxing: we are.
In committing to the judgment "wax," we are not creating the actual
physical item we call wax. We are activating, bringing into play, the
system of terms—the vocabulary, the conversation—in which "wax" is a
value. We find out more about wax—and about the world in which wax
occurs—by using that vocabulary, dwelling in that conversation. To say
that a paradigm directs scientific experiments and explorations is to say,
not that a theory is "behind" whatever collection of facts we see, but that
facts and theory and observations and experiments all fit together in a
vast network of conversations. That network of conversations is a net-
work of commitments we're making, bets that whatever we find next will
fit into our already-devised network in certain ways.18 Only the bets, the
commitments, the judgments usually slip unnoticed into the background
of our investigations, and of our being together. Indeed, they can function
only as background. That is why science works, why it has such huge
success in catching the flies it is out to catch.19 But it is also why witches
get burned at the stake, and it may be why our students fail and we
burn out.
Descartes' wax, like Elm Street, is a customary position: a place in a
system. It is, precisely, that which we are committed to calling "wax." To
preserve our common-sense background notion that perception is a mat-
ter of the senses, and not of the judgments embodied in language, the
modern English translation must import the notion of adequacy and the
correlated supposition that Descartes is examining a "body." Here, at
least if this translation gives any indication, the picture we current En-
glish-speakers may have of the Cartesian position doesn't seem to agree
with his own.20 Perhaps the modern translator does not see the trees in
Descartes' wood because of the forest we live in.
Now I'm looking back on the last several pages and asking myself,
"Why in the world would anybody care about Descartes' picture of the
world? That's all very nice about the mistranslation, but it's a little
recherche, don't you think? Surely the jobs most teachers have to do every
day don't have much to do with an accurate picture of what Descartes
was saying—let alone an admittedly hypothetical picture!" Squirming my
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way upright in the chair, I clear my throat and begin: Yes, I have to agree:
with the current state of my academic training in the background, my
listening for what will wash as an argument, I can tell that my translation
probably goes off on a track that Descartes, in the rest of his oeuvre, might
end up repudiating. If I could win an argument with philosophers about
Descartes and his role in the development of philosophy, I would probably
be content to let it rest at having made a contribution to the accuracy of
our knowledge of the past. That is not what I am committed to here,
though, so I justify my intrusion by changing the context around what I
am doing. I am at work here to call attention to the background of our
being together, you and 1.1 am at work on the matter of background, not
in a given background.
So you are invited to ask yourself how you are hearing this, reader.
What gives you your picture of what is important in our jobs? What
judgment is embodied in the language you use to frame your objection?
By language I mean the set of mutually opposed values that give you
your thinking—values such as "past" versus "present", or the content of
what is read versus the interpretation of the content. What Descartes-
Saussure is saying implies that the content of anything comes out of the
interpretation we bring to it, and not vice versa—that content and interpre-
tation depend on each other reciprocally. It also implies, though I haven't
shown how yet, that the past grapples the present to itself like a backhoe
scooping up soil from behind and swinging it around to the front. We
think the present embraces the past and goes beyond it, continually
bringing forth new things. What Descartes-Saussure is saying suggests
that it is the other way around. The past embraces the present and brings
forth versions of the past. What happens is what was always going to
happen anyway, unless something like the telescope contributes to a shift
in the structured judgments that ordinarily prevail.
But it is not that we need to understand Descartes in order to teach
effectively. It is that inquiring into what it is to understand anything at all
may open new possibilities in our being together with students/or educa-
tion. We can train them passably well without this kind of inquiry, and
we should train ourselves to train them well. But to engage them in
education is a different matter. That may require us to get beyond the
pictures embodied in standard translations, to invent our material newly.
When I started writing this book, I had Descartes as one of the founders of
the conversation that inhibits education. It turns out what I had was a
picture I made up from a standard translation of Descartes. Of course, I
am making up my new picture, and of course it doesn't square perfectly
with what we have always thought about Descartes' thought. But I bet
that, given time and means of talking to philosophy professors, I could
make it square with the tradition. I bet I could add to the tradition.
52 FROM COGNITION TO BEING
So what is the practical relevance of this re-vamping of our picture of
Descartes' philosophy? Where does it impact real life? I think that is a
legitimate question, and I hope I can answer it. Well, if not answer it, at
least suggest a fruitful avenue for exploring the question, and at least a
provisional answer. What? Sick of questions? You want a plain answer,
by God?! Why? What if the answers, as answers, will get you stuck in one
position? Don't you wish your students would make the bet that they
could add something to the material they study, that they could come to
own the tradition?
When we left Dustin, he had just interrupted a session of my writing,
and I said I realized I had two reactions and described one of them. Now
my other, almost simultaneous intuition. Where my initial annoyance had
grown like a crystal in a supercooled solution from the seed of Dustin's
arrival, this second intuition seems to depend for its virtue on something a
little less automatic, more voluntary. The "second" intuition proceeds
from two sources; and again, both of these are also conversations.
The first is an inquiry I have been maintaining for some time now, as
Dustin grows and changes so fast, it is reliably frightening. I am always
asking myself, a moment after I react to something he is saying or doing,
"Now, what is really going on with Dustin here?" While posing this
question to myself does not fully remove the annoyance of an interrup-
tion, or of some obnoxious behavior, it really does change the character of
the space we share. Now I am looking and listening to him differently,
and my way of being with him is given a new context. There is a slightly
different tone in his voice now—so it seems to me, anyway—and my
"interior" generalizations and assertions, while still present, are not as
insistent or as all-encompassing as they were. It seems to me that I have
gained a little room with this added conversation.
The other source of my "second intuition," in this particular case, was
the conversation I am having with myself and with Descartes while I am
writing this chapter, a conversation about the essential creativity of intu-
ition, the contribution of our mental acts to what we call reality, the near-
equivalence of "judgment" and invention. If that's so, then what does it
imply about the "perception" I have as Dustin comes up the stairs to my
office? It was my immediate judgment that his arrival spelled annoyance,
burden. Could I have invented that? Or is it really annoying? Well, it surely
felt like an annoyance—just as it feels like... no, it bloody well is an annoy-
ance to have classroom walls so thin that the audio from classes next door
disrupts whatever tiny bit of attention you have managed to generate for
what you are doing in your own room. How do you invent your way
around that?
Let's stay with Dustin for a while longer, for I think I may be able to
make a transfer from my being with him to our being with students, even
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in noisy classrooms. My "second intuition," I said, was more like an inten-
tion on my part: as if I reminded myself, after that rush of annoyance, of
my ongoing inquiry "What is really going on with Dustin?" and then sup-
plemented the new space that gave by tapping into the conversation I am
making up for this book. So my second intuition came to me as something
like this: "The kid that wants to play the same game over and over again
really laves to reinvent the wheel. If I can tap into whatever that is, maybe
I'd be able to teach, say, irregular verbs." Now I am "listening" to Dustin's
presence in a radically new way. Now I hear him as making a real contri-
bution to what I'm up to, and I'm alive to him, alert for that secret and
willing now to play with him, to keep the interaction alive instead of
killing it off. Now I'm like, "Oho!" instead of like, "Go away!" I use the
colloquialism on purpose: who I am for Dustin in our encounter has shifted.
In the context given by this "second intuition," then, I have space to
respond to Dustin's game more freely and flexibly. As the space of our
being-together now occurs, I can see in it possibilities that were not available
in that first instant. I could now propose a delay in complying with his
request: "OK, Dus; just let me finish these two sentences." (This usually
buys me a bit of time.) Notice that in the new space what Dustin says
shows up not as an interruption but as a request, to which I can be open
and which I can answer with a promise to respond later. Or I could
propose an alternate game. This almost always works. For it allows me to
shift the focus of attention, to "get his mind off" the recycled video and
onto a fresher invention. J now have the space to re-own the conversation.
In that space I am called to ask myself "What am I committed to now, for
Dustin and for myself?" As it replaces the generalizations and assertions I
began with, that question enables teaching. Now the Robin Hood game,
the noisy classroom, has become a resource instead of an annoyance. (Or
perhaps a resource as well as an annoyance.) It works now as a spur for a
re-inventing in which the students can be my partners. As an intuition
born in the sole light of articulation, it frees me to go to work with them.
For another experience of that birth, of re-inventing, let us return to
the title of Descartes' seminal work, this time not to look at it but to listen
through it:
Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting One's Reason
and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences
What if instead he had written:
Dialogue about a Plan for Conducting an Inquiry
to Discern the Articulations in which We Transact Reality
What picture of a world, and our jobs as students of it and in it, might be
reflected or embodied in those words? What difference is there between a
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discourse and a dialogue? What do the ideas of "discerning articulations"
and "transacting reality" bring with them, contrasted with the idea of
"seeking for truth"? You can record your speculations about this in the
spaces that follow. It would be a good idea to look the words up, espe-
cially if you already know what they mean. And did you think of the
possibility of sharing the exercise with a colleague? (Be sure to set up in
the background of the exercise, of course, the question "How might what










If you worked through this revamped title, you may have seen that it
gives a different conversation than Descartes' original. It conjures different
associations, spawns different questions. (One of which might be "what is
it that is conducting my reason here? Are the conjured associations pro-
duced by a method, or is it more like there is some automaticity at work?)
But the title alone does not conjure associations. Only in your listening to
the title, using it for something, will it yield its speaking. So if you did not
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notice an altered conversation taking shape on the previous page, you are
encouraged to change the title around as much as you like, looking up the
words and asking always, "What conversation am I participating in now?
What further speaking and listening could be entailed or suggested by the
context this conversation gives?" And, with colleagues: "How do we feel
about ourselves and our students while participating in this conversation?
What possibilities does it open for us to make a difference with and for
each other?"
What if Descartes' most basic intuition, his first principle, had been
amo ergo sum? What would follow from that? What conversation would
that found? There exist communities that take loving as the ground of
being. Whatever we may feel about the doctrinal variants of Christianity,
"Love thy neighbor as thyself" may work better as an ontology than as a
commandment. "Love thy neighbor" is an inquiry: what world does its at-
tendant conversation call us into? What about loquor ergo sum? How could
speaking be the ground of being? I speak, therefore I am? Of course Descartes
was not a Saussurean. But what if he had noticed something about human-
being-in-the-world, something that, two and a half centuries later, Saussure
revisited? If Descartes had read Saussure, what he might have meant by
"I am thinking" is "I am speaking." And the purpose of Cartesian doubt
would then have been to interrupt the easy and usually harmless as-
sumption that words refer to things, supplanting it with the notion that
the world is articulation.
The question posed here in Part One becomes, then: Are we articulate
because we know, or do we know because we dwell within an articulation?
Are we looking at the particulars of the world, the scales on the butterfly's
wing, or are we looking right through a clear and distinct articulation of
ideas? Whether we are looking through particulars to generals, or through
generals to particulars, Cartesian doubt has opened, briefly, a window on
the question what is it to look through? Wittgenstein will propose an answer:
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature
over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame
through which we look at it.
What looks as if it had to exist is a part of the language.21
Perhaps to look through is to speak, to be engaged in language. What-we-call a
Triangle is what-we-call Bounded By what-we-call Three what-we-call Sides.
There is one further point to be made in this regard. A system, a
language founded in sociality, in being-together, makes not only facts
possible. It makes individuals possible, too. Hence je suis, j'existe instead of
je pense, doncje suis. Ego sum, ego existo, not cogito ergo sum. I speak, there-
fore I exist; and with "I" comes world. (When Helen Keller got "water,"
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she got her hand wet in the bargain; and she got that her hand was wet.)22
We are looking from Descartes here toward Saussure's insight Descartes
begins to say "I arise together with a world": ego sum is world arising. To
know yourself is to know a set of things that are not you. You exist in
distinction, as a distinct member of a system of distinctions.23 We not only
look through the system; we are in it. We be in it. Alone in his study,
Descartes says "I judge." With his students in the classroom, Saussure
says "we speak"
So now me final question of this chapter: What is the system, the
articulation of values, you "be in" when you walk into the classroom each
day? Another way to ask it: What pictures do you not notice in the
background as you teach? For it may not be the system of values you
know about and can manage, the one you design your life around, that
has power to shape your experience and your being with students. Look-
ing through the window, you say that you see men passing in the street;
but do you see that really you are judging that they are men? What I hold
as axiomatic is what may design me. Or rather, what I take for granted
along with the axioms is what designs my life, my being, the practices and
pursuits and goals that characterize me.
In his "On the Heavens," Aristotle states what he took to be axiomatic
about the universe in which we live:
The shape of the universe is necessarily spherical. For that is the
shape which is most appropriate to what is primary by nature.
The universe itself is what is encompassed within the extreme
circumference, since we habitually say that the whole, or ev-
erything, is the universe.
Let us say that something is heavy when it naturally moves to the
center of the universe; and light when it naturally moves away
from the center-
Easy as it is to see this as a piece of musty didacticism, not agreeing with
scientific "discoveries" we have made since, we should also be able to see
it as an articulation of values, a commitment to a system of terms. Its
mode is "Let us say." It lays down a pattern to be shared. Thus the ancient
system of four observable elements—earth, air, fire, water—was supple-
mented by a fifth value, the "ether," a value that has only in this century
died out of our scientific conversation.
Richard Rorty warns of the "fallacy of seeing axioms where there are
only shared habits, of viewing statements which summarize [shared]
practices as if they reported constraints enforcing such practices."24 What if
the picture of rationality-as-representation, as it has developed since
Descartes, is a constellation of myriad axioms and assumptions mutually
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supporting each other—that reality hangs together in a structure of facts;
that theories account for facts; that a comprehensive theory accounting for
all the facts would solve all our problems; that subject and object, teacher
and student, are different kinds of entity; that the social world is made up
of individuals; that the individual as rational and moral agent should be
the object of our attention; that this individual acts on the basis of knowl-
edge (or sometimes of ignorance)... What if these were not truths about
the world or constraints enforcing our teaching practices? What if the
axioms of representation were seen as ways of summarizing how the
world shows up now, for us, rather than ways of getting at the truth of how
the world z's? Perhaps if we look at them as parts of a language, if we hold
them as a set of values supported not by the facts of nature alone but by
our own agreement in concert with the facts, something will appear that
could not appear when they were held as axioms. Particularly for teachers,
it may be that viewing axioms as natural truths entails some cost. Descartes
himself might have warned us against taking an axiom—for instance, that
Aptitude times Motivation equals Achievement, or that Cognition and
Affect are separable, or that there is such a thing as an LD or ED kid—for a
solid piece of wax. Descartes would not deny that the designations
"Learning Disabled" and "Emotionally Disturbed" apply to some inde-
pendently constituted reality, some features of a perhaps neural organiza-
tion. But as with the wax, he would notice that it is our commitment to the
terms that keeps them in place. We may indeed have good reasons for our
commitments, here as elsewhere in our vocabulary. But it does not follow
that the designated states are any the less phenomena of judgment. The
question Descartes' work may open for us is whether there might be some
other terms, held in place by and in a somewhat different system, that
might serve us better.
To explore further what is axiomatic for us, the frame that produces
what is intuitively clear and distinct for us, we turn next to John Locke.
Thomas Jefferson ranked Locke with Bacon and Newton as "the three
greatest men that have ever lived without exception." As one of the
intellectual fathers of our country, then, Locke has had much influence in
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LOCKEAN CERTAINTY
...when things exist, they are what they are, this or that, abso-
lutely or relatively, not by will or arbitrary command, but by the
necessity of their own nature.
—John Locke
I have no doubt that our discoveries are "objective," simply
because the styles of reasoning that we employ determine what
counts as objectivity. My worry is that the very candidates for
truth or falsehood have no existence independent of the styles of
reasoning that settle what it is to be true or false in their domain.
—Ian Hacking1
I take it that the first epigraph above expresses one of our bedrock as-
sumptions. That a "thing" has a nature independent of what anyone says
about it is so obvious a proposition that there seems no reason to state it.
So clear an idea is this that we look right through it. As we have noticed in
re-reading Descartes, though, looking through an accepted framework of
ideas (or as Hacking puts it, using a given "style of reasoning") may
actually produce the objects we see. It is not a question of distortion, but of
creation; not that the window may obscure the sight—Locke would heart-
ily agree to that—but that the window may give the sight. We fail to see
(or to hear, really) Descartes' audacious insistence on the ordering of the
world performed by our mental inspection, our judging. So it becomes a
matter of some interest for us to explore what kind of power the window
may exert.
After beginning a conversation that allows for some malleability by
including the power of judgment in the design of reality, Descartes went
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on to establish as one of his clear and distinct certainties that a material
world exists separate from the mind. In Locke, that world hardens like
coral removed from the sea, and man's contribution to the world he lives
in withers into re-presentation: the copying and recombining of what is
already designed. Where Cartesian doubt reveals a "judging" at the heart
of things, and thus opens the way for the construction of certainty, Lockean
empiricism doses off any possibility that the construction of certain
knowledge out of perceptions might be drawn from the well of inventing,
co-poiesis: the sociality of the human coming-in to a world.
As a master of inventing, Dustin will sometimes pull off a coup of
being together. Tonight when I got home he invited me outside to watch
him ride his bike. Pretty soon we were racing up and down the driveway,
and up and down again, and again, making up different formats for the
races as we went, each time trying to outdo the other in preposterous
regulations:
"Yay, I win!" he began.
"No, you don't; the finish line is way up herel"
"Daddy, you can't go that fast."
"Oh no, my shoes won't roll," I puffed, "you have to drag me."
"When I say go," he responded brightly, "you give me a push..."
I wish I had thought of that one. Once when he had opened up a big lead
on me, I turned around to go the other way and called back "Hey, the
finish line is this way!" He thought that was outrageous. How can you
judge a race if the finish line keeps shifting? he might have asked. I might
respond: How do we know where the finish line is? Don't we get to say
where it is? Do you see a place on the ground that has to be the finish line?
Is it in the world, or in our speaking, which is our judging? I might have
said all that, but I didn't. Dustin hasn't read Saussure, or Descartes, much
less made the preposterous judgment mat they belong together.
In his own time, of course, Descartes' conversation was not Saussurean,
either. His thinking contains only that bare hint of what Saussure would
develop into the founding sociality of language. By portraying him, in his
Meditations, as a single isolated consciousness, alone in his study day
after day or night, Descartes' conversation focused authority rather in the
individual, in his thinking and in his representing to himself, in his think-
ing, the world outside himself. Look now at the way John Locke takes up
this Cartesian conversation for the possibility of individual authority—the
authority of the mind surrounded by objects but disengaged from them
and from other minds—and remakes it into radical empiricism: a conver-
sation in which the highest kind of thinking I can do, the most valorized
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act, is to make my ideas "comformable to things as they exist." One does
not contribute to reality; one pays tribute to it. In quoting several passages
from Locke, I do not hope, of course, to give more than a partial summary
of his philosophy, but I do hope to bring into bolder relief for us some of
the contours of his thought. I want us to hear the tenor of his conversation
with his time, and to ask how nearly these—conversation and cultural
moment—are ours as well.
At the beginning of his colossal Essay Concerning Human Understand-
ing, then, Locke expresses his purpose in an Epistle to the Reader. He has
set himself the task, he says, of "clearing the ground a little, and removing
some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge." Philosophy, Locke
says, is "nothing but the true knowledge of things."2 How do we arrive at
that, then? There is a series of questions here: What is knowledge for
Locke? How does it qualify or fail to qualify as true knowledge? And,
perhaps more easily overlooked but no less crucial: what are the things
that we aim to get knowledge of?
To set the context for those questions, we may ask of Locke what this
rubbish is which impedes philosophy's advance toward true knowledge.
His answer is not tentative: it is "the learned but frivolous use of uncouth,
affected, or unintelligible terms introduced into the sciences, and there
made an art of," that ruins philosophy, making it "unfit or uncapable to
be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation." It sounds as
if there had been a kind of language used by "couth" philosophers that
certified not only their breeding but the nearness to truth of their dis-
courses! But I think that while Locke may be positioning his own discourse
here so that it fits into the proper social circles, what he is most concerned
to expose as false is not the social standing of contemporary discourse, but
something about its way of meaning:
Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language,
have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and
misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescrip-
tion, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of
speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who
speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of
ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge.3
Locke is on a high horse here, intending nothing less than "to break in
upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance." But what kind of language
does Locke approve? What does he certify as the true and valid use of
words? What is it for a term to be meaningful? In one kind of conversation
we have fallacious depth, vain speculation and ignorance: what kind will
give us true knowledge? The answer to that should be of considerable
interest to teachers.
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To explore Locke's answer, we first need to find out what he says
knowledge is, and where it comes from. Locke's most famous idea was
the assertion that a person comes into the world without any knowledge
whatever. A mind—for that is where knowledge is bound to reside—
begins as a blank slate, a tabula rasa. If we come into the world with a blank
chalkboard in our heads, what teacher writes on it, and what does the
writing say?
Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all
characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished?
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this
I answer in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge
is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.4
Notice that Locke is "putting a case" here: he begins with a supposition,
continues with a question based on it, and then answers the question so
that it accords with the supposition. He does not prove the initial assumed
condition. Tabula rasa is simply the contrary of the doctrine of innate ideas,
which Locke wants to demolish; he is building up a framework to support
the opposite notion, to make it seem more plausible. But so far what we
have are fairly bare assertions.
So our first and only teacher is experience. What is experience, then, and
where does it come from? Locke sets up a clear and unambiguous catego-
rization of the sources of the ideas that constitute experience: "All ideas
come from sensation or reflection." Here is his first explanation of "sensa-
tion":
First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do
convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things,
according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect
them... when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they
from external objects convey into the mind what produces there
those perceptions.5
What Locke is talking about here, in his elaboration of the framework
supporting his initial supposition, is the notion of clear and distinct ideas, a
notion that he has appropriated from Descartes. But there is a subtle
difference between Descartes' notion and Locke's. Where for Descartes
the intuition of clarity and distinctness entails a fundamental contribution,
tacit and powerful, from the perceiver's "mental inspection," for Locke
that implicit malleability is a source of confusion. To inspect, as Descartes
had proposed, the fact of mental inspection, the contribution to what we
see of the way we look, produces nothing but muddy water according to
Locke; and in editions after the first he adjoins the following explanation,
or admonition:
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Clear and distinct ideas are terms which, though familiar and
frequent in men's mouths, I have reason to think everyone who
uses does not perfectly understand. And possibly 'tis but here
and there one who gives himself the trouble to consider them so
far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them.
I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or de-
termined, instead of clear and distinct...6
So what does that move accomplish for Locke? What is the difference
between clear, distinct ideas and determinate ones? "Determinate" is used
to mean "definitely bounded, limited, fixed so as not to vary."7 "Deter-
mined" is used like the words "ended," "settled," "fixed," "decided,"
"resolved upon," "exactly defined." Locke's purpose here, it seems, is to
fix into place, once and for all, the meanings of the words of our language—
to arrive at stable, unfluctuating definitions—and accordingly to fix for all
times and all speakers the precise characters of the objects to which words
refer:
[By determinate or determined] I mean some object in the mind,
and consequently determined, i.e. such as it is there seen and
perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or
determined idea when such as it is at any time objectively in the
mind and so determined there, it is annexed, and without
variation determined, to a name or articulate sound, which is to
be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind, or
determinate idea.
...by determined, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an
one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less
complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation as the
mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is
present in it or should be present in it, when a man gives a name
to it. I say should be, because it is not everyone, nor perhaps
anyone, who is so careful of his language as to use no word till
he views in his mind the precise determined idea which he
resolves to make it the sign of.8
In threading our way through the clauses here, we must be careful of
Locke's philosophical vocabulary. An "object" in the mind means an idea,
not a stone or a table, and all Locke's talk of objective determination really
applies to the delimitation of ideas, not to the limits of real objects, things
in the world. He is not in danger of claiming that when one speaks the
word "table," a table falls out of the mouth. But true meaning, in the
paradigm Locke is developing, resides only in "precise determined ideas"
and precisely delimited definitions, steady recipes. Ideas are (or ought to
be) like chemical compounds, elements joined invariably according to
66 FROM COGNITION TO BEING
precise proportions. Thus knowledge, in Locke's formulation, depends on
and prescribes representation. The mode of knowledge is representation, corre-
spondence of this particular "determinate" character.
Nor is the conversation about precise determination unattended with
that certain hauteur we remarked in the first quoted passage—a warm
disdain for careless ordinary usage. In Locke's speaking here, there is
present a certain way of being, is there not? What kind of speaking would
count as a failure to communicate? Dostoevsky's profanity, perhaps, or
slang? In Locke's picture, could silence communicate?
What is it that precisely determines the content of an idea, and thus the
meaning of a word in Locke's ideal language? At root, remember, the
building blocks of ideas are sense impressions; we receive ideas into our
minds by way of the senses. So what determines what he calls "simple
ideas" is things in the world outside the mind, acting through impulses
conveyed by the nerves to the brain, which Locke characterizes, in regal
spatiality, as "the mind's presence-room." By the end of the thirty-three
chapters in Book One of Locke's Essay, the vocabulary of Ideas as the Sense-
images in the Mind of Objects outside has grown strong and plausible.
(And there are still three Books to go.) Locke is here installing into our
intellectual discourse the vocabulary of, and conversation for, referentiality.
With its pervasive image and metaphor of knowledge as a kind of di-
rected sight, Locke's vocabulary becomes the one in whose terms every-
thing we know and do fits together.
To appreciate how durable this vocabulary and conversation have
been, how resilient in the face of challenge, we have only to look at a
newspaper, or an article on an issue in education:
...the research described here contributes to defining what it
means, cognitively speaking, to be an educated person, or at
least to define an educated person as one who trunks well...
knowing is an ongoing process of evaluation, which the ever-
present possibility of new evidence and new arguments leaves
always uncompleted. Central to this process is reflection on
one's own thinking—metacognition in its most basic and impor-
tant sense—and beneath its surface is the structure of argument
examined in this article. It is this structure that must be in place
for someone to hold a reasoned belief or make a reasoned
judgment, which we can think of as the building blocks of
educated thinking.9
What the researcher is after, in the realm of the cognitions of an educated
person, is a definition; the educational discourse into which this article fits
has called for a recipe for combining building-blocks. For beneath the pro-
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cess of thinking lurks the structure of argument, without which there can
be no building blocks for educated thinking. As Locke had put it,
"Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas."10 And it is
seen here to be in the nature of building blocks that they reside in "one's own
thinking/' the mental process of a single person. It is true that the very next
section of the recent article is called "Thinking as a Social Activity," and
recommends that thinking skills be taught in "argumentative dialogue,"
which "corrects individual thought." And in the sentence "knowing is an
ongoing process of evaluation, which the ever-present possibility of new
evidence and new arguments leaves always uncompleted," we find the
intrusion of a vocabulary of social function into the vocabulary of structured
knowledge. But the word "dialogue" is soon supplanted in the article by
"discourse," and Descartes is back in his study, arriving at the correct
formulations, the correct representational furniture, required by Locke.
In Locke's picture, notice now also that the mind has gained a third
dimension along the way; it has become more like a box with slots for
input than like a blank canvas. Somewhere in the Essay Locke probably
acknowledges that he is far from speaking literally in formulating his
pictures of how the mind works, mat he is himself artfully using metaphors,
figurative instead of representational language. Under the auspices of
clearing away the rubbish, he is inventing pictures. And the picture of the
mind as a factory, operating with its own internal machinery on raw
materials supplied from outside, quickly comes to dominate the discussion,
so that Locke's second great source of experience, reflection on the mind's
own operations, itself looks like another input:
Secondly, the other fountain, from which experience furnisheth
the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations
of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it
has got... which we, being conscious of, and observing in our-
selves, do... receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as
we do from bodies affecting our senses.11
Locke makes explicit the pictured similarity between sense impressions
and internal operations: "and though it be not sense as having nothing to
do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough
be called internal sense." When we say nowadays that "an idea came into
my head," when we accept without even a first thought the input-output
analogy between a mind and a computer, we are re-committing ourselves
to this picture of the brain as a box, an enclosed room that receives data
into itself like so many bytes. We have settled into a style of reasoning.
How much of the rest of our conversation nowadays arises from and
reinforces just this picture? I have heard teachers say—in jest, of course, or
maybe in frustration—that kids cannot get ideas through their thick skulls,
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or that a child has a "Teflon-coated mind." In no case that I know of has
that conversation made any difference in the student's performance in
school. It seems rather to have cemented into place a picture of the student
with just these attributes: it makes the attributes permanent.
What expressions have you heard and used in your own case? How
do these expressions serve you? To what extent do we use them, and to
what extent do they use us, channel our thinking about causes and cures?
I do not intend this as a rhetorical question; the answers that matter are
those that come out of our own examination of the teaching and learning
situations we participate in. Derided though it may be, the idea of pouring
knowledge in through a funnel may insinuate itself unnoticed into our
colloquy and our practice. To the extent that our practice depends on our
students hearing what we have to say, the unclogged funnel may be an
apt image. To the extent that what we have to say, and how we say it,
comes out of Locke's paradigm of knowledge, we may be shooting our-
selves in the mouth. For it may be that the only way to pour in the "finish
line," to bring it present in a classroom so that everyone can see it and
dwell in its presence, is to invent it together. What would such a co-
invention look like, then? Does a Lockean pedagogy allow for the sociality
of inventing? Let us look further.
Having fixed the character and sources of knowledge into the system
of his explication, so that we now have an elaborate vocabulary displaying
what knowledge is and where it comes from, Locke expands the picture
by, as he says, observing another fact about ideas "in" the mind. Once the
"simple ideas" of sensation are stored, the mind has the power to "repeat,
compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety." It can build
castles from its blocks. But it can neither fashion the blocks on its own, nor
alter their shape:
it is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged
understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent
or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the
ways before mentioned... the dominion of man in this little
world of his own understanding, being much-what the same as
it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power
however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to
compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand...12
Here again the dominant image of knowledge as sight, and here again the
divorce between minds and things material. But the vocabulary of regal
presence has shifted: man's dominion in matters of understanding, hence
of knowledge, appears rattier paltry now, like that of a prisoner in a cell,
hardly dominion at all. And here is the treachery: humans are reduced in
this way of speaking from architects to slab carriers, constrained in this
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picture to re-presentation, the copying and combining of what is already
designed. Lockean certainty, as it develops here, is opaque to the self,
resolutely turned away from personal (that is, social) contribution, im-
mune to the co-poiesis of meaning. In stark, brute facticity the elements of
the world confront us. Outside perception and before perception, the el-
emental objects govern with an iron dominance. To know is to be in-
formed.13
That we actually manufacture and destroy, nowadays, the chemical
elements which make up matter, is not the point to be made to contrast
Locke's picture, though that fact in itself might give us pause in assigning
absolute primacy to any set of building blocks purportedly laid close to
the foundation of knowledge. (We do not know exactly what's what; and
my students, at least, are on to that.) Rather, the point is that whatever
elements we take to be primary, indissoluble building blocks, all the way
down to electrons, positrons and quarks, are values in a system. Their
valueness is no less important than their objectness. (In my home town
there is a restaurant whose name lights up with valueness, engaging it in
the language of the city's commerce. It is called the Silvertron Cafe. The
food is not bad, either.) In designating the things that we aim to get
knowledge of, Locke has assigned ontological primacy to the objectness of
objects, leaving out of the picture that "judging" which Descartes-Saussure
glimpsed as the engagement of human beings that occurs in a system of
values, a language.
Early in the spring a year or two ago, there had been a light dusting of
snow during a cold snap, and as daylight faded from the overcast sky, I
was wishing, as I had off and on during the winter, that our house
contained a fireplace. Dustin, who had been playing outside as I puttered
around, sometimes attending to his own interests and more often seeking
to interest me in joining his play, suddenly announced: "I know, Daddy!
Let's build a snow fire." And he began to gather the icy sticks and leaves
that rumpled the surface of the snow-crusted yard, piling them up in a
fairly well wrought model of the lean-to fire I had taught him about. But
he hadn't remembered to put underneath them any "tinder," shavings or
twigs that could be "lighted" with a "match." So I asked him how we'd
get the fire to burn, since we didn't have any kerosene to pour on the
sticks. "Don't worry," he said confidently, "I know how to handle fires
like this." Locke might have smiled benignly at the childish imitation of
knowledge.
Descartes, remembering his "knowledge" of men passing in the street,
might have worn an expression somewhat more doubtful, as if the nature
of Dustin's speaking might not be so plain. For its purpose had clearly
been to include the two of us in a shared activity, the adventure of
inventing snow fire. Dustin's speaking (as I heard it) had not been geared
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to deal with objects in a real world: it was a declaration of possibility.
Though Locke would never have wanted to squelch that childish spirit of
declaration,14 his grown-up philosophical position makes it rather diffi-
cult to sustain the kind of attention that Bakhtin sets at the heart even of
literary study. ("The real object of study," Bakhtin says, "is the interrela-
tion and interaction of spirits.") When I told Dustin, on one of his recent
visits to my office, that I was writing about his snow fire, and recounted
the story to him, he asked in wonderment "But Daddy, how did it burn?
You didn't get warm from it, did you? Did we really light it with a
match?" In these questions about what things are by the necessity of their
own nature, I heard him asking another question: What is Prometheus?
Over and over again, Locke reiterates that no one can ever "fashion in
his understanding any simple idea not received in his senses from exter-
nal objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about
them." Over and over he dismisses received opinion to the contrary as
folly, and stands firmly on the ground of his own dear and systematic
classification, appealing to his readers' observation of their own experience
to certify its validity. The picture in the background is always the same:
words represent internal ideas that represent external things. To select a
passage almost at random:
it may not be amiss to consider that though our words signify
nothing but our ideas, yet being designed by them to signify
things, the truth they contain when put into propositions will be
only verbal, when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not
an agreement with the reality of things.15
In light of Dustin's snow fire, we might say: that may be so, if one accepts
the story about determinate ideas and their combinations, but this is not
the whole story. In fact, its effect, like that of any vocabulary taken to be
comprehensive, "final," is to hide other stories. We want to have an idea
of the way fire really works, so that we can handle the real thing, but
Locke's philosophical picture devalues the context of human being to-
gether that allows for our handling it. There is no soobschenie here, no be-
coming together. We are obliged to build real fires sometimes, but what
are we building with them? Where is the originary fire located? Perhaps it
is the being-together which handles fires, makes fires possible. Maybe the
spirit of Prometheus is born here, in our being-together-for-something.
Locke's picture of knowledge and truth as representation, as "agree-
ment with the reality of things," gives him decided opinions about the
proper means toward "improvement of our knowledge." Under the rubric
of improving our knowledge he is talking about what we would now
refer to as research, but his thinking has clear implications for pedagogy
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as well. Having in the background now Locke's picture of what knowl-
edge is, and what makes it "true," we can ask what Locke means by
"improvement" of knowledge.
In the chapter devoted specifically to that topic, he speaks of "building"
our knowledge of a subject, of the "advancement" and "certainty of real
knowledge," of "enlargement" of knowledge. We notice the directionality,
the implied progress toward the goal of certainty, in the talk of improve-
ment and advance; of sequence and cumulation in the talk of building
and enlargement. Here Locke is using a vocabulary appropriate for one
kind of improvement: that which comes from observations of and experi-
ments on the physical universe.16 While the Essay elsewhere distinguishes
other kinds of knowledge and other kinds of improvement, Locke's over-
riding purpose, to establish clear and incontrovertible principles that will
lead to true and certain knowledge, leads him to set up this kind—the
empirical, experimental, "objective"—as the foundation and test of the
others. At bottom, this kind is the touchstone of knowledge. Thus Locke
shifts the conversation of his time away from reliance on what he calls
"general maxims, precarious principles, and hypotheses laid down at
pleasure"—away from that merely verbal rubbish that impedes
philosophy's advance.
So according to Locke, the question for us teachers must be: what
kind of language use, what kind of conversation, will lead toward true
knowledge? How do we talk so as to communicate knowledge to our
students? In all this conversation between Locke and his contemporaries
which we have been overhearing, we have been led to valorize a language
that works with two inter-related presuppositions in the background: 1)
there is a natural distinction between subject and object, perceiver and
perceived; 2) language is referentiality (words refer to ideas of things).
From these a third follows: 3) our knowledge depends on accurately
communicated information. Locke's whole system, as we have seen, as-
sumes that sense experience involves two distinct terms: the mind inside,
and the outside objects that affect it. "Simple ideas, as has been shown, are
only to be got by those impressions objects themselves make on our
minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort."17 While Locke distin-
guishes several sorts of ideas other than the simple sense-impression, and
acknowledges that most of these are "inventions and creatures of the
understanding," his purpose in doing so is to reinforce the separation
between words and ideas, whose "seat" is in the mind, and things outside
it. The "inventions" of the understanding he calls "creatures": created
objects with their own distinct identities, in analogy with the objective
identities that make up the material world. An idea, especially a precisely
determined idea, has the character of an identity, like the bead of an
abacus. In this formulation, that is, this way of talking, Locke has focused
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his attention and ours on "inventions"—things already invented—thus di-
verting our eye from the possibility of an ongoing activity of inventing. His
language enables description and not play. In our interest in the relative
motions and spins of the billiard balls, we forget to ask who made the
game up, and where the pleasure in playing it comes from.
Interesting. Dividing subject from object has the effect of making
everything, subjects included, into an object of one kind or another. The
object-objects are res extensa and the subject-objects are res cogitans. We have
extended things, objects whose boundaries are delimited in space, and we
have mental or thinking things, whose boundaries are delimited... but
rather than completing the partition, notice the dominant background, the
whole of which the two kinds of things are parts: everything is delimited,
everything is res. We don't live in a kingdom any more (much less a
Kingdom with a dapple-dawn-drawn falcon for a Dauphin); we live in a
thingdom.
Looking at the "piece" of wax, Descartes had begun his conversation
by raising the question whether subjects are really separated from objects.
(Reading his early conversations with his reader, one might have asked
"Where is this piece of wax?") Then, examining the action by which the
wax is perceived, Descartes' way of talking draws our attention to invent-
ing, judging, inspecting as ongoing actions (or better, ongoing acting) rather
than already finished processes that have issued in completed products,
the objects and ideas we deal with every day. This is a difference of
enormous moment. For the opposite of "thing" is not "process." The
opposite of thing, surprisingly, is being, or more exactly, giving being, in-
venting being. Processes are made up of things, A causing B causing C, D,
and F. (Did our system, the alphabet, cause you to ask "What happened to
E?") Inventing being is made up of nothing. It gives things, gives systems.
These windows are, literally, worlds apart. Locke's window is epistemol-
ogy. Descartes-Saussure's window opens into ontology. But we are ahead
of ourselves here; we will look at ontology in Part Two.
Let us return then to the assumptions that make up Locke's window,
the frame around which he traces. One member of the frame, one edge of
the window, let's say, is the subject or mind; the edge opposite that is the
object world. The other pair of edges that make up the frame come from
the background assumption that words refer to or correspond to or conform
with things as they exist in themselves. (Or rather, that they should so con-
form if our knowledge is to be as exact and complete as is possible for
finite creatures.) Here again is Locke:
Nature, in the production of things, makes several of them alike:
there is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals,
and all things propagated by seed. But yet I think we may say, the
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sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding,
taking occasion, from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make
abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names
annexed to them, as patterns or forms... to which as particular
things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that
species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis.18
We might draw a picture of the frame that is present in this discourse;
Locke is drawing it himself in this passage and countless others:
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Objects confront men, and men try to describe them. Things produce
ideas to which words are "annexed"; words relate to things by represent-
ing their ideas. Determinate things solicit the naming of classes, abstract
general ideas, like a set of templates for sorting other already determined
objects. This, of course, is a crude, first-approximation diagram of what
gives Locke his vision. He refines it so skilfully that its presence is not
noticed: he sees through it, and we see through it with him, not noticing
that we are seeing through just this window.
What else is there to this window of Locke's? What is the color or tint
of the panes, for instance? Locke strives, as his model of knowledge
requires, to make them as clear and colorless as is humanly possible. But
here is another hint. Man's acumen, weak and stunted compared with the
Creator's omniscience, sets a limit on the adequacy of his perception, his
invention of taxonomies, on the validity of his ranking of reality. Looking
through this window, the purpose of invention is to serve description, which
can be more or less accurate, more or less "conformable to things as they
exist" in God's ultimately unfathomable creation. And here is a bind
indeed. We are required to conform our knowledge to an ultimately
unknowable fabric of substances and attributes. And then we are required
to speak as if we had achieved an adequate description:
For, though men may make what complex ideas they please, and
give what names to them they please; yet, if they will be un-
derstood when they speak of things really existing, they must in some
degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of; or
else men's language will be like that of Babel; and every man's
words, being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve
to conversation and the ordinary affairs of life, if the ideas they
stand for be not some way answering the common appearances
and agreement of substances as they really exist.19
Doesn't this sound like just plain good common sense? Doesn't it resonate
with our sense of how things are, what we have to do to get things
accomplished, what our job as human beings is? It is not something one
can disagree with.
But notice the window in the background. In the reference to Babel,
the coloring of the panes shows up: they are tinted with the prideful
insufficiency of man's understanding of the creation God made indepen-
dently of us. "Here we see as through a glass darkly," Locke implies, and
our speech, like our knowledge, "has so great a conformity with our
sight"20 that we can rely on nothing but clear communication to avoid
failure. Here is the framework again: Clear communication, our stay against
confusion and the antidote for pride, presumes and requires an absolute
difference between men and other "things really existing," and depends to-
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tally on conformity between things, ideas, and words—on stable reference.
And the coloring of the panes appears in that resignation to the limits of
our human powers of perception and our aspiring axioms: "our faculties
are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences of
bodies," Locke concludes.
What are our faculties fitted for, then? Looking through Locke's win-
dow, how are we to proceed in improving or enlarging or advancing our
knowledge and that of our students? Locke gives us two rules:
The first is to get and settle in our minds determined ideas of
those things whereof we have general or specific names.... And
if they be specific ideas of substances, we should endeavor also
to make them as complete as we can, whereby I mean, that we
should put together as many simple ideas as, being constantly
observed to co-exist, may perfectly determine the species; and
each of those simple ideas which are the ingredients of our
complex ones, should be clear and distinct [that is, determined]
in our minds. For it being evident that our knowledge cannot
exceed our ideas; as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or
obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear
knowledge.21
And the second rule is to find out "those intermediate ideas, which may
show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be
immediately compared."22 "O piling up of information!" Buber would
say. "It, it, it!"23
I still remember my favorite project in the ninth grade. We were to
pick out, somewhere on the school's hundred acres, one square meter of
ground, which we would observe, as closely and regularly as we could,
for the whole semester. Our observations were to culminate in a report on
the contents of our square meter, a compendium of observed data, hy-
pothesized relationships among the facts, and conclusions about the "na-
ture" of our adopted territory. We had to get and settle in our minds
determined ideas, and annex names to them—these were the facts we
reported. We were looking for "steady signs." We had to look deep, using
as many of our senses as we could to explore the phenomena, to amass
data for correlation: we had to look for the constant co-existence of datum
with datum. And the report was to be an interpretation of the data we had
observed, a finding out or supplying of ideas "intermediate" between
datum and datum. We had to show how phenomena on one side of our
square meter were related to phenomena on the other side. John Locke
assigned us that project.
To acquire knowledge, through Locke's window, is to set up a vast
honeycomb, with rows and columns of cells into which information is
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deposited for later recall. In this array, knowledge is built on prior knowl-
edge; learning depends on prior learning.24 Though the data that are or-
dered and correlated in the honeycomb are as various as the impressions
entering at our senses, once it is coded into the honeycomb of our knowl-
edge, it becomes just information like everything else. We can recall it,
manipulate it, massage it and report it, but it is no longer ours. I said the
square meter was my favorite project. Why did I get such a charge out of
it? Was it because I was finally getting to be outside doing things, instead
of sitting at a desk taking notes? But I enjoyed taking notes in other
classes, though not in all classes. Was it because my friends were all
assigned the same project, and we could call across the pond to each
other? ("Oh, man, I found a stumpl" "Hey, today the ground is wet—I
wonder what that means?!") Perhaps it was because I had the opportunity
to invent the data—I got to make up the facts about my territory and the
relationships between them. My "observing" was inventing. I got an A+
on the report. How did I know that what I was supposed to be doing, even
in a Lockean project, was inventing? How did they teach me that?
In fixing the identities of natural and human objects for human subjects
to perceive and understand—in cementing the foundations of knowledge—
Locke's picture, ratified and augmented by the ascendancy of science, had
catalyzed not only the split between man and his world, but also a massive
retreat from what might be seen as the responsibility of Adam: that naming
of the world that symbolizes man's ever-original say in it. This last, now,
is not obvious to us, because the picture we receive through Locke's
window prevents us from recognizing the say we have in forming the
world, populating it with forms.25 We are always renewing our culture by
speaking and listening in its terms—repeating and participating in its
conversation. We are always responsible in committing ourselves by
speaking as we do. When Heidegger says that "the fundamental event of
the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture,"26 he is pointing to
the hegemony of representation that Locke so magisterially voiced. If we
re-open the questions Locke has already answered so forcefully, we may
open a way toward responsibility—having a say in the world—that does
not ignore the facts, the rocks, or the rock stars, but re-establishes our
intimacy with them. What is it to be with facts powerfully?
When Locke shifted the conversation of philosophy away from the
authority of "first principles" toward skeptical observation and experi-
ment—toward structured knowledge as the alpha and omega of con-
sciousness—he undercut another possible way of looking, listening, and
being, too: the way I'm calling inventing. Locke's purpose, especially as it
was heard by Thomas Jefferson, was to empower the solidarity of free
men. "The field of Knowledge," said Jefferson, "is the common property
of mankind, and any discoveries we can make in it will be for the benefit
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of yours and of every other nation, as well as our own."271 am not obliged
to genuflect because of some first principle like the Divine Right of Kings.
As a political position, this worked rather well. But as epistemology,
Locke's writing cements into place a picture of individuals—objects and
men and women—acting on each other in determinate ways, rather than
generating the possibility of freedom in their encounter. Locke's picture is
not wrong: like the old Brooklyn Bridge, its capacity to carry traffic has
been exceeded. If a scientific hypothesis must not be made "at pleasure"
(which means at random), is it so also for, say, a declaration of truth? Do
"things" govern the truth of declarations? Do facts in the objective world
limit possibilities, constraining invention? Or is inventing the vehicle of
engagement, of being together? Can we be only when we be together
coming into a world?
When you tell your child things about the world, when you impart
knowledge to him, what happens? Does he use it as information, or as
material for inventing, for play? Or does he avoid or ignore information
presented as information? Last fall, my son had been playing in a tarp full
of leaves that had been left in the middle of the yard. It was a ship for him,
and he had been sailing the sea of grass, master of his career through the
deep. Because I had had to empty the tarp to get another load of leaves, I
was faced with the opportunity to make another ship for him. Filling the
tarp with leaves, I dragged one end up onto a small tree stump, so that it
looked tolerably like a ship's prow. But now the question arose: how will I
present this construction to the child? If I tell him, "See, the bow is riding
over a big wave," how he takes this and what he does with it will come
out of the way I am being when I say it. If I say it as an already rehearsed
line, he may get my saying as acting, and decide either to participate in
the play or not. But if I invent the line newly, at the precise moment in our
dialogue when he needs it or can use it—then he may get my saying as his
homeland, and the ship will live again. What is it to invent together?—for I
need his homeland as the listening into which I may speak. How do he
and I both know that what we are supposed to be doing, even amidst the
brute facticity, the heavy mass of those millions of leaves, is inventing?
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We persist in breaking reality down somehow into a multiplicity
of identifiable and discriminable objects... We talk so inveter-
ately of objects that to say we do so seems almost to say nothing
at all; for how else is there to talk?
—W.V.O. Quine1
But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that
someone has been on the moon? If we are thinking within our
system, then it is certain that no-one has ever been on the moon.
Not merely is nothing of the sort ever reported to us by reasonable
people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.
For this demands answers to the questions "How did he over-
come the force of gravity?" "How could he live without an
atmosphere?" and a thousand others which could not be an-
swered.
—L. Wittgenstein2
We have now looked through the window of representation, and have
seen it as a window, on our way to developing our vocabulary of invent-
ing into a powerful context for education. We have begun to distinguish
between the window of representation, with its associated presupposi-
tions about the structure of reality, and another window, which I have
been looking through in moments of communion with Dustin and at
other times. I have been talking about it as a window of inventing, or of
giving being. If Davidson is right (in the epigraph to Chapter 1) that there is
no such thing as a structured referential language to match a structured
reality, then what are we teachers doing? Here is Wittgenstein's bridge:
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what we are doing, he suggests, is languaging, engaging with each other in
language-games, that is, in "forms of life." "Languaging" is our activity in
the realm of systems of values, semiological systems. Languaging is our
activity—essentially social, arising out of and residing in our being to-
gether. What we ordinarily mean by "language"—grammar, syntax, lexi-
con—is the residue of languaging. The question of this chapter is: what is
it to mean something by a word? What is there about languaging that is
different from "using language," or just plain "talking about something"?
We are working on bringing about an extraordinary result: that we look
through the window of inventing being with our students even as we
look at what we call objects in the structure of reality.
What is an object, for my four-year-old? On occasion, when we arrive
at suppertime, our distinct paths of activity will have converged at the
dinner table and, having caught the drift of this convergence a moment
before, I will take matches out of the buffet drawer to light the candles,
perhaps wistfully reminded of the days when, as a small child in my
parents home, I would hear mother announce: "Light the candles and
gather 'round!" On this occasion at our house, Dustin will say "Let me
match the candles, Daddy!" Using "match" as both noun and verb, he
infuses the name of the object/action with exuberant fascination. Once,
when after supper he had duly snuffed the candles with an implement
hardly less radiant in his eyes man the match, we told him that it was his
chance to have a cookie, he replied: "And now it's my chance to wash the
dishes!" Perhaps his mother simply failed to teach him that doing the
dishes is a chore. No doubt he will learn that soon enough. Or perhaps, in
his harvest of the ever-new "objects" of awareness that present them-
selves every day, he has not yet learned to adapt himself to the language-
game in whose terms dirty dishes mean chore. For him, in good moods at
least, it seems that the language is a form of exuberance, its values to be
appropriated and played like drums or flutes. Sometimes we get to see
that an object, for him, is a chance, an opportunity.
Before we begin to listen our way through Wittgenstein's inquiry into
our adult ways of using language—"processing," we cybernauts might
call it—let us return briefly to the pedagogical import. For Wittgenstein,
even in the midst of what he calls "doing philosophy," brings us face to
face with the possibility of applying it—of doing real life. Wittgenstein's
talk of space flight is obviously dated, but this contributes to rather than
diminishes its resonance for today's teachers. For, considering "objective
truth" in the context of a moon visit, he proposes an example of everyday
interaction with children.
Suppose some adult had told a child that he had been on the
moon. The child tells me the story, and I say it was only a joke,
the man hadn't been on the moon; no one has ever been on the
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moon; the moon is a long way off and it is impossible to climb up
there or fly there.—If now the child insists, saying perhaps there
is a way of getting there which I don't know, etc., what reply
could I make to him? What reply could I make to the adults of a
tribe who believe that people sometimes go to the moon (per-
haps that is how they interpret their dreams), and who indeed
grant that there are no ordinary means of climbing up to it or
flying there?—But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a belief
and will soon be convinced by what we tell him seriously.3
Isn't this a familiar scenario? Don't students often seem to be members of
a tribe with a different mythos than ours? Aren't we in the position,
always, of trying to get students to latch onto our stories of the way things
are, to buy into our interpretations, our myths? To be sure, if the gentle
subtleties of shared mythos fail, we resort to sterner persuasions. But why
study anything—why teach it?—unless the study fits, serves to support a
system of world in which the student, because of his study and our
teaching, owns membership? Are they ordinarily convinced by what we
tell them seriously? Are they convinced by the objective reality of it, or by
something in the way we tell it? What is it to tell them "seriously"? What
could keep the child, or the tribesman, stubborn in his contrary story?
What in our being together would let him be convinced by ours? With
these questions in the background, we return to the philosophical story.
True to the problem implied by Descartes' disjunction of mental and
physical, Wittgenstein's first major work (his dissertation, in fact), weight-
ily titled Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, sets out to represent the founda-
tions on which language can give an accurate account of reality. The axle
of his thinking here is the copy theory of language, the notion that what
words and propositions do is to compose a picture that corresponds
exactly with objects and events outside language and outside the self—a
picture that mirrors them perfectly. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus was try-
ing like Descartes to "see the world aright"; like Locke, to see it steadily
and see it whole. In mis early view, the world has a stable structure, and
the goal of philosophy is to discover and then describe it. The project of
the Tractatus, then, is to discover the structure of propositions that must
correspond to the structure of things in the world. At the outset,
Wittgenstein announces: "The general form of propositions is: "This is
how things are/" Once we see the way of things, that is, we can utter state-
ments that express that way of things, definitively.
Having written the Tractatus, Wittgenstein spent six years teaching
elementary school in small towns in the Austrian hills. While he found
some success with the more able of his pupils, these were not, on the
whole, good years for Wittgenstein. It appeared that he had set his sights
impossibly high for the cultural milieu in which he was teaching. Now,
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post hoc is not propter hoc. But it was after his experience of teaching living
students that his way of looking at the phenomena shifted away from that
undergirding concern with fixed structure. In his next work, Philosophical
Investigations, regarded by many philosophers (and a few educators) as
the most important work of contemporary philosophy, he used the views
in the Tractatus like rungs of a ladder on which he could climb up over a
high wall to see into a new country. And this meant getting out from
behind an old way of speaking. As historian of philosophy James Edwards
puts it:
In Wittgenstein's [later] view, the sort of comprehensive under-
standing aimed at by philosophy takes a particular form and has
a particular (usually hidden) motivation. Its form is theoretical
representation. For the philosopher, to understand is to be able to
depict metaphysically. It is to be able to fix the "object" of one's
understanding in some medium of abstract and impersonal
representation. It is to be able to say what that "object" truly fs...4
In using the method of metaphysical representation, Wittgenstein had
been hoping, like Descartes, to "see the world aright,"5 to assume the po-
sition of an independent, isolated consciousness, surveying the world
from its study and issuing reliable reports. Like Locke, he had been swept
up in the attempt to discover the way of things, to find out by experiment
how their simple determinate constituents fit together in a complex world
designed by God before we got to it. He had been held captive, he noticed,
by a particular view: that there are true pictures of reality. That is, he had
assumed as basic a particular sort of relation between saying and being: a
relation named representation, with its associated picture of the world as
made up of structures of objects and corresponding structures of ideas. A
fact is a correspondence of structures. No one had been on the moon, and
the impossibility of space travel seemed equally factual, as firmly en-
sconced in the structure of reality as the current fact that space flight is not
only possible but routine. The point is this: the particular view of reality is
ensconced in a vocabulary. When we talk of "saying what an object truly is," no
less than when we talk of space travel within our particular historical
situatedness, we are, willy-nilly, swimming in a sea of interrelated as-
sumptions and propositions and conclusions.
It is not only that a proposition false at an earlier time may become
true at a later time, or that discoveries and advances do in fact occur. Of
course that is so, and it leaves intact the presumption that there is a
structured objective reality to which our ideas must conform. But what
Wittgenstein had noticed is that it is not just an imputed structure of
reality that has power in our thinking and belief. The function of our
language systems, the ways we talk—what he calls our "language-
games"—also have power to determine what appears as real for us. "Phi-
WITTGENSTEIN'S INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURE 85
losophy," he now says, "is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelli-
gence by means of language."6 Between reality and the judgments wrought
into the weave of our language the relationship is more like mutual
conditioning than like one-way determination.
This point will bear some elucidation. For that one-way relationship,
from structured object to approximative representation, is still part of our
inherited cultural system; it is natural and unremarkable for us to think in
its terms. Because we remain, at least in our intellectual work, children of
the Enlightenment, thinking in terms of object and representation is just
plain common sense, like breathing. Observer, object observed, and de-
scription go together like lungs, air, and diaphragm. Thus, to the extent
that our presumptive vocabulary is Lockean, our talk breaks reality down
into subjects, objects, and descriptions (or builds it up from these compo-
nents); and we adapt everything we hear or see or notice to the pattern of
that way of talking which embodies our common sense. Having begun
already to listen to our breathing, in what follows we shall continue to
bring it up out of the background, where it is inaudible, so we can be
aware of it. You will have noticed that I am shifting gradually from a
visual to an aural metaphor, from talk of pictures to talk of listening (and
even to think of the analogous plural, listenings: if ways of seeing give us
pictures, surely ways of listening may influence our awareness). My word
"elucidation" above, of course, is picture talk; and we are still "looking at"
philosophical ideas. But now, alert for the faint rustling of a vocabulary
that may enable a new way of being with students, like an animal sensing
danger or prey, we have begun to hear the way our being might be
attuned to a possibility.
(At first I wrote this last sentence as follows: "But now, like the
Victrola dog, we have begun to hear the way our being might be mastered
by an idea, our vision of possibilities limited by our reasonable systems of
physics." What is the difference between these two versions? Where does
each leave you? Does it matter which version I speak?)
So first to the common-sense "view," the picture called representation.
For something to be re-presented, to be made available again as certain,
factual, objective truth, it has to persist in some way, to have the same
appearance in later encounters as in earlier ones. It has to be a single,
recognizable thing, re-cognizable from one moment to the next. This is
what it is to have a structure. "Objects consist in having been," Buber
says.7 The dictionary says structure is "the mutual relation of the constituent
parts or elements of a whole as determining its peculiar nature or character."
So the vocabulary of structure fits with and interarticulates the vocabulary
of "nature," "character," "essence." Things, as objects, have essences. To
that structure-talk we might add more: that which has structure is that
which exhibits a peculiar nature or character at even/ inspection. A struc-
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hire is a relationship between parts comprising a whole, and to re-present a
structure is to affirm the unchangingness of this relationship. Thinking back to
Locke, we might reflect: A structure is the hand that fits the glove of one of
Locke's determined or determinate ideas. It is almost the definition of structure
that you can represent it, present it again, present it again.
Talking of structure, dwelling in representation, we may say that a
carburetor joins fuel jets, a venturi barrel, a float bowl for the fuel, and
whatever else a carburetor needs to work. We may also say that a student
has this or that characteristic, that his personality, or perhaps his actions,
are so structured: we can predict mat they will behave in this or that way,
perceive things in this or mat way. "All that kid wants to do is party!" We
try to discover his or her attributes, those perduring qualities that make
him who he is and cause him to behave as he does. "I see two possibilities:
either she's very stupid or she's not doing any work." Or there may be
apparently obvious reasons for a lapse of effort: "She's always with the
bad kids, smoking like a steam engine—she hangs out with the wrong
crowd." It may come to look as if a student has parts like a carburetor. He
has a particular learning style, we may say, or perhaps a learning disability,
or an overwhelming susceptibility to peer pressure. A venturi is an essen-
tial part of the structure of a carburetor; ineffective work in school is an
inevitable consequence of laziness; laziness is like a learning disability. So
we say. Only it is easier to fix a carburetor.
As you may have guessed, I am an amateur mechanic. Like Dustin, I
love to take things apart and find out how they work. Unlike him, if I can't
figure something out, I am totally stopped, stumped. What he does when
he doesn't know what's what—which is much of the time, of course; he's
five years old—is to invent a game to play. He never wastes time being
stumped. He's busy inventing structures of meaning, inventing facts,
building flashlights and catapults and anything. It may sound like he is
merely oblivious to reality—sometimes, exasperatingly, he is—but most
of the time, in the midst of his inventing, he is splendidly alert, on the
lookout for the real design, the way things really do work. Tonight he was
going to make a little fire in the yard out of leaves and sticks, in order, he
said, to burn up the aluminum cans we had collected in our recycling box
under the kitchen table. He had patiently fished the cans out, separating
them from the bottles and loading them into a plastic bag to carry them all
out to the visionary fire. When I informed him the cans wouldn't burn, he
replied, cheerily and plaintively at the same time: "I'm just gonna try it!" At
that moment, what I heard him saying was: "I know you're probably
right, Dad; but here I've designed this experiment, and done some work
to bring it off, and I've got my sights set on doing it now, and won't you
please let me?" Was it important at that moment that I already knew cans
wouldn't burn? I was my adult self, appraising and appreciating his
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childlike enthusiasm, and I was with him, sharing his spirit, his alertness,
his adventure. We had become together in his re-inventing of the world.
For adults in the culture of representation, you could say that struc-
ture is a tool; it saves effort. Because I know that, in the structure of "things
as they exist," cans are not combustible, I don't have to find out every time
whether cans will burn. (But then, I don't get to find out every time, ei-
ther.) Or you could say that representation and structure presuppose each
other, or that the terminology of structure fits together with our inclination
toward representation, that they work in tandem, like a horse and plow.
That is to say that one of the furrows we find opened to us in the culture
of representation is investigating and specifying ever more precisely the
structure of things. And this is to say that one of the ways we are given for
dealing with our students makes salient for us a particular concern, pre-
scribes one predominant job: we are to reveal and report on structure as
the overriding concern of being together. The structure of their present
knowledge, the structure of the lesson plans that must fit onto and expand
it, the structure of concepts in a given subject area, the consistency of a
student's inabilities across several subject areas, the way (so strong is our
need for a single generalization) he or she uses her time... And do we feel
we have to discover the truth about these structures of meaning, to get
them all sorted out, to be right about our diagnoses and prescriptions, as
we are right about the non-combustibility of aluminum cans?
This way of being that we are given, thrown into by the dominant
cultural conversation, is built from Descartes' distinction between subject
and object, as Locke codified and hardened it; and as Buber would say,
our interactions with objects will be little different when the object is a He
or a She: one of our students. The job of the teacher as Subject is to get
things right—which means, in the lesson, to bring fitting concepts and
information together, to choose material of "high interest" for the stu-
dents taught, to emphasize sequence and cumulation so that logical rela-
tions between facts and ideas stand out, to discover those core concepts or
skills or facts that the students most need to know... From your own
experience, can you add to the list of structure-bearing, structure-laden
activities? Has it been your experience, too, that sometimes you just cannot
get the students to pay attention to the structure inherent in these, that the
structure is lost on them? Is Locke's confrontation—between Subjects and
Objects—where they live?
Given the outcry about the failure of schools to produce the results
needed by our society, to train children for what are conceived to be the
basic social, civic, and most crucially economic functions, television and
newspapers have devoted more and more "coverage" to educational issues,
the problems and solutions. Here is a recent example, headlined "Unlocking
Your Child's Academic Potential":
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Your child may obtain high achievement scores, yet he has poor
grades; or he may be a B student, but his teachers feel he is
capable of more. There are several reasons why a child may not
be working to potential, but the two most common are:
1. He does not have adequate study skills such as time manage-
ment, using resources, taking notes, listening skills, how to
prepare for and take tests; how to read a textbook (this is dif-
ferent than just looking up answers), and problem solving; or
2. He does not have strong basic skills in vocabulary, reading
comprehension, math, or English.
With the headline, we are already emprisoned in an epistemology. What
locks up the child's "potential" is that he lacks skills of two kinds; what will
unlock it, presumably, is giving him those skills. His education, his edu-
cability, are matters of what he as an individual has or does not have. In the
epistemology that gives this diagnosis, which certifies it, makes it plausible,
the student is an isolated individual, a subject whose job it is to cognize
objects, a receptacle for structures of meaning and processes of internaliz-
ing and manipulating them. Skill is manipulation of "resources" for the
purpose of mastering subject- matter content: represented structures of
meaning. (This is why the notion of "social skills" is so odious. Do you
find it possible to be authentic in a conversation with another who is
exercising social skills, thereby making you into a representation of a
person—a structure of attitudes, beliefs, ideas, and what not? How does
one feel about skilled laughter?) With skill as the background of our
interactions with students, we are in a world where the goals are achieve-
ment test scores, grades, "command" of subjects, manipulation of material
and of time with other people. Without another context to enfold this one,
it is a deadly world.
Our word "skill" comes from Old Norse skil, meaning distinction or
difference, the power of discernment or discrimination, and from a verb
skilja, to divide or distinguish. I wonder if the world of "skill" used to be a
world of languaging, of creating distinctions, making and using articula-
tions. In early uses, the word associates the human with divinity: man's
shape is fashioned in the image of the divine.
1380: He made skylful creaturis as angelys and man.
1440: A skylfullbeeste than will y make, after my shappe and my
liknesse.
But the divinity of the image is conceived as the power or ability to give
shape, to fashion. As intelligent artificer, man is allied with divinity. Skill,
then, implies responsibility for a creation.8 Some of the early uses of the
word do seem to have this resonance, the echo of responsibility, though
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the sense of purposeful, creative articulation integral with that sense of
responsibility is almost dissolved in the sense of skill as knowledge or
mastery of an already defined situation, an already given reality.
1587: Of men themselves, the skilfullest make Lawes, & take
upon them to rule others.
1606: The Greeks are strong, and skilful to their strength.
1631: Choice persons are instructed... wisely to encampe and
skilfully to embattaile.
As we think of it today, skill is evinced in timely response, the careful
management of given situations according to learned pattern. The promi-
nent definitions in Webster's relate to proficiency in the handling of ma-
chinery to produce a product. "Skilled: of workmen or labor, having or
requiring such training in one occupation as would involve industrial loss
in transference to other occupations." Skill in this sense may rely on the
kind of repetitive training used in mastering industrial processes, and
would not be available outside those processes. It is a matter of the in-
struction of "choice persons."
But if the predominant sense nowadays leans into the vocabulary of a
mass production economy, in the earlier uses the response to stimulus, to
given situation, comes as the manifestation of an inventive, spur-of-the-
moment improvisation. It is educed in choice persons:
1338: At conseil & at nede he was a skilfulle kyng.
1387: He was nevere so wroth with man that he would not
forgeve if he seigh [saw] skilful occasioun.
1561: The experte skylfullnesse of so excellent a Pilot.
To improvise, as an expert, is to see occasions skillfully, to apply one's
knowledge but also to adapt it, to re-invent it so that it works in particular
cases as they develop in ways never before encountered. Twain's portrayal
of the riverboat pilot (see Life on the Mississippi) gives us skill in this latter
sense.
So we have trained response, which is mastery of pattern, and invented
response, which is the poetry of pattern. The now archaic use of the word
as a verb would once have resonated with a different sense of our respon-
sibility than obtains in the current cultural conversation:
1300: Wei sal he cun knau quilk es quilk, fra the wick the god to
skil. (Well should he know how to know which is which, from
the wicked the good to skill.)
"To skill" is not only to know what's what. It is to invent what's what,
creating an articulation in and of environmental circumstances. To skill
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you must have the power of distinction at your disposal. Skill not only
depends on represented, structured knowledge, but, as Webster's also says,
manifests a "union of knowledge and readiness." Where does the readiness
come from? What is readiness? How does the choice person know how to
know?
Yes, I have purposes, intentions, even a structured knowledge base
and some facility at using it. But I don't have these as an individual, I have
them only in the older sense of skill: in readiness to be with others in a
world. I mean something by a word only in speaking with another.
Skillfully, we invent articulation together.
1675: We could skil to modify also the Air about them.
1869: Could he skill to make it seen as he saw?
Readiness, here, is relatedness. As a matter of "we-work," of convention
(con + venire), skill entails letting a world appear in colloquy.
In the world of "unlocking the child's academic potential," though,
how are deficiencies in the skill of the isolated subject to be corrected? By
more isolation, stronger manipulation, by him and of him; in a word, by
better structures:
For high school students who have never had a structured study
plan, try a simple, common sense plan. The only way the plan
will not help is if they do not try the following suggestions:
1. Mandatory study time for the high school student is two hours
a day. Each student should work on homework, read chapter
assignment, review notes from the day's class, study for upcoming
tests, and look at short and long term assignments. If your son
says that he does not have any homework—or he did it at
school—the mandatory homework time is still required (no TV,
telephone, etc.). Study time is a priority. Be structured and
consistent.
2. Check out your school's extra help. If your son's school offers
after school study skills instruction, enroll him. Let him know
through actions (not words and endless discussions) that his
academic success is a priority with you.
3. Communicate with his teachers, and find our why your son is
not working to potential (homework, classwork, tests?). Identify
the specific problem and work with his teachers to implement a
plan.
4. Praise and reward positive results. The majority of children
want to do well. If nothing else, "doing better" keeps us parents
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off their backs! Make sure goals are set in small sections of time.
Please do not set six week goals; set weekly goals, and reward
and praise those successes.9
Several things might be said about this. The first is that it might be good
advice, in certain cases. When Dustin is recalcitrant about schoolwork, I
will myself very likely adopt at least part of it. But what is the context in
which the advice can be effective? Its behaviorist orientation prescribes
stimulus-response conditioning, structured to produce automatic responses
rather than choices.10 Even if a particular "underperforming" child does
want to do well, we might ask whether conditioning will contribute to his
embracing learning as a possibility for continuing to realize his freedom—
that is, for managing his responsibility.
The conditioning associated here with cognitive representation of
structures works reactively, retroactively, if it works at all. It envisions our
reaction to behaviors, to "results," rather than our contribution to generat-
ing behaviors, to sourcing results. If the child remembers the reward (or
punishment) from last time, and reacts accordingly, his behavior must
always be driven and enforced by the past, rather than by a possibility
chosen by himself.
Indeed, from the praise and reward, from the fact that his parents are
communicating with his teachers, even from the unequivocal action of
enrolling him in an extra help program, what the student may get is the
parent's commitment to possibility in his life. But this result would be at
odds with the paradigm of structure and representation (of subject/ob-
ject, cognitive epistemology) mat prescribes the actions. What the student
may just as easily get from these well-intentioned and perhaps effective
remedies is more evidence that she is under the compulsions of structure.
If the suggestions work to enable education, in the sense we are working
toward, the enabling context comes from somewhere else.
It is not that parents and teachers should not punish, much less that
we should not reward successes. It is not that human beings are not
animals; of course we respond to conditioning. As one successful coach
says, the pat on the back must sometimes be a little harder and a little
lower. And it is not that the suggested structures, the recommended
consistency, are not practical; of course they are eminently practical, given
the reality into which they fit and on which they work. But which future
shall we create for ourselves: one that is automatically and by necessity an
extension of the past, or one that enables our responsibility? In what
paradigm, what context, could we choose a past excellence, choose to "do
well," as an expression of freedom rather than conditioned response or
avoidance of subjugation? What are we building? Structure and consistency
are valuable in a context, and educators need to be awake to the contexts,
the spaces in which they and their techniques operate.
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Emphasize to your son that you have a plan; and that the plan
will help him improve his grades and maximize his recreational
potential. (By learning good study skills he will have better
grades, allowing him to participate in more extracurricular
activities, and have more recreational time.) That is one potential
he will be glad to hear about.
What picture of education emerges? We are watching a movie here, with
a particular theme, one which leaves us in a very strongly defined space.
What system, what semiology, connects the values "grades," "extracur-
ricular activities," "academic potential," and "recreational time"? How
are these values connected to the value "learning"? What listening does
the speaking here depend on and perpetuate?11
Having noticed this dependence and this perpetuation—the mutual
conditioning of reality, speaking, and listening, the interdependence be-
tween the content of experience and its social context—Wittgenstein pulls
back the corner of the projection screen, as it were, so we can look into the
blank, dark space behind it, to see that our insistent looking for meaning
as structure entails demands for a pedagogy of procedure, teaching content
by algorithm. The picture holding us captive fetters our attention to what
we write on the blackboard or in our class notes. And it projects the
students as receivers, who either participate by receiving or don't partici-
pate. This one is too dreamy, or sleepy, or dumb, to get the presentation;
this one is so far ahead that he's bored; this one has attention deficit
disorder; these two are bragging about that escapade last night instead of
paying attention... Do you hear the conversation about these students in
the teachers' lounge? The picture has made them into ciphers, caricatures;
though every description be true, every complaint apt, yet, seen from the
point of view of the teacher's presumed purpose—to communicate infor-
mation, to transmit knowledge—the students have one dimension. Either
they receive it, through varying degrees of noise in the transmission
channel, or they don't. In the faculty meeting or the classroom, while we
are immersed in the algorithm that this picture seems to demand, we may
no longer be with the real students before us. Already, then, we are not in
a felicitous condition for communicating knowledge, let alone for educat-
ing. Our next steps follow along as Wittgenstein explores the space behind
that screen on which flickers the picture of structure and representation.
In Philosophical Investigations, he begins the exploration by describing
our shared language with a simile, perhaps peculiarly European in its
flavor, like a painting of a medieval town center surrounded by more
recent suburbs:
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little
streets and squares, of old and new houses and of houses with
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additions from various periods: and this surrounded by a mul-
titude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform
houses.12
The ancient-city image gives a picture of language as a structure, but it is a
particular kind of structure: one that comprises a wide range of different
kinds of pattern, one built up according to different sets of rules that
apply differently at different times. There are in language, Wittgenstein
says, a variety of regularities, a variety of kinds of use of words. What he
is doing here is railing into question the fundamental assumption that
rules govern our experience from the outside, as it were, as if there had
been written down somewhere the master plan for centuries of growth of
a town. As part of his questioning, he asks "How many kinds of sentence
are there?", and answers:
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what
we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity
is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of
language, new language games, as we may say, come into
existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.13
Now if that is the case—if there is no single fixed set of rules at the bottom,
no deep grammar that generates the structure of the language—then
what does generate it? Where does language come from? What could he
mean by "language games"? And more pragmatically, what becomes of
the teaching of, say, grammar—those more or less fixed rules from the
Harbrace handbook? As teachers, what are we supposed to see in this pic-
ture? What are we supposed to do? For it seems to pull the floor right out
from under us, by suggesting that there is no "way of things" out there
from which the ultimate rules of reality are supposed to be derived.
Wittgenstein's picture would seem to lead away from the cozy familiarity
of accepted, standardized structures of meaning toward a blooming,
buzzing, bloody confusion in which no meanings could be depended on
as stable, and consequently teaching and learning would be useless. If
there is no immutable structure behind or above us, what can we depend
on? If we do not live in a single representable world any more, but in
multiple, perhaps incommensurate language-games, then what do we
teach/or?
Wittgenstein does not give us something else to depend on. Instead
he provides us with the opportunity to get behind this insistent question,
to hear its insistence, and to notice that its nagging comes out of a particu-
lar picture of the world. Our insistent looking for meaning as structure
entails these demands for technique, for rules of procedure. What are we
to look for, then, if looking for structure creates this bind? Let us start,
Wittgenstein suggests, by looking at the ways in which meanings are
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taught to young people. Here, then, we begin to examine further the idea
we first glimpsed in re-reading Descartes, that non-common-sense "view"
in which the relation between language, languaging, and reality is some-
thing like "enarticulation" rather than one-way determination.
Even though he taught for those six years, Wittgenstein's work is not
primarily devoted to pedagogy, but to inquiry into how language works,
and what languaging is. As a philosopher, after the Tractatus, he never gets
himself into the structure-trap of looking for the "DNA," the code that
governs learning and growth. As there is no core definition of the essence
of a sentence, nor a set of rules for generating kinds of sentence, neither is
there an essential feature of learning situations. Though it falls easily off
our tongue, "the learning environment" is a misleading phrase, suggest-
ing a singular and repeatable pattern of events or activities—something
that has a structure to it. And while in his portrait of the acquisition of
language Wittgenstein does describe what might look like a general feature
of a learning situation, the description is not neat:
How do I explain the meaning of "regular", "uniform", "same"
to anyone? —I shall explain these words to someone who, say,
only speaks French by means of the corresponding French
words. But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach
him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. —And
when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know
myself.
In the course of this teaching I shall shew him the same colours,
the same shapes, I shall make him find them and produce them,
and so on. I shall, for instance, get him to continue an ornamental
pattern uniformly when told to do so. —And also to continue
progressions. And so, for example, when given:...... to go on:....
.... ...... . I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by
expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encourage-
ment. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on.14
He is talking about one characteristic situation among many non-identical
others, and accordingly uses phrases like "and so on," "and also," "for
instance," and "for example." In the situation described, a young child
may be gathering new concepts, and this is not purely an intellectual
transaction. Instead it includes several different kinds of interaction, in-
cluding bodily guidance, and results in an expanded repertoire of actions.
The pupil is not learning to represent the structure of things accurately; he
is participating in action with others, moment by moment. In this picture,
then, teaching is influencing action.
Wittgenstein seems to sidestep the issue of how it is that we recognize
a color or a length or a shape as "the same" as another. Indeed, it is as if, in
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describing the child's learning, he thinks of the similarity between pat-
terns, the structures we apprehend, as the result of the being together of
teacher and student, not as something given beforehand:
How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself—
whatever instruction you give him?—"Well, how do I know?"—
If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will
soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons.
When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue the
series, I act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of
reasons does not trouble me.15
Now, in Wittgenstein's classroom, we are not going to teach our hapless
pupils by frightening them!16 That is not his point. What he means is that
the being together of teacher and learner is not merely the setting or
background. Learning does not take place against this background as a
separate process of responding to structures of meaning. In the manifesta-
tion of skill, readiness comes from relatedness. Learning occurs, in
Wittgenstein's later view, in a matrix of sociality—within the restrictions
and possibilities alive in the moment of being together.17 It is a maternal
moment, one that brings forth. Certainly every child's biological develop-
ment is controlled by the DNA of its parents—at least, so we say now. But
in what wombs do we develop after birth? In our human need for tools,
our reliance on the system of language as we inherit it, we may not see
that the structured world, the world the tools fit and help us to manipu-
late, may depend for its sustenance on another, more encompassing womb:
being-in-a-world-together-and-speaking. With Wittgenstein, and with
Dustin, we are trying to flesh out this other womb and to distinguish it
from the one that bears current educational theory and practice.
In another section of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is dis-
cussing what it means to teach (and to learn) the concept of "talking to
oneself."
What is it like to say something to oneself; what happens here?
How am I to explain it? Well, only as you might teach someone
the meaning of the expression "to say something to oneself."
And certainly we learn the meaning of that as children.—Only
no one is going to say that the person who teaches it to us tells us
"what takes place". Rather it seems as though in this case the
instructor imparted the meaning to the pupil—without telling
him it directly; but in the end the pupil is brought to the point of
giving himself the correct ostensive definition. And this is where
our illusion is.18
Our illusion is that the definition of a concept comes ultimately and most
importantly out of the structure of the world, the solid, stubborn
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"thingness" of it—which we call its nature. So then teaching should con-
sist of conveying structured information to students in an order deter-
mined by purely logical considerations. But though presumably you can-
not teach algebra before you teach arithmetic, Wittgenstein has this re-
minder for anyone who insists that structure is the ultimate hard rock of
the world:
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature
over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame
through which we look at it.19
The social matrix gets lost, the fact that it is we who are looking, through a
frame of our own. Is it true mat 12 x 12 = 221? At first glance, of course not.
It is easy to forget that the normal base-ten system is a matter of social
agreement. In base three, 12 x 12 = 221. Thinking about the world in
concepts, we do not see that there is already framing at work behind
concepts and their logic. Their usefulness derives from a social contract—
though "contract" is the wrong word, since it implies voluntary, con-
scious assent. Saussure would say that this framework is social "agree-
ment"; Wittgenstein suggests that it comes from social behavior: being
together. Thus a teacher "imparts" meaning, without telling it directly, by
being in certain ways; she brings the student to the point of what we call
understanding by guiding his hand, by showing approval and rejection in
facial, bodily, and verbal expressions, by repeating or otherwise empha-
sizing important cues, and so on. Now the question is: if neither structure
in the world nor the structure of knowledge can give the teacher what we
could describe as teaching procedures—what she does and is in the en-
counter with students—what does give those procedures? Are they "pro-
cedures"? Or do they just occur as they do for some other reason than
conscious decision or training? If we lived in a different space, how would
we influence?
In another collection of paragraphs, assembled at the end of his life
and called On Certainty, Wittgenstein carries on the exploration of a pos-
sible new space by asking a question implied earlier: what is it to be right?
What does it mean to say we are certain of knowledge, or certain of
anything? Of course I can be sure whether or not I have personally been in
outer space—but what is it that makes that a matter of course? Why
would any normal person be thought daft who denied the perfect author-
ity of his own actual experience here? Wittgenstein asks, whimsically:
Might I not believe that once, without knowing it, perhaps in a
state of unconsciousness, I was taken far away from the earth—
that other people even know this, but do not mention it to me?20
Actually, that sounds less whimsical today than it did forty years ago,
given the changes that have occurred in what is possible. Can we use
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Wittgenstein's exploration to get a handle on the ways in which possibil-
ity may change? Can we create with our students new possibilities to live
into together, ways in which knowing a structure of facts occurs almost as
the by-product of our being together in the class?
So back to Wittgenstein's argument. To assert the perfect authority of
your own actual personal experience—as Descartes had apparently done
for us Westerners—you have to have some assumptions, some judgments
in the background that you hold as certainties. Our judgments of cer-
tainty—such as the assumption that you could not possibly have been
unconscious while travelling in space, and that even if you had been,
someone would have told you about it—these are like anchors, helping us
to hold our position in the water. Better, they are like the centerboard that
keeps the sailboat from wallowing to and fro at the mercy of the wind and
waves, and thus allows it to sail constantly in a desired direction. Varying
the position and tautness of the sails works to alter speed and direction
only if the centerboard remains fixed in place. As we cannot walk without
ground to stand on, we cannot sail without a centerboard for the boat to
lean on. Certain propositions, our most basic judgments, hold fast for us
in order that we may agree or disagree about others, arguing toward the
fulfillment of some purpose.
The combination of sails, centerboard, wind, and rudder forms a
system, says Wittgenstein, echoing Saussure's term, and echoing also, in
his example of the moon-walk, Saussure's insistence on the sociality of
systems. We use systems to accomplish things of interest and concern to
us—not just physical systems like rifles and cartridges, but language-
systems as well. As the rifle must be braced against the shoulder—for the
shoulder too is part of the rifle-system—so in our investigations and our
ordinary dealings there must be some bracing propositions that stand still
for us—some truths beyond question, some facts, undisputed if not indis-
putable. But these facts are not there independent of the system they
stabilize. A centerboard detached from a sailboat is useless for sailing;
only in our sailing does its value as a centerboard arise. In trenchant
examination of our purposeful agreements, our social judgments of cer-
tainty, here is Wittgenstein:
Men have judged that a king can make rain; we say this contra-
dicts all experience. Today they judge that aeroplanes and the
radio are the means for the closer contact of peoples and the
spread of culture.21
Atomic structure, molecular structure, social structure, the structuring of
gravity and of electromagnetic radiation, the economic structure, the
structure of knowledge—are all these, too, judgments? Are they supersti-
tions? Are they ways of speaking, languaging?
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Such a question yanks up the centerboard. And in the ensuing loss of
control, without the ability to direct our activity in the accustomed way, it
is hard to see that it is not the centerboard that has lost its function but the
entire system. "Just lower the board again!" we cry. Why would
Wittgenstein, having himself taught in school, suddenly raise the center-
board in the middle of a dose haul? Why should we follow him, especially
during a race in which we seem to be falling farther and farther behind?
Raising the centerboard, noticing our assumed certainties—for instance,
the certainty that structured knowledge is the goal of education—this
may raise to our attention the whole system with which we operate. We
may indeed find that we were falling behind because there were barnacles
on the centerboard. Sailing is a splendid system, one of the marvels of
human invention, and as long as we are committed to a sailing race, the
system we have been using may need only to be streamlined. But if we
look with Wittgenstein, we may discover in the raised board the possibil-
ity of a different system altogether, one that serves to fulfill a different
commitment. What if we change the traditional rounded shape of the hull
so that the sides are vertical below the water?22 Then we might be able to
sail straight without a centerboard, in shallow water now as well as deep.
No less than the possibility of surf sailing, the possibility of space flight
arises only when we have two things available: first, a commitment to a
new goal or a new activity; and second, an awareness of the whole present
system in which our purposes have been being fulfilled (or thwarted) as a
"system" instead of a structure. For what we do with structure is observe it,
receive it, learn it, repeat it: in "covering" the structured material, we
make ourselves its prisoners. But with "system," what we are doing is
speaking. We have something to say about what's what.
The "space" we are exploring now is opened up by this distinction
between system, as Wittgenstein uses the term here, and structure, as we
have distinguished it above. With structure/representation as the center-
board, we are pulled to see, to feel, and to be in certain ways. There is a
certain common sense about the world, enforcing a way of playing the
game, sailing the course. In the game called language, words represent ideas
that correspond to things, objects confront subjects who describe them
more or less adequately. Knowledge depends on "truth," which is a
function of this correspondence and this description. Like Wittgenstein, I
do not want to depart too hastily after tossing the question "Is there then
no objective truth?" We are looking at the question so as to notice the
system—including sentences, beliefs, and behavior—in which truth is a
centerboard, if not an anchor. We want to notice that asking the question
"what is the truth?" nowadays places us in a particular arena, one that
presets the answers to other questions—indeed, brings certain other
questions into play while hiding others.
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If instead of "what is truth?" we ask "what is responsibility?" or
"where is responsibility?" we may see that there is a further answer possible
than "describing reality" or "conforming with fact/' Describing reality,
communicating knowledge, delivering truth—these are not trivial enter-
prises. But teachers need a new arena in which to undertake them, one in
which they can occur with more power. If, as a context for the teaching of
represented structure, we had a different common sense, anchored in
what both Saussure and Wittgenstein saw as the nurturing sociality of
language, what would that pull for? If "system" were the centerboard,
what boat would we all be in together? Would such a common sense
allow for, pull for, a new possibility for being related in the classroom, a
possibility that what teachers and students do, in their being together and
speaking responsibly, their languaging, is share, invent, and bring forth?
Wittgenstein says in On Certainty that "one can instruct a child to be-
lieve in God, or that none exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce
apparently telling grounds for the one or the other."23 Apparently chil-
dren live into the commitments of their elders. By now, Dustin can almost
match me in making grand generalizations about life, pronouncing as
eternal truth whatever he wants to do at the moment. But he also has the
skill of snow fire. What if we had, alongside our already given commitment
to structured knowledge, a commitment to inventing, sharing, and bring-
ing forth for children to live into? Such a commitment, to be effective, will
itself have to be invented. "We are working on bringing about the result
that we choose the window of inventing being with our students," I said,
and I left the ambiguity in. For perhaps inventing being with our students
amounts to the same thing as inventing being with our students. Perhaps
that—inventing together—is, among other things, what it means to mean
something by a word. "Words don't mean; people mean," said S. I.
Hayakawa in our high school semantics textbook. It is not a sophisticated
pronouncement. But it is easy to forget.
Building his bridge between knowing and being, Wittgenstein has
taken us behind the apparent structure at the surface of things, to get a
glimpse of the social functioning, the being together in which that structure
appears to us as we mean something by words, in our saying. We now
turn to the philosopher in whose work we can glimpse the possibility of
inventing saying as a way of being.
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James Edwards, The Authority of Language (Tampa: University of South
Florida Press, 1990), 140.
Tractatus, 6.54.
Philosophical Investigations, §109.
land Thou, trans. Kaufman, 64.
Professor Hoyt Duggan informs me that in the societies of Old and Middle
English, people were not excused from responsibility even if they did not
intend to commit the crime.
My source here requests anonymity.
In Handbook of Applied Behavior Analysis: Social and Instructional Processes,
Thomas A. Brigham and A. Charles Catania, eds. (New York: Irvington
Publishers, Inc., 1978), there is the following summary:
The behavioral reinforcement paradigm represents learning in
terms of the changes in response rate or response probability that
occur when reinforcement is contingent on the emission of particular
responses... "Behavior is learned only when it is emitted and
reinforced." The basic units of analysis are responses, reinforcers
and stimuli.
In applying the behavioral reinforcement paradigm to the con-
struction of programs, the material is arranged to ensure that the
appropriate responses are emitted in the presence of the proper
stimuli and that such responses are reinforced. The responses to be
learned must first be identified, and then provision must be made
to see that the responses are emitted. (458)
This description of the necessary machinery of learning has its roots in
Locke's picture of the automatism of sensory perception. Responses, rein-
forcers, and stimuli are to be as "objectively determined" as the ideas
imprinted on the mind. Ten years later, in Beyond Behaviorism (Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988), Vicki L. Lee repeats the echo:
The concept of the reflex originated in the work of Descartes and was
elaborated by physiologists... it designates a relation between a physical
stimulus and a muscular or glandular response. An example is the pupillary
reflex in which a bright light elicits pupillary constriction... Stimulus-
response psychologies are psychologies based on the concept of the reflex.
They identify psychology's task as a matter of finding stimulus-response
connections... Stimulus-response psychologies lead us to expect that given
a stimulus, we might predict the response, and that given a response, we
might retrodict the stimulus. These psychologies organize psychological
knowledge around the concept of the reflex. (151-2)
In Krapp's Last Tape, as the protagonist struggles to rearrange and catalogue
the memories of his life, we see that the world of individual manipulation of
material, command of resources, has become delapidated. The tape recorder
works, and Krapp can use it with facility, but its failure as a medium for













living words, its failure even to reconstitute remembered words, becomes
more and more appalling — a mix of bathos and chagrin. Krapp repeats
absently, fascinated: "Be again. Be again." I laugh at his absorption in the
material on the tape, but I know that every day I am trying to structure a
world/or myself, and to fit into that structure by finding my identity, myself
as a structure. And I recognize that a world in which I try again and again




Philosophical Investsigalions, §211 and 212.
In his Austrian hill towns, Wittgenstein himself was not so constrained. To
spur his recalcitrant students, he would box their ears or pull their hair. This
had other results, apparently, than producing the desired cognitive outcomes.
Even today, though, we may be sorely tempted to jerk a knot into a kid who,
we know, can do better schoolwork. Wittgenstein is saying in this passage
that our instinct may be pointing us in the right direction, if we could j ust find
an appropriate and authentic way of answering it, a way that fulfills our
impulse to act with our students and not merely on them.
Of course, John Dewey made a similar point in work after work. For a precis
of his contribution see Gert J. J. Biesta, "Education as Practical
Intersubjectivity," in Educational Theory, vol. 44, no. 3 (Summer 1994), es-
pecially 304-9.




This is what Hobie Cat did a decade ago.
On Certainty, §107.
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PART 2
ONTOLOGY
What Is Saying, and How Do We Be?
e are progressively leaving behind, now, the algorithmic model of
reaching as instruction, and moving toward what I hesitate to call a model
at all, for fear that it will induce imitation instead of invention—that is,
more algorithmic teaching, more instruction. Though there is no need for
inventing in algorithmic teaching, there is no room for it, either. But in our
best moments together in a classroom students discover, because of the
environment for being together that we have created, meaning and pur-
pose in material new to them: then cognition and invention are one. The
point is to create that environment which is not a surrounding, like a
decorated room, but like an atmosphere, a breathing-space. And the point
is not to construct an instrument with which to create the magic environ-
ment, the magnetic field—not to answer the question "How do I create
that environment?", for that answer is really just a means of manipulating
the atmosphere, and probably the people who breathe in it. I'd rather not
be a master of manipulation.
Instead, we hope to generate a conversation that pulls for that envi-
ronment, that calls forth and goes with being together powerfully. Is that
a distinction without a difference? Isn't "generating a conversation" itself
a technique, a form of manipulation? Since I am building the idea of
teaching as a different realm than instruction, I am loath to think so; but I
am not sure yet whether I can clarify the distinction between manipulation
and generating conversation. So I want to explore a little, to try to tease
out the distinction, on our way to creating a new speaking and listening
for the act of teaching, of educating. A question opens a door. Repeated
questions—continuing inquiry—prop it open.
One of the questions opened in the Introduction was: In an encounter
between a teacher and a student, where does power come from? And in
W
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Chapter One, childlike, we began by jamming this first question up against
another: Who would you be if you lived in a particular philosophical
picture? In the next three chapters, there is thus brought into place a
certain inclination, a lean toward a quasi-illegitimate way of describing
things. (What does living in a picture mean? And what is a philosophical
picture, that it can be said to be lived in?) I want to establish a queer sort of
atmosphere, one whose vapors show up, like fog. For, in the fog, in the
indistinct half-light, our sense of hearing is sharpened: though we must
walk slowly, we listen acutely, powerfully.
Perhaps, Wittgenstein suggests, there is a bind in the very idea of
looking for something. For to look/or something is already to assume that
its structure will be manifested persistently outside ourselves: visual acu-
ity is binding, we see at twenty feet exactly that which is at twenty feet
from us. We suppose that in representing this structure to ourselves we
may achieve mastery of it. But of the paradigm knowkdge-as-structure—have
we achieved mastery of that, or does it master us? Does it not shape our
expectations, and so our actions, and our idea of what is possible? If
meanings are structured like boards and nails, what else is there to do but
saw and hammer? More vapors, perhaps. Let's see if we can listen our
way through them.
The teacher's way of being. Engagement. Shared mastery. To pay
attention to these, we have begun by inquiring into the ways language
occurs for us, in the classroom and in the culture that flows into and out of
the classroom, particularly that part of the culture in which young people
develop. Following on Saussure's picture of language as a social function,
an activity instead of a structure, Wittgenstein re-invented language as
languaging. How then are languaging and being related? What does
speaking have to do with who we are? We want now to investigate the
relation of being with what Heidegger calls "Saying." Perhaps the capital
letter annoys us as an undue inflation of a plain word, a plain meaning.
But perhaps we can bear with it, for I do think it expands our vocabulary;
it marks a different value than the small-lettered word. Being and saying
are merged in listening, I will say. Listening gives how we hear what is
said; it comes not only out of the paradigms we transact, but also out of
the declarations and commitments we speak. What you hear is what you
are listening for; what you listen for is both borne in the paradigm of our
world and born in the way we commit ourselves in conversation with
others. In a teacher's speaking and listening of his students resides the
possibility of their greatness. "Speaking must have speakers," says
Heidegger, "but not merely in the same way as an effect must have a
cause. Rather, the speakers are present in the way of speaking."24 Could
languaging and being modulate each other? Could Saying alter the world?
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OUR LISTENING WITH LANGUAGE
To say and to speak are not identical. A man may speak, speak
endlessly, and all the time say nothing. Another man may
remain silent, not speak at all and yet, without speaking, say a
great deal.
—Heidegger1
It is the man determines what is said, not the words.
—Thoreau2
erhaps at the outset of this chapter I should acknowledge a certain
embarassment. At the current stage of scholarship on Heidegger, it seems
dear that he was not only personally but also academically committed to
the program for German national greatness or "restoration," which devel-
oped into the Nazi regime. Apparently he was guilty, as rector of the
University of Freiburg during the thirties, of acts that might have sup-
ported anti-Semitism; and while debate is continuing about the degree to
which Heidegger's philosophical position is implicated in his politics, and
about whether or not his politics changed as the full horror of the "final
solution" became apparent during the war, his involvement with Nazism
remains troubling.3
I have nothing to add to this debate. I am using Heidegger's words to
say what I want to say, and insofar as Heidegger the man determines
what the words say, I may be in dangerous proximity to him. But if I
gather passages from Heidegger for footholds, it should be clear that I am
climbing a different mountain than he was in the Germany of mid-century,
not resting my case on his philosophical position but bringing what he
says into the service of a different matter altogether, the matter of our
P
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encounters with our community's children. Karl Jaspers assessed Heidegger
as "a significant potency, not through the content of a philosophical world-
view, but in the manipulation of speculative tools."4 Scholars continue to
find humanity in Heidegger's writings; I hear in them the passionate
commitment to a renewal of spirit. Honoring our commitment to our
students, to our children, we can, I hope, listen for the possibility of
rekindling as distinct from the wish for restoration.
When I have had occasion to present a fact or an observation or a plan
to my child, it has gone sometimes well and sometimes badly. I may, for
instance, have the pleasure of announcing to him that Mom has just
finished fixing him a treat: "Dus, you know what? There's a surprise in
the kitchen for you." Or the message may be less pleasing: "Dus, you
know what? You need to learn not to interrupt us when we're talking." I
can structure the message in similar ways, but what I think I see is that the
structure of what I say does not matter much in the message I see him get,
in what he does after my speaking. The content matters more, I think—
treat works better than admonition. Not surprising. But what matters
most seems to be just this: the way I am being when I speak to the child.
And that would seem to depend on the immediate occasion for my
speaking to him (what he has just been doing or has failed to do), what I
have been preoccupied with today, and so on. There is no easy way to
figure out what incidents, thoughts, feelings, etc. may have shaped the
way my manner comes across to Dustin at a given instant, and may thus
be shaping our encounter for good or ill.
But is it these pieces of the day's experience that make the admonition
into something he shies away from, if he does? Why doesn't he see how
hard it will be for him to maintain amicable relationships if he doesn't let
others talk sometimes? Isn't the admonition a blessing with a thin disguise,
like spinach? So what is it that makes my speaking ill-received? Is it that
he doesn't know the concept "amicable relationships" or its five-year-old
equivalent? Why does he sometimes accept an invitation to eat spinach?
What makes it taste good to him? What makes a treat a treat?
Now, notice something: what is the automatic answer to the question
"What makes a treat a treat?" Does it presume something like a structure
of meaning, associated with a structure of experience? "He doesn't like
the taste of spinach!" Answers give closure; they finalize structures of
meaning, the spokes of the already invented wheel. Most of the time we
listen not only/or answers; we listen/rom answers. To re-invent the wheel—
for I claim that as our calling—let us listen from re-opened questions.
Remember, first, Heidegger's assertion (quoted in Chapter One) that
listening is not the opposite of speaking. Here is that passage again, with
more of its context this time. It may not seem to you on first reading that
OUR LISTENING WITH LANGUAGE 109
this passage has much to do with getting a treat, but listen, as you re-read
it, for the faint, as yet unspoken hint of a relationship between language
and freedom.
Speaking is known as the articulated vocalization of thought by
means of the organs of speech. But speaking is at the same time
also listening. It is the custom to put speaking and listening in
opposition: one man speaks, the other listens. But listening
accompanies and surrounds not only such speaking as takes
place in conversation. The simultaneousness of speaking and
listening has a larger meaning. Speaking is of itself a listening.
Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is
a listening not whilebut before we are speaking. This listening to
language also comes before all the kinds of listening that we
know, in a most inconspicuous manner. We do not merely speak
the language—we speak by way of it. We can do so solely because
we always have already listened to the language. What do we
hear there? We hear language speaking.5
There are a lot of uphill twists in the trail in that passage. Let us go back
over them slowly, trying to become a little more familiar with the topog-
raphy. As I add more passages from Heidegger to this one, hoping to
enrich the background listening that we can bring to all of them, it may
happen that you begin to ask yourself: What are we to make of all this?
Indeed, these passages, like Bohr's lectures, may be taken as guides for
inquiry rather than as formulations of truth. (They must be so taken if we
are to honor Heidegger's wishes.) We are to make something of them, not
at random or carelessly, but intentionally, designedly. So how can we
make these almost cryptic passages useful for ourselves as teachers? How
do Heidegger's words... I almost said, how do they illuminate our experi-
ence? As if on automatic pilot, my discourse flies through the transparent
paradigm of visualized structure. What Heidegger would say is, how do
these passages shift the listening we bring to our experience?
On purpose, Heidegger begins by blurring the ordinary conceptual
separation between speaking and listening, teasing out a replacement for
those two values. He invites us to notice the ordinary way of conceiving
what speech is: giving voice to thought, changing thought into sound
with the mouth. As it is "known" by us, the salient thing about speaking
is physiological, an act of production by which, we would say, the stored
contents of one mind are transmitted into another. The customary picture
of human communication is encoding and decoding messages. Is this the
wrong picture? Instead of proposing a more accurate picture, Heidegger
suggests a picture with "larger meaning" to supplant this oscillation be-
tween speaking and listening as encoding and decoding: rather than
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alternating, discrete activities, perhaps speaking and listening should be
seen as simultaneous. Or even more strongly, and strangely: perhaps they
are the same thing.
Here Heidegger seems to combine two distinct values into one, a
molecule instead of two separate atoms. If these two values were fused
into a single place in a re-invented system, we might give it the name
"speaking/listening," except that the relationship signified by the "I" is
more than mere reciprocity, as in "throw/catch" or "I sigh/you sympa-
thize." But the name of the molecule is not just "language." It is a curious
new compound, made up of speakinglistening and two new components:
"saying" and "showing." In several places in his work Heidegger dilates,
sometimes briefly and always abstrusely, on what "Saying," or "Showing
of Saying," or "showing saying" means. Heidegger's philosophical vo-
cabulary may take some getting used to. If you will, read through these
passages a couple of times.
Language speaks by saying, this is, by showing... We, accord-
ingly, listen to language in this way, that we let it say its Saying
to us. No matter in what way we may listen besides, whenever
we are listening to something we are letting something be said to us,
and all perception and conception is already contained in that
act. In our speaking, as a listening to language, we say again the
Saying we have heard.6
Saying is showing. In everything that speaks to us, in everything
that touches us by being spoken and spoken about, in everything
that gives itself to us in speaking, but also in the speaking that we
do ourselves, there prevails Showing which causes to appear
what is present and to fade from appearance what is absent.
Saying is in no way the linguistic expression added to the
phenomena after they have appeared—rather, all radiant ap-
pearance and all fading away is grounded in the showing
Saying. Saying sets all present beings free into their given
presence, and brings what is absent into their absence.7
"To say," related to the Old Norse "saga," means to show: to
make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call
world, lighting and concealing it. This lighting and hiding
proffer of the world is the essential being of Saying."8
Whenever Dustin says anything lately, his voice sounds like some
horrific cartoon character, giving raucous orders, demanding capitulation,
pronouncing doom. Desperately I ask him to "talk regular, please," and
sometimes, briefly, he does. During most of his time, though, he is engaged
in making up his own games, imitating characters he sees on television or
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singing the songs he learns at school. My dictionary gives little help with
this: the Latin verb from which "imitate" comes is imitari, to copy, mimic,
counterfeit. No surprises there. The school songs are always pleasant to
hear, but when what he chooses to imitate is already a mutant of a
counterfeit of a superhero, I wince, or worse. Likewise when he aims a
gun at me, even if it's the gun I made for him out of two sticks of wood. Is
his pointing the gun a kind of speaking? And if his speaking is also my
listening, and if, as Heidegger suggests, we are giving being to a world in
our speakinglistening, then what is really going on here?
In one respect, what is going on seems to be that Dustin is making up
the rules of his games—he invents after what he has already encountered,
says after the Saying he has heard, makes up a world to play in. "OK,
Daddy, you say "Oh no you don't," and I'll be the bad guy." He actually
scripts what I should say next; and when I say it, even halfheartedly, my
interests tending elsewhere, it works to create a real game for Dustin.
Instead of what looks to me like a dull mechanical repetition, what he gets
is the opportunity for full participation. And when I do engage in his re-
invention by following his rules, letting him say his saying to me, he
positively lights up. Where could this have come from, this way of being?
It is a way that starkly contrasts what happens sometimes when he is
called upon, say, to add "please" after a request, or to change an order
(now his usual mode of addressing us) into a request. In these cases, he
can be perfectly dull and mechanical, repeating the words hollowly, his
attention riveted to the television. Here, he is following my rules but there
is no engagement between us; neither of us is really present to the other.
This second way of being might be called mocking, and it makes me feel
as if I were being paid with counterfeit money. The way I be with Dustin
when he is imitating is worlds apart from the way I can be when he is
engaged in re-inventing. When he re-invents a request instead of counter-
feiting it, two things happen: he looks for eye contact, and I am free to
respond appropriately, rather than parroting a script of my own. "No,
you'll ruin your dinner" sounds altogether different in the two worlds: if
we are imitating, he may frown or cry; if we are re-inventing, he may say
brightly, "OK, Daddy!" (and come back in a few minutes with a different
stategem). Now, I am participating with Dustin in both cases: whether we
are re-inventing or mocking, what we say and how we be arise together as
we speaklisten our world into being moment by moment. I cannot usually
distinguish one thing I have said or done as the cause of the world whose
effects and affects show up in the encounter with Dustin. Instead, there
arises in our interaction a field, an arena in which and by virtue of which
our play proceeds. What interests me now is the difference between these
two arenas—really, these two kinds of arena. For in the arena of inventing,
we get to play, to dance with one another. We get to share ourselves.
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Is all this—Heidegger's abstruseness followed by my appropriation
of it for family life—a fancy way of recommending for teachers the old-
fashioned show-and-tell time? You show what you've got and tell what it
is, say something about it. Here is the candle, here is how the wax drips
when you light it! We may be entranced, enchanted by the wonder of the
presence of the candle, the object, in the child's imagination; his showing
and saying may bring the object alive for us as for him. I think this is part
of what Heidegger is getting at; but his saying in these passages is showing
us something more besides.
He says it in three slightly different ways: things speak to us; things
touch us by being spoken about; and things give themselves to us in
speaking. What happens with speaking, Heidegger says, is that a whole
world appears, its constituents announcing their presence and its non-
constituents fading into absence. What happens with speaking, he says, is
a "lighting and hiding" of the world. Is that a contradiction in terms? How
can something cast light and hide what it casts light on at the same time?
Well, how are we listening to Heidegger's formulation? If we listen with
Locke for language to describe things, we cannot quite make sense of
speaking as a "lighting and hiding," nor can we understand it as a cause
of phenomena, a giving, a setting free. For language as description would
be language that reveals, that illuminates; words would represent things
(re-present them) rather than offering or giving them to us. And words
certainly shouldn't work to hide things. Dustin's task would be, as Locke
puts it, "to get and fix in [his mind] clear, distinct, and complete ideas"—
by which he means solid sense impressions, gained in experiments on
objects—"and to annex to them proper and constant names"9—by which he
means unambiguous, consistently used terms. When Dustin is seriously
engaged with the world, learning its ways and its constituents, he should
be storing up and cataloguing descriptions. He should be amassing cultural
literacy.
But before we describe and catalogue, we are listening, Heidegger
says, not only to our interlocutor, and not only while he is speaking, but to
our language, before we begin a conversation and all the while it lasts and
afterward. Speaking by way of our language, our cultural conversation, our
semiological system of values, we may listen for and hear only what it can
provide. Trees, Poems, Streets, Windows, Hats, Coats, Structure...—our
language sets forth for us, like an abacus with its wired beads, the items
and combinations of items, the configurations of values that make sense
among us, that add up to meaningful discourse. And, as the merchant
tallies his sales at the end of the day, his fingers zipping the beads back
and forth absently, fluently, so with the calculator we use to transact our
business: the language is transparent ("inconspicuous") while we are
using it. While we are engaged in conversation in this way, the medium
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goes unnoticed; indeed, it would hinder us to take notice of its structure,
of its structuring. Our fingers would get tangled, we would lose track of
the sum. Without even a first thought, I Judge that they Are Men (to
capitalize the names of some beads) Because of their Hats, their Coats,
and the Way they Move in the Street. We let our language (our system of
values) say its saying to us, and our thoughts and actions grow, accustomed
in that saying. Where is the freedom in that? you may ask.
For it seems that in our listening to our cultural language, participating
in its conversation, whipping the beads back and forth on their wires like
electrons without stopping to inspect the instrument, we may be commit-
ted willy-nilly to an act of being—we are "letting something be said to us"
that foreordains what we see and think. "In that act," Heidegger says, "all
perception and conception is already contained." Seeing, feeling, and
acting in concert with the saying, we be that beads combine into sums, that
electrons are part of the structure of reality, that Aptitude and Motivation
(along with Basic Skills, Study Habits, and Attitude) combine to produce
good or bad grades. In saying again the Saying we have heard, we are
being in a particular way, too. If the Saying we educators have been
hearing is a speaking of and listening for structure and its correlates, then
we have been being given a particular way of interacting in the world of
our classrooms, a certain mode of being with our students. Our cultural
conversation has prescribed a set of procedures which, it Says, are required
for education to take place. We have become a system of categories, wired
with the beads of the abacus.
What practices and processes in your classes can you see as having
derived from, or as meshing with, the paradigm of structured knowl-
edge? Can you characterize a way of being toward or being with your
students that fits with these activities? In my case the way of being was
something like: "This that I'm trying to teach is sophisticated, tough stuff,
and I probably won't be able to have everyone get it. But it is important
for them all to get it if they can, and to struggle with it even if they cannot
get it." My typical practice was to hand out the material—cleverly arranged,
I thought—in small dittoed chunks, to be discussed in class that day, and
perhaps followed up in homework assignments. And often, in spite of my
best intentions, I would find myself standing in front of the room and
talking. (Sometimes, all that was exactly appropriate, and it worked: the
question, of course, is why did it work on those occasions and not on
others?) If you will take a minute or two—or more—at this point to write
down what you see in response to the questions about classroom practices
and ways of being with students, we will use the record of your inquiry
later on. Teach a class or two with the questions in the back of your mind;
then return to consider them head-on again. Ask your students what they
see in your teaching. After another philosophical excursion—a fairly long
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and difficult one—we will return to these practices. The purpose of the
philosophy is to make it possible to re-invent them.
If the abacus-language of referentiality, the language of structured
knowledge, articulates the activities and the ways of being you have just
examined and listed, what other language, or languaging, is there? Let us
listen for one. While the merchant may count himself fortunate at the end
of a day of high sales, when he goes home smiling to share his good
fortune with his family he is no longer tallying. His way of being with the
facts of his day's sales shifts. Now he has a different prospect ahead of
him, and now his knowledge of the facts about his sales that day becomes
something else. Can you hear his pleasure as he tells his wife that he made
enough today for...? When he gets home what he will do is proffer his suc-
cess to his family; he puts it forward as a sacrament of their lives together.
How has this transformation occurred? What gives the merchant this
different way of being? What happens when a teacher comes home to her
family after a hard but rewarding day, a day on which she has clearly
made a difference with her students? Is there excitement about the pros-
pect of grading papers? Does she be with her family more fully, sharing
her experiences and theirs in ways that embody their love for each other?
What arenas occur?
Somehow one of the customs little boys bring with them seems to be
reliance on knives and firearms for fun. Moments free of the womb,
Dustin raised his arm over his head in a gesture that I gladly took to
foretell a career as a great symphony conductor. It now appears that it
was only the flourish prefatory to aiming a pistol or stabbing a "bad guy."
My saying about what was possible in his case—said before he could
understand or respond to it—was soon supplanted by the cartoon vo-
cabulary of shoot-em-up, which he seems to have understood perfectly
and immediately. He and I now run around wildly in the front yard,
spraying each other with bullets from our "whistle-guns" (Dustin's word
for the sound we make to imitate muzzle blast) and laughing as we
collapse in agony of mortal wounds. This is his saying, his vocabulary,
absorbed from television cartoons, playmates, or wherever, and re-invented
on the spot. (Whoever heard of whistle-guns?) Once I take it up as a
material, a form of sharing, a possibility for sharing, rather than as a struc-
tured description, a representation of an occurrence, it is a saying that can
give voice to our spirit, our love, shaping our relatedness as a font shapes
the poured water. Its shaping saying now becomes a sacrament of our
being together. Sometimes—is it just luck?—Dustin's saying, his scripting
of possibilities, sets a world free, rather than corresponding to the world
or imitating it. When I am presented with a world he has "set free," when
I take it up as a participant, I can be co-inventor with him: I am free as
well. Is this phenomenon related to the merchant's return to his family?
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With Heidegger, and with Dustin's help, I want to propose another
re-invention—indeed, not only to propose it, but (with your help) to carry
it out. Like Heidegger, I do not intend to throw out referential language
and replace it with something else. We could not do that even if the
argument here required it. The immense edifice of represented knowledge,
structured concepts, and all the apparatus that goes with them, will still
be available after this re-invention of language. The merchant will still use
the abacus to tally his sales. But he will have, after this re-invention, that
other possibility of sharing with his family more fully. The teacher will
still grade her papers, but she may find that her family has expanded
along with the possibility of parenting her students, bringing forth, with
them, education. She may begin to have access to another arena.
Let us start our re-inventing of language, then, by listening from this
other idea of what language is: instead of description, what if language, as
Saying, is creation? Cogito ergo sum, we heard Descartes saying. I am
thinking, therefore I am. How could cogito give not only self but also world:
self and world arising together as something like intertissued veils? What
if, in the beginning, veiled, is the word?
The poet names the gods and names all things in that which they
are. This naming does not consist merely in something already
known being supplied with a name; it is rather that when the
poet speaks the essential word, the existent is by this naming
nominated as what it is. So it becomes known as existent. Poetry
is the establishing of being by means of the word.10
To listen from this new idea of what language is, we are led back figura-
tively to Adam, and to that naming which is said to be his God-given
prerogative. As we proceed along Heidegger's path,11 we will be keeping
to the question "what is naming!" What if naming has something intimate
and crucial to do with Adam's, and thus our, being?
For Heidegger, what the Old Testament figured as Adam's naming
would be a kind of poetry. Indeed, made in the image of a creating God,
Adam expresses his nature by naming not only the animals, but the gods
themselves, as if he had created them! To consolidate this turning of the
tables, Heidegger says that "being and essence of things can never be
calculated and derived from what is present," but instead must be "freely
created, laid down and given."12 So naming is a special kind of poetry; it
makes something that never existed before, not composing it out of mate-
rials already available but laying down the materials, giving what there is
to build with. We hear in Heidegger's words the echo of Saussure's idea
of the arbitrariness of language, and this combines with an echo of the
scriptural account. Neither Heidegger nor Saussure, of course, is necessar-
ily concerned that his account square with the Biblical story—philosopher
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and linguist, neither is a Judeo-Christian apologist, nor a proponent of
any theology. But why should there be such a persistently recurring echo?
Is there something about what it is to live a human life, some antenna that
tunes in these faint signals that we usually fail to notice? Since our stan-
dard notion of man as a sole subject coincides with our notion of man as
confronting and receiving an already structured objective world, perhaps
we will be rewarded with an insight into the ways we regard ourselves,
what we take to be our place and function, if we explore Heidegger's
contrary account in conjunction with this piece of Biblical myth. And it
may happen that as we inquire into what naming is, we will find ourselves
being in the classroom with more power.
In what Heidegger has to say about being-in-the-world there is not a
little specialized terminology and usage. Having already encountered
some of his vocabulary, you may be acclimatizing already—perhaps we
can adjust to unfamiliar ways of speaking as our bodies do to high alti-
tude. Here, as in mountaineering, the key is to pace oneself. If you have a
child, or some students, with whom you can spend time between reading
the paragraphs of mis book, please do so. Create for yourself a route up to
the higher base camps, including several return trips.
Heidegger's central term, the focus and goal of much of his philoso-
phy, is "Dasein"—literally, "there-being" or "thereness." Heidegger uses
the term Dasein to mean, approximately, the human way of being. As
distinct from animals (presumably) and stones, the way humans be is in a
world. For us, a world is "there"; and to say one perceives a world is to say
one is in it. That is to say, each of us is Dasein or has Dasein in us, exactly
when a fundamental assertion occurs: "By Dasein we mean... the entity
that we each ourselves are, which each of us finds in the fundamental
assertion: I am."13 So in exploring Dasein we are dealing with an assertion,
a piece of language—and a particular kind of assertion, at that.
Most of our assertions are predications; they say something like "x is
y." For such an assertion to be valid, there must be some evidence that x is
indeed y—that the category or thing called "x" is coterminous or coinci-
dent with the category or thing called "y." The maker of such an assertion
is, willy-nilly, in the position of supplying that evidence if it is not already
apparent. For me to assert that the sun is shining, or that I am standing in
the sunshine, I have to be there beforehand to decide that I want to make
that assertion, on the basis of available evidence. If I assert that Light
cannot Escape from Black Holes, I am speaking on behalf of a structure of
inter-related facts and theories, relying on the correspondence of this
amalgam with a structure of observations. I am expecting you to say "Yes,
and..." or "Not so, because..." The point of my assertion is to tie into an
ever wider correspondence, strengthening its consistency. Such an asser-
tion calls for investigation and proof, or rebuttal. Our usual way of using
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and dealing with assertions, making them and defending them, contains
Descartes' distinction between subject and object, and involves us in a
characteristic stance vis-a-vis reality. But the assertion "I am," we said, is
one that "occurs." We find Dasein in it, says Heidegger.
It is odd to say an assertion "occurs," but we cannot follow Heidegger
out of the Cartesian-Lockean ocean of subjects confronting objects unless
we see that until this assertion is present, there is no one and nothing there
to make it. Of course, this defies common sense. How can an assertion be
made, or "occur" even, without anyone to make it? But this common
sense throws us right back into the water—for it merely repeats the back-
ground assumption that for anything to happen, something must be there
to make it happen.
Now this assumption, this pattern of thinking, is essentially circular—
it amounts to saying that if anything is there, something must be there.
Thus it shuffles off the question of ontology; it takes thereness for granted.
Heidegger's project is to get us up out of that water. He asks: where did
the something come from in the first place? What is it to bel He begins to
make a new dwelling for us in a sequence of eight theses (of which we
will use only the first three), which he delivered in a lecture to the Marburg
Theological Society three years before Being and Time was published.14 To
introduce these, he has begun with that definition of the human way of
being: "The authentic assertion of Being pertaining to the Dasein of man,"
he repeats, is "the assertion 1 am/"15 What is this special assertion "I am,"
then? There, now, is a question worthy of thinking—like the question
"what makes a treat a treat?" Maybe the answers are related: maybe what
makes a treat is the possibility it presents of saying "I am," not referring to
a thing, but speaking Being.
So what is it when the assertion "I am" occurs? Heidegger answers,
first, by denying that what occurs is the isolation of a subject from objects.
Here is the first thesis, in which he relegates the cogito to the realm of
metaphysical legerdemain:
Human life is not some subject that has to perform some trick in
order to enter the world. Dasein as being-in-the-world means...
dealing with the world; tarrying alongside it in the manner of
performing, effecting and completing, but also contemplating,
interrogating, and determining by way of contemplation and
comparison.16
Here there is no focus on the "structure" or "essence" of contemplation,
on the grammatical form of questions or the rhetorical form of comparison.
Instead, Heidegger brings into view a body of distinctions, as between
contemplating and interrogating. He is concerned not with language, but
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with languaging. The concern with distinctions-in-practice—the focus on
languaging—extends also into the physical world of what we would call
objects:
When, for example, we walk along the edge of a field but
"outside it," the field shows itself as belonging to such-and-such
a person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used
was bought at So-and-so's shop and given by such-and-such a
person, and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned
in its Being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages
with it...17
So when the assertion "I am" occurs, concerned subjects and objects of
concern arise together, in everyday activities—"performing," "effecting,"
"interrogating," making coffee, etc.—held apart from each other by and in
a design that relates them. For us (or with us or in us), he says, as we
engage in our normal everyday activities, system arises. We simply find
ourselves in a world, an articulation, a network where jointed parts, like
the boat, its owner, and their voyages, arise together. Mea res agitur,
Heidegger adds: "I am what is being enacted," or "I am that which
concerns me."18
Now what does this sound like? Sure enough, in my speaking^hinking
here I have merged again with the saying of Saussure. For it now appears
that Heidegger, in his re-inventing of language, is speaking Saussurean.
But unlike Saussure, Heidegger is speaking not just about language, but
about our way of being: Dasein. What human being is, then, is the spring-
ing-to-clarity of a world in and with a system of distinctions, as between
"contemplating" and "interrogating," or between decently kept fields and
shabby ones, the coffee and the coffee pot and the kitchen. A system of dis-
tinctions is embodied in language, and that embodiment is us. (Is it hard to
think of language as an embodiment—as a body? Doesn't that difficulty
arise when we look at everything through Locke's subject/object/mind/
world window?) Elsewhere Heidegger says that words "shelter" beings;
his most famous dictum—"Language is the house of Being"—says the
same. So we have come full circle—but of course, in a way, we started out
full-circle, too, with the notion of language as articulation, the arising-
together of reciprocally delimiting values along with the valuation of
those values—their presence in and as our form of life. Heidegger is
saying that world and language arise together, for us. "Language is the
primordial poetry in which a people speaks being."19 Here we have ar-
rived at a base camp. In a primordial poetry, people speak being. Rest here.
We remember that Locke had defined his project as clearing away the
terminological rubble, eliminating old systems, the received doctrines of
his day. While Heidegger in his turn disapproves of the consequences that
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follow from the received subject/object epistemology, his philosophy is
not a firebrand call to revolution. He does not reject the tradition, for the
"tradition is rich in truth."20 But he does raise the question of what ocean
the boat is sailing. Is it true, he asks, that all there is are subjects and
objects? Or is there another intuition about our situation here that, while
perhaps not yet as clear and distinct as a visual sense-impression, hints at
another ocean altogether? Here is the second thesis:
As this being-in-the-world, Dasein is, together with [this dealing
with the world in ordinary actions], being-with-one-another,
being with Others: having the same world there with Others,
encountering one another, being with one another in the manner
of being-for-one-another.21
So "being-in-the-world" and "being with Others" happen in conjunction.
What could it mean that Dasein exists, not as a subject against objects, but
as a "being-for-one-another"? How is being-for-one-another the same as that
fundamental assertion of Dasein, I am? Part of Heidegger's point is this:
when we say "7 am" in our ordinary conversations, asserting our own
existence, we do not mean that others and a world are too, arising
commutually. Or rather, zf we ever said "I am," if we ever felt it necessary
to assert our own existence, we would not intend that commutual kind of
being; we would be referring to our Cartesian self. That is to say, what we
hear in that fundamental assertion is isolated subject against pre-existent
structured objective world. What Heidegger would have us hear in it,
instead, is "Mitsein"—with-being. We arise together as aspects of each
other. Only then does speakinglistening make individuals from a manifold,
dividing the workman from his tools.
In re-directing our attention to the commutual character of what we
would hear as a Cartesian declaration of the subject's independence,
Heidegger wants us, first, to begin to hear this silent assertion that we take
for granted; and then to hear it in a different way. In the hearing it, we are
opened to the possibility of hearing it newly. So in the present book we
have already heard the echo of Saussure's idea of "arbitrariness" in lan-
guage; now comes an echo of his idea of a sociality at the heart of language:
Heidegger says there is a mutuality at the heart of being. How are we to
hear this? As teachers, we want to explore the possibility of an ocean of
mutuality, as it were behind the beginning of things.
Is Adam on his own, a single entity in a world of other single entities
with no names yet? Heidegger says not. Rather, it is that along with
Adam, along with naming, comes that lighting and hiding "proffer" of
the world. Our world, the one we live in, arises together with Adam's
naming, and not beforehand. How? How do people speak being? What is
poetic creation, "originary" speaking, as Heidegger calls it? Saussure in-
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sisted that language depends on human intercourse, dwells in sociality. If
we see Adam on his own in a world alien to him until he names its
components, we miss what Heidegger might be saying here. For if social-
ity is of the essence of the being of language, of naming, of poetry, then
there is no poet without soobschenie, mutuality, being together. Here,
Heidegger says, Iam = being-for-one-another.
What are we to make, then, of Adam's solitude, a feature apparently
designed into the scriptural account of the creation of world? For it would
seem to contradict Heidegger's notion of original mutuality. Well, how
does Heidegger think this mutuality that his second thesis invokes? Is it
like commerce (individuals trading beads or currency or ideas with one
another); or like diplomacy (the "art of letting another have your way");
or like politics (the "art" of compromise); or like statecraft (individual
nations forming alliances and bargaining with other nations); or like another
kind of billiard-ball mutuality on the subject/object table? What is "being-
for-one-another"? We are listening, of course, for something bearing on
what it is to teach—or better, to engage in teachinglearning. For in the
prevalent subject/object paradigm, isn't a teacher an individual over against
the students and over against the facts and ideas to be taught?
In Being and Time, Heidegger expands his thinking of mutuality, clari-
fying and making more distinct the related values he calls "being-in-the-
world" and "being-with." Against our ordinary common-sense under-
standing of what another person is—a separate individual—Heidegger
distinguishes another sense in which we can encounter Others:
By "Others" we do not mean everyone else but me—those over
against whom the "I" stands out. They are rather those from
whom, from the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—
those among whom one is too... By reason of this with-like Being-
in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with
Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with
Others.22
When I watch a basketball game on television, I can get a sense of what
Heidegger might mean here. Perhaps because of a deficiency in my own
background, I cannot see individuals interacting as individuals on the
court. What I see is more like the flow of the ball and the players back and
forth. It looks miasmal to me, or rather miasmal-distillant (to borrow one
of Faulkner's astounding coinages), colorful and active, but not designed
to illuminate individual persons' colors or actions. I have heard about the
amazing feats of individual players, and hard as it is for me to focus
attention on one player in the maelstrom, I can sometimes see individual
performances. But they always dissolve back into the totality of what is
happening on the court. Individuals cannot be-in a basketball game with-
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out being-with others. What I see for the most part is not individuals at all
but team, maybe even just a "with-world" of teams in play.
But Heidegger is saying more than this. It is not only that we cannot
play life alone, as individuals; not only that the individual player cannot
shine without his team around him, feeding him passes. It is that we are
each other. "Dasein in itself," Heidegger says, "is essentially Being-with."23
Human being is being with others. Miasmal-distillant, we arise together.
Am I not sitting here alone in my study writing mis, then? What could be
more indubitable? No. I apprehend my audience, I imagine readers' re-
sponses, I hear the muffled sounds of my children playing outside, I
wonder where my wife has gone... There is no such thing as a me apart
from these conversations. I exist when I am thinking of my wife and
children, Descartes had said. What "thinking" means here, Heidegger
says in his turn, is "language occurring." Try that exact substitution: I
exist when I am language occurring. Language is the house of Being. It is
not that I exist only when I am "communicating" with others, as Descartes
recognized. But it is also not that I exist apart from others or from the
world. The circumference of a circle does not exist apart from its radius;
the front and back of a sheet of paper come along with each other. They
are distinct but not separable. Same goes for a teacher and his students, a
teacher and other teachers, the members of a family.
But since, in the subject/object paradigm of being, "communication"
between "individuals" in a group is still of utmost concern for teachers, let
us return now to see how Heidegger deals with the issue of communication.
In the terms of his alternate paradigm, languaging—Saying—is being-for-
one-another. If we grant, as before, that speaking and listening are not
opposite, reciprocal processes, then
Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences,
such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into
the interior of another.24
What is communication, then, in Heidegger's paradigm? It is of a "more
general kind" than the informative assertion or the expression of feelings,
paradigmatic cases of what the subject/object paradigm calls communica-
tion. For Heidegger, communication is the "Articulation of Being with
one another understandingly": "Through [this more general kind of com-
munication] a co-state-of-mind gets 'shared/ and so does the understand-
ing of Being-with."25 Let's say that Heidegger is pointing here to the classes
we have all taught, ones where we would say that "channels were open,"
where the kids were listening and "getting" the material, where we could
speak in "anticipation of an active responsive understanding" (Bakhtin's
phrase), where the room was lit up with participation in ideas. In that
kind of communication, Heidegger says, "Dasein-with is already essen-
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tially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding." The kids
are with it, the teacher can be with the kids where they are.
When a magic "co-state-of-mind" or "co-understanding" is present in
the classroom, what is that? For we have all taught the other kind of class,
too, where all our assertions were correct, perhaps where we even ex-
pressed our passion about the subject, and all eyes were glazed, nobody
was home (or worse, where inattention and disruption were in charge of
the class). The co-understanding present at those times (for this too is a
form of Being-with) would be called something like boredom, maybe, or
defiance. Heidegger distinguishes between several different ways in which
"Being-with" can develop in our colloquy, ways not unfamiliar to a teacher:
Being-with develops in listening to one another, which can be
done in several ways: following, going along with, and the
privative modes of not-hearing, resisting, defying, and turning
away.26
When students are following the lesson, going along with the program of
the class, there may be in the classroom a "listening" to one another that is
working. But what is your reaction, ordinarily, when students resist, defy,
or turn away from the lesson? If you are like me, you go away in the other
direction—you clam up, too. "All right, I'm doing my part; y'all do yours!
Shut up and pay attention!" Heidegger directs our attention not only to
what teachers say and do, but to the listening present in the classroom. He
would not ask us to change our behaviors, but to notice, first, the listening
that is giving the behavior (and to notice it as the listening, not students'
listening or teacher's listening.) Communication as the articulation of
Being-together will occur according to the listening present in the room,
welling up moment by moment, feeding the discourse of teacher and
students, giving them what they say and how they be, determining how
the class shows up, its "feel."27 Defiance is a mode of listening to one an-
other, as is rapt attention. If human Being is essentially Being-with, and
what we call the world arises in Being-with, then listening is poetic.
Listening is not reception. It is action. In Cartesian terms, remember, the
intuition that gives us the data of sensation, constituting our world, is
"cameropoetic," not a representing function but a making of the articulated room
in which we dwell together. Here in Heidegger's formulation we are not, as
teachers, the ones who know about the room and tell: we are speaking
listening, listening that speaks. "The encountering saying of mortals is
answering. Every spoken word is already an answer: counter-saying,
coming to the encounter, listening Saying."28 Our listening gives students
the world they live in. And vice versa, of course. Our common world is an
encounter, says Heidegger. Being-with develops as we listen the possibility of
sharing as the primordial poetry. Here is the next base camp. By all means,
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you should rest here overnight, then return to the lower camps to ferry
some gear up to this higher elevation.
We are each other, Heidegger says. How is that? How are we to think
that? Here is the third thesis:
Being with one another in the world, having this world as being
with one another, has a distinctive ontological determination.
The fundamental way of the Dasein of world, namely, having
world there with one another, is speaking. It is predominantly in
speaking that man's being-in-the-world takes place.29
We are each other in speaking (what he means, of course, is
speakinglistening). That is why Adam, the namer and the naming, dancer
and dance, is pictured as alone. His solitude, in the Bible, marks the
distinctness of man's way of being. What Bakhtin had called "utterance in
anticipation of an active responsive understanding," what we have from
time to time been calling languaging, becomes in Heidegger the
speakinglistening that is Dasein.
In our epistemology of subject and object, I find I can barely hear the
subtlety of Heidegger's point here. "The word gives being," he says. How
are we to hear that? Again the original German contains a clue: "gibt das
Wort: das Sein." The colon makes it seem that Heidegger wants the "giving"
of Word to be not preliminary to the event of Being, not the pre-condition
or origin of Being, but co-eval with it. Word and Being arise together, not
like cause and effect, and not even like soul and body, but like address and
acknowledgment. When you are addressed, your being is acknowledged. In
our presence to one another there arises the possibility of mutual conference,
and that is a mutual conferring of Being. In the moment of Word, the
moment when this mutual giving becomes possible, the moment of be-
coming together—that is when the kids turn to the teacher, the child to the
parent, knowing each other in and as the possibility of giving Being,
bringing forth. This is no solicitation by things of named classes, but a
being-in-one-another, the "living We," as Buber calls it, that fulfills the
present. This is the moment when Dustin and I make what we would
ordinarily call "eye contact." Perhaps my reading of Heidegger gets a bit
overenthusiastic here. As I did with Descartes, I may have put words in
his mouth that he would not endorse. And even with "Mitsein," Heidegger
does not quite capture the sense of freshness, of possibility, of vitality, of
celebratory presence in those moments of sharing that make parenting
such a treat and teaching such an exalted railing. For this we can look
forward to Martin Buber.
World, thereness, and perception, "subjects" and "objects," arise to-
gether, in mutual support, like a system, a sailboat. Dasein exists in sys-
tem, or better, in systeming. For not only do we make up systems, like
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mathematics, to explore and describe—here comes the crucial step, the
one which fulfills that hint of freedom alluded to earlier—we are that
making-up. We are inventing. That is what the assertion "I am" is: it is
Adam's naming, an inventing of Being, not only of my own but of others
and of our world. Being, for humans, is inventing being. Languaging is
the house of being because it bears the possibility of inventing being, of
co-poiesis. And this is not only something that happened in the dim past,
like a linguistic Big Bang. It happens, according to Heidegger, moment by
moment as we speak with each other:
In the manner in which Dasein in its world speaks about its way
of dealing with its world, a self-interpretation of Dasein is also
given. It states how Dasein specifically understands itself, what
it takes itself to be. In speaking with one another, in what one
thus spreads around in speaking, there lies the specific self-
interpretation of the present, which maintains itself in this
dialogue.30
In our dialogue in the teachers' lounge or the faculty meeting, then, we are
not describing the facts about students or about school, just as in our
classrooms we are not describing structures of facts. We are making up
and maintaining the world in which our students and their school experi-
ences (and ours) are occurring. We are stating how we understand our-
selves, what we take ourselves to be—though I think Heidegger would
say that the mode of this "statement" is more inference and implication,
unsaid, like those declarations and assertions that were present in my
responsewwhen Dustin interrupted with his urge to play. Spreading a
world around in our speakinglistening, we are inventing the context for
our common experience. Adam is responsible: in our speaking together we
promise, pledge, and warrant a self-interpretation of the present.
Has language created the world we live in? Yes and no. What we call
physical reality might or might not have some mode of being if there were
no people to talk about it, to speak it. for us, though, it is languaging that
embodies, manifests, realizes our being-together-in-a-world. Language
lives as the trace, the spoor of our sharing. Language, including rules of
grammar, syntax, putative deep structure, and all the rest, is what is left
over after languaging, sharing, has given us being. "Language is fossil
poetry," said Emerson. Languaging, establishing being—for us and among
us—is the same as poetry. I am not an object, not my body; nor am I a
subject, a res cogitans, a thinking thing. I exist in speakinglistening; we are in
naming, languaging, systeming, distinctioning. Languaging is never left
over; it is always with us, preparing the future by giving us world, self,
selves, selvesworld.
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LANGUAGING AS SHARING
When will the action of thinking endure, include, and refer to the
presence of the living man facing us? When will the dialectic of
thought become dialogic, an unsentimental, unrelaxed dialogue
in the strict terms of thought with the man present at the
moment?
—M. Buber1
A living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object
of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process.
—M. Bakhtin2
V& have now re-invented language as languaging, and we have begun to
investigate how languaging and Being might be related, might modulate
each other, on our way to re-inventing the wheel of our teaching as an
embodiment of what Heidegger calls Saying. There is one more step to be
taken, though, a further shift to be made before we attain that place, and
for this shift we turn to Martin Buber, particularly to his difficult and
immensely rewarding book 7 and Thou. For it still might sound as if
languaging were no more than using language, as if using language were
a skill in the contemporary sense of executing a set procedure, following
grammatical rules with perhaps a canny regard for the social and psycho-
logical effects to be expected. In the domain of skill, even of social skill, we
experience what Buber calls the "basic word I-It." Then our subject mate-
rial comes represented in hierarchically ranked outlines, in videotapes,
filmstrips, and drill sheets; and our students come in tracks, serried ac-
cording to their academic history and test scores. In the world of "I-It" we
look to predict the future of students on the basis of their past; we look for
evidence to confirm our predictions that a demonstrated structure of
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behavior will almost certainly produce the same results as it always has;
or we seek to modify a student's structure so that it can deal with the
structure of the material. We define and classify our students, we confirm
and re-confirm our generalizations. Thus we are able to conclude that our
experience with students makes sense.
Insofar as we are teachers, we will be dwelling in a different domain:
that world of relation established by "the basic word I-You," the domain
of sharing being. We want to expand on what Heidegger postulates about
being-with, about being-for-one-another, about being-speaking-in-the-
world; we want to feel beneath us the swell of another conversation
mingled with the vocabulary of experience, where the past stakes its
claim. For the vocabulary of experience cannot give us an ocean of mutu-
ality, in which Saying and Being dwell together in the self-interpretation
we spread around. Since the distinction between experience and mutual-
ity is of such moment for our lives together, Buber devotes himself to
developing the vocabulary of I-You against the rampant vocabulary of I-It
that dominates the twentieth century. If Heidegger is the prophet of Being
as housed in languaging, and thus in being-with (Mitsein), Buber is the
prophet of I-You, of relation. He re-invents languaging as sharing.3 For
Buber, it is not language, or even languaging, that houses Being. For him,
Being resounds in the originary mutuality of "encounter." If language is
the house of Being, then encounter is the front porch of language.
Since I am treating them together, I should note that Buber found
Heidegger's philosophy seriously deficient in that it "knows nothing of
any essential relation with others or any real I-Thou with them which
could breach the barriers of the self... that the individual does not have the
essence of man in himself, that man's essence is contained in the unity of
man with man, has entirely failed to enter Heidegger's philosophy."4 In
light of the passages quoted from Heidegger in the previous chapter,
Buber's criticism seems to me unduly harsh, but I am reading Heidegger's
philosophy of Mitsein as prefatory to Buber's notion of mutuality—a luxury
unavailable to Buber himself. In important ways, Heidegger and Buber
are contraries. But I do think there is a further step for teachers in Buber's
thinking.
For both thinkers the matter of our relatedness crucially involves our
languaging. "The mystery of the coming-to-be of language and that of the
coming-to-be of man are one," says Buber.5 But even if there flickers in
and out of Heidegger's theses an idea very similar to this—the almost-
identity of languaging, being-with, and being-for-one-another—Buber must
still shift our notice away from language as the locus of mis communion
toward a notion of the ontological primacy of sharing, a communion of
beings that seems to arise in a certain kind of meeting. When Dustin, at three,
asks me a question about why some kids are bullies, or about how a
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bobcat that he saw in the back of a pick-up truck had died, there is a
certain feel to the conversation between us. Perhaps it is some kind of
urgency I feel, some special edge: some kind of sharing is available to us
then beyond merely verbal, informational contact. I can answer from my
knowledge (or perhaps from my sophistication). But if I do, I have failed
to touch that knife's-edge of encounter. And I may have missed the
possibility of meeting, in which the "essence of man," in Buber's inad-
equate phrase, is somehow available between us. How may I share his
attraction to, or perhaps fear of, the stilled potency of the bobcat? How do
we, who love each other, name death? In speaking, if he and I are Saying, I
listen the "word" I-You in these questions from a child, and we are awake
not to interaction, but to possibility itself.
Buber begins his re-inventing of the ontological primacy of sharing:
"The life of a human being," he asserts, "does not exist merely in the
sphere of goal-directed verbs. It does not consist merely of activities that
have something for their object."
I perceive something. I feel something. I imagine something. I
want something. I sense something. I think something. The life
of a human being does not consist merely of all this and its like...
For wherever there is something there is also another something;
every It borders on other Its; It is only by virtue of bordering on
others. But where You is said there is no something. You has no
borders.
Whoever says You does not have something; he has nothing. But
he stands in relation.6
In our twentieth-century vocabulary, in the paradigm of being made
available there, Buber is hard to hear. What could it mean that You has no
borders? Does saying You blot other things out? What is "standing in
relation," if it is equivalent to "having nothing"? Does Buber mean You as
a concept? No, for concepts have borders; indeed, concepts are valuable
because of their edges. One says "the concept of the self" to render discrete
a component idea in his analysis. Nor does Buber mean that saying You is
an experience. In German the verb "to experience," erfahren, links up with
fahren, to drive or go, and with befahren, to drive over the surface of some-
thing.7 Going over the surfaces of things, our experience brings back to
our consciousness a report on conditions that obtain, on the already es-
tablished borders of phenomena. It is hard for us to distinguish between
"experience" and "encounter," for in our language both words inexorably
name that way of relating to objects that Descartes inaugurated and Locke
codified so forcefully. The world of experience is "the world of It, the
world of ordered objectivity and private subjectivity."8
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Buber says "encounter": what then is encounter? I am using the generic
word so as to discourage our tendency to reify, to make realities into
objects, instances, things. (And an encounter is a real, concrete, in-the-world
phenomenon.) As Buber distinguishes it, encounter is, first, a realm borne
in the possibility of greeting another. For Buber, greeting is far from simply
emitting or hearing the formula, "how do you do?":
We greet those we encounter by wishing them well or by
assuring them of our devotion or by commending them to God.
But how indirect are these worn-out formulas... compared with
the eternally young, physical, relational greeting of the Kaffir, "I
see you!" or its American variant, the laughable but sublime
"Smell me!"9
"Smell me!" is emphatically not to be translated as "Fit me into your
category-system." It means something more like "Distinguish me as a
presence. Get me in my strongest particularity." There is something
"physical, relational" about greeting as encounter. Buber emphasizes the
sense of bodily confrontation.10 In our psychology, we might analyze the
punk-rocker's pink spiky coif, the smoky knock-dead makeup and high-
heeled boots, or the baggy "low-riders," and unlaced high-tops of the
"homeys" as attempts to stake out an individual identity, to stand out
from the straight crowd, or to assert membership in whatever cool scene
happens to have spun out of mass culture this season. Though as Ameri-
cans we applaud individual self-expression, these we might regard as, at
best, pathetic imitations. Buber's premise asks us whether in the outrage
to convention there might not be another drive, potent if unpurposed and
unrecognized: perhaps we could see the pomaded spikes as an attempt to
get into relation, a lunge toward encounter. It is a greeting. Its purpose is to
"smell" bad to us, so that we can smell again, have to smell again. The
challenge to authority is—can we suppose this?—really a challenge to the
world of I-It, a commitment, however ill-mannered and ill-managed, to
restoring the fecundity of I-You relatedness. Until I listen for this note of
commitment, when such a youth confronts me in a class I am not con-
fronted, I am affronted. I am speechless. I am outside his world, he is
outside mine. How is this breach to be filled up? Instead of an answer,
Buber has provided this riddle, this hint: in the moment when we receive
another as other, as You instead of It, we have nothing. But "having
nothing" is positive, decisive, crucial. For it is the condition that allows
for, calls for, a naming like Adam's.
One rainy, gusty afternoon recently, as I was poring over my manu-
script up here in my Cartesian garret, I was surprised to hear excited
voices outside the window. Since the words on the monitor had begun to
blur anyway—I noticed my bleary eyes at the same moment as I heard the
voices—I got up from the computer and, hugging the wall of the building
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so as to stay under the eave, descended the outside stair to the yard. As
there was a lull in the rain when I reached the ground, I ran across the
open space between my little house and the big house, up onto the covered
front porch, where I found my wife with our year-old daughter in her
arms, and my slightly larger son, soaked through and dripping into a
puddle at his feet, a tentative grin on his countenance. He blurted:
"I don't know what came over me—I was just running and
running around like crazy in the yard..."
"I know," I said.
«What?" he asked breathlessly.
"Rain-running happiness.»
His face erupted in sunshine, suffused with joy and satisfaction; and I
saw in his eye, heard in his voice, the recognition of our secret, exuberant
affinity. Where did that moment come from? The moment was a gift:
what gave it? Is a simple psychological explanation—a father's sentimen-
tal pride in his own son—all there is to it? The word "parent" is from
Latin parere, meaning to bring forth. Though I am the parent, I have no
sense that anything I did, consciously or not, caused that moment of what
was really heart-stopping communion. I did not tell my child about rain-
running happiness; I taught him. We invented rain-running happiness
together.
When I get You, then, when I listen for encounter, what I get is not a
thing or set of things, but the context in which things can take place. What I
get is a standing-in-relation in which the possibility of inventing world,
inventing shared or mutual being, springs up, suddenly present, like a
scent.
When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic
word I-You to him, then he is no thing among things nor does he
consist of things.
He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot
in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition that can be
experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities.
Neighborless and seamless, he is You and fills the firmament.
Not as if there were nothing but he; but everything else lives in
his light.11
So encounter with You brings with it, as it were, a resplendently fulfilled
present world. We might have heard this as a world filled with ongoing
experiences, varied and significant; but Buber is careful to scotch this
snake. "Experience is remoteness from You,"12 he says; far from multiply-
ing or deepening our experiences, strengthening the borders between the
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objects and the objectives in our lives, to speak You is to pass through the
arena where borders matter into an arena of immediate presence, a realm
where "eye contact," which occurs in the vocabulary of borders between
beings, becomes communion of beings. There are no "significant others"
in this realm; the popular phrase is a contradiction in terms. As long as an
"other" is significant, it is not truly an other, but merely the locus of a
category-system, an already designed set of qualities and attributes, and
not a possibility for designing being. A "significant other," in the sense of
one who answers to some set of preconditions, cannot really be there for
us, for we are present instead to that conceptual screen. Such an other
wears plenty of deodorant. As do most of our students. As do we, most of
the time. I mean, of course, metaphysical deodorant. Our metaphysics of
objectivity, of content and form, data and interpretation, fact and value; all
this masks the odor of You, the scent of encounter.
In that redolent moment when we distinguish another as other, as You,
we have nothing. For Buber, though, "having nothing" is a felicitous
condition. For as it is the fecundity of I-You relatedness, it is the possibility
for designing being, for inventing rain-running happiness. Here we are as
far from Locke as we get. For the empiricist, things are what they are "by
the necessity of their own nature." Their names represent their fixed
natures, discovered by experiment. By contrast, the You Buber means, the
essence of the basic word I-You, is a naming like Adam's. In his originat-
ing saying, Adam declared "I name You," and thus became himself:
"becoming I, I say You," echoes Buber. The fecundity of I-You relatedness,
the possibility for designing being, arises together with such a naming, a
naming that does not record discoveries, but makes them possible. Here
again is that recurring echo of the originarity of naming.
As I try to listen my way into this realm of encounter where naming
grows, as Buber reveals it little by little, I am met with a difficulty that
seems insuperable. For Buber himself says that you cannot define or
elucidate or detail the realm of the You, the realm of sharing, or of shared
being; "It cannot be surveyed: if you try to make it surveyable, you lose
it."13 Consequently, "you cannot come to an understanding about it with
others."14 To survey the realm of sharing, of shared being, you would
have to draw in lines and boundaries, establishing just those borders by
which the It-world persists in its intelligibility. If the You-world were to
become intelligible in the usual way, Buber seems to say, it would sud-
denly become the It-world. How can I deal with it as an item in an
exposition then? More pointedly, how can I purport to recommend that
teachers devote themselves to this immitigably inscrutable non-phenom-
enon?
That, it would seem, is a killer question. Doesn't it just stop the show?
"How can I get out of this trap?" I ask myself. "My own key witness just
LANGUAGING AS SHARING 133
said something that casts doubt on my whole case!" Let us replace the
question by asking where it comes from: where does the question get its
impetus, its force? Where are we standing, you and I, when we ask it? You
are the reader and I am the writer, but what does that presume; what is
projected out ahead of us as the model for our interaction? What do we
expect from each other? Well, what is the vocabulary of our conversation?
The notion of a "case" to be made involves the vocabulary of evidence
and its valid use, of logical consistency, of persuasion: of meritorious
argument. And we are indeed (whether we like it or not) playing the
game in that arena, for those stakes. We are pulled into that arena, are we
not? But it is exactly the point to notice the arena, to be able to give some
body to the context in which forces operate. This is what Buber is doing in
7 and Thou: he is distinguishing two arenas for us so we can see the one
against the other. It looks as if he is describing the It-world and the You-
world, experience and encounter, but he is not. He is naming them,
inventing them. For the sake of that rain-running happiness, for the promise
it offers, I want to stay with him a bit longer. What else can we glean about
naming?
Having now begun to distinguish the realm of I-You from the realm
of I-It, Buber elaborates on ways the two realms appear, fading or erupting,
supplanting each other like the faces and vase, or the rabbit and duck:
Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing
or at least to enter into thinghood again and again. In the
language of objects: everything in the world can—either before
or after it becomes a thing—appear to some I as its You. But the
language of objects catches only one corner of actual life.
The It is the chrysalis, the You the butterfly. Only it is not always
as if these states took turns so neatly; often it is an intricately
entangled series of events that is tortuously dual.15
We must be careful not to hear in these sentences a relapse into the
ordinary opposition between the "language of objects" and the "language
of feeling," say, or the "language of words." For that would plunge us
right back into the quagmire of referentiality (words versus objects) or
expression (facts versus feelings).
But Buber does envision an alternation between states of being that,
though intricately entangled, are radically distinct: between "bodily con-
frontation" on the one hand, and dwelling in the structured array of pre-
formulated ideas, using the taxonomy of objects and objectives, on the
other.
The I of the basic word I-It, the I that is not bodily confronted by
a You but surrounded by a multitude of "contents," has only a
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past and no present. In other words: insofar as a human being
makes do with the things that he experiences and uses, he lives
in the past, and his moment has no presence. He has nothing but
objects, but objects consist in having been.16
Buber here fairly designates our occupational hazard. Here is that backhoe,
scooping up the soil of the past. Surrounding ourselves with a multitude
of contents, the contents of the curricula mandated, the core knowledge
we devote ourselves to dispensing, we teachers may often be led to make
do with things that we experience and use, with sentences whose kinds
we already know. (We might ask Wittgenstein "Why are there countless
kinds of sentences?" Buber's answer might be: because there are countless
unrepeatable encounters.) And then, without a present, we can have no
presence in the classroom among our students. Thus we may often lose
even the tortuously dual series of events that fuse knowledge into en-
counter. We may find the chrysalis empty. Even if we are not tied to a
textbook's structure of information, or to a curriculum guide, we may find
ourselves in the It predicament. For we are led into It by the vocabulary,
the conversation of our culture. Fine for us if in the intricately tangled
series of events that makes up a classroom day, there shine out sometimes
moments of this confrontation, this being with another being.
But the It-humanity that some imagine, postulate and advertise
has nothing in common with the bodily humanity to which a
human being can truly say You... The ideas are just as little
enthroned above our heads as they reside inside them; they walk
among us and step up to us... Every word must falsify; but look,
these beings live around you, and no matter which one you
approach you always reach Being.17
And here is the delight of our profession, the source of our calling. Every
word, Buber must mean, in the absence of the "basic word I-You," cements
the objectivizing, structurizing way of dealing with phenomena. It is not
that the basic word of relation must replace the words used to refer to things
in the object world, as if it were one of them. It is rather that the It-words
can only live truly among us—that means, we can only be students—
when they, It-words and It-world, have become the occasions of our
relating to one another.
After one has stood in relation, one can no longer live with, or
"deal with" the things and beings of the world in the same
objectifying way... Our natural tendency is to transform relation
into an experience that can be located, staked down, in space and
time, since it is by such an approach that our knowledge about
the world is secured. But the kind of continuity appropriate to
relation is of another sort. From the point of view of one who has
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stood in relation, the world of It, the structure of need and its
response, has a new, non-threatening status. Such a person finds
himself entering again and again into the world of It with a kind
of expectancy, a kind of reverence which he did not have before
all the things and beings because one or another of them has been
the vehicle or occasion, the minister or partner of relation. The It-
world is preserved in its own necessary distance and integrity,
but that world has been transformed, has been penetrated by
relation.18
As a description of the attitude toward the world we might hope our
teaching would engender in our students, this is not bad. It suggests that
the fact of relation is the soil where Being grows. Teaching that does not
welcome and nurture encounter is organic in no ecology. And to encoun-
ter others, in the way peculiar to human beings, is to share naming with
them—sharing naming being a tautology, of course. Until I can share
naming of world with my student, then—until we can share in having
nothing—we will not have world to live in together, only the separated
worlds given from the past.
If relation, sharing, I-You, transforms our world in this way, could we
provide for this kind of standing-in-relation, this pregnancy, this expect-
ancy, in a classroom between teachers and students? How does a teacher
speak the basic word of relation so that students are included in what we
have called the space of inventing? Is it the same kind of speaking as
when he or she delivers information?
For Buber, who devoted considerable attention to the problems of
pedagogy,19 real education happens in the space of the particular kind of
sharing we have been pointing to. Already this contrasts with the space of
concern about curriculum per se. For the question at the base of our concern
with curriculum is too often said to be: what facts and skills should an
adult know and have? Then the further question is implied: in what order
should a child learn these? Here we are caught up in considering the
"structure of need and its response." What do adults need to know, and
how do we need to teach these things? And to answer these questions, we
are impelled to look at ways of building sequences of concepts in the
subject matter of a discipline, even if we have one eye on stages of "cognitive
readiness" or psychological development. If what a teacher does is select
materials and activities—curriculum—that will make a difference for his
students, transforming their ideas, interests, and abilities, then how is that
achieved? How does it happen that the curriculum, however selected and
ordered, promotes our entering again and again into the world of It, the
world of experience and knowledge, with reverence and expectancy?
What is there besides need and its satisfaction?
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Here, I think, is the way Buber might answer, commenting on that
moment of rain-running happiness I shared with Dustin:
Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of
the solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which
came into being with him, secretly and bashfully he watches for
a Yes which allows him to be and which can come to him only
from one human person to another.20
My dripping, exultant child did not know what had come over him. I
think it was that his exuberant animality had surfaced briefly, unexpect-
edly—an exuberance that, to one whose language is becoming human,
looks like chaos. He had had in that moment of running a glimpse, as
though back over his shoulder, of the natural domain; and from the
perspective of the solitary category of /, me that develops as our human
language refines its categorization, he could only be amazed at his exuber-
ance. Sheepish, bashful, he could only watch for an answering Yes from
another human person. When I am available to be that person, it is the
best luck I ever have. For it satisfies more deeply than any It can reach.
What is the relevance for teaching and learning of this moment of
mutual confirmation? Is there a way of planning for such moments, de-
signing them into the fabric of classroom events? Here is Buber comment-
ing in a less lyrical mode on classroom practice:
...the teacher must relate himself to his students... as one being to
other beings; as a mature being to maturing ones... his guidance
should emanate not from above to below, from his lectern to
their desks, but from a genuine interrelatedness and exchange of
experience—the experiences of a full life and those of lives still
unfulfilled but no less significant. What is required is not merely
a search for information from below and a handing down of
information from above, nor a mere interchange of questions
and answers, but a genuine dialogue into which the teacher must
enter directly and unselfconsciously, though he must also guide
and control it. This dialogue ought to be continued until in fact
it culminates in a wordless being-with-one-another.21
We note that Buber does not eschew the vocabulary of experience when
he is envisioning an encounter between a teacher and students. So much
for absolute categories. But we do have a hint of his distinction between
arenas in the difference between "dialogue" and something in which
dialogue "culminates." And of course, in my unplanned encounter with
Dustin in the rain, it was not a matter of beginning a dialogue and then
continuing toward a "wordless being-with-one-another"; but of the scent
of being-together springing out into presence, suddenly freshening. It was
a momentary gift, to which I could only be open. The question for the rest
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of the chapter is, what is this openness? How are we to open ourselves
appropriately to the experience of a "wordless being-with-one-another"
in the setting of a school? Must it remain a matter of luck?
Here is one last passage from Buber, the most explicit specification of
"dialogue" or "encounter" that he provides:
The chief presupposition for the rise of genuine dialogue is that
each should regard his partner as the very one he is. I become
aware of him, aware that he is different, essentially different
from myself, in the definite, unique way which is peculiar to him,
and I accept whom I thus see, so that in full earnestness I can
direct what I say to him as the person he is...
But what does it mean to be "aware" of a man in the exact sense
in which I use the word? To be aware of a thing or a being means,
in quite general terms, to experience it as a whole and yet at the
same time without reduction or abstraction, in all its concrete-
ness. But a man, although he exists as a living being among living
beings and even as a thing among things, is nevertheless
something categorically different from all things and all beings.
A man cannot really be grasped except on the basis of the gift of
the spirit which belongs to man alone among all things, the spirit
as sharing decisively in the personal life of the living man, that
is, the spirit which determines the person. To be aware of a man,
therefore, means in particular to perceive his wholeness as a
person determined by the spirit; it means to perceive the dynamic
center which stamps his every utterance, action, and attitude
with the recognizable sign of uniqueness. Such an awareness is
impossible, however, if and so long as the other is the separated
object of my contemplation or even observation, for this
wholeness and its center do not let themselves be known to
contemplation or observation. It is only possible when I step into
an elemental relation with the other, that is, when he becomes
present to me. Hence I designate awareness in this special sense
as "personal making present."22
Here Buber's picture of the nature of "genuine dialogue" does not include
parameters such as rational argument, mutual understanding, consensual
agreement, or the empowerment of problem solving, however the latter
may be defined.23 The simplest tasks of cognition fall away into the back-
ground, out of focus. Here there are no taxonomies of educational objec-
tives, no stages of cognitive development. The picture simply elides the
question of motivation, as if that phenomenon occurs neither because of a
choice by one partner nor out of the procedure that a group may adopt,
but by virtue of a kind of awareness that is not perceptual, or at least not
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perceptual in the sensory meaning. Though Buber (here as elsewhere)
does envision the efficacy of a personal commitment to genuine encounter,
he gives us no techniques, no recipes for "having nothing," beyond a
description of its "presupposition."24
Dialogue here seems to depend on something called "stepping into an
elemental relation" with another, attuning our awareness to the person as
uniquely "determined by the spirit." It may be useful to notice that we are
uncomfortable (if we are) with this formulation: how do we use it, where
does it direct us? If, as Buber seems to counsel, we are to step away from
the comforts of our already formulated structures, how is such a stepping
up to another (or others) and stepping into relation accomplished, or
made possible or likely? Does it require an endorsement of some kind of
spiritual practice? I think Buber would say no: what it requires is a conscious
step away from the position of contemplation or observation that takes
the other, the student, for its "separated object," and thus away from the
paradigm that governs our perceptions most of the time.2^ This is not a
matter of enhancing attitudes of acceptance of tolerance or even openness
to others. For attitudes are my attitudes, attributes of an individual. But
the shift from cognition to being is a breakthrough. It is a matter of being
with and for another person, addressing myself to "the very one he is."
"Becoming I, I say You." This step into an "elemental relation," with students
and teacher if not with parent and child, needs to be prepared for; it is an
opportunity we watch for, even if it cannot by its very nature be designed
into the curriculum. Since observation and procedure are such a large part
of the algorithm of teaching, we need to make room somehow for these
prescriptionless moments. It is not that the position of objective observation
is wrong or useless, but that it is insufficient, incomplete. We could work
on bringing it about that we have opportunities to turn to each other in
"speech in its ontological sense," making available in our speaking an
openness to Being. For another feature of encounter, of the step into
elemental relation, is that it arises along with the fact of approach between
persons, with speaking together, with the phenomenon of "address."
In the classroom as in everyday being, there is the process of informa-
tion transmission, of describing and cataloguing, of exposition and illus-
tration, and there may be also the moments of address, recurring like light-
ning flashes, like the mana of primitive myths,26 without which no exposi-
tion can proceed powerfully for long: these are the moments in which
teacher and student or students turn to face each other in recognition,
standing in nothing, no system of rules or of roles, but acknowledging
their relatedness; the moments when eye contact becomes communion. In
such a room we are not speaking about relatedness; instead we are speak-
ing it with our being. We are coming from a conversation of relatedness,
not going toward one. To come from a conversation of relatedness is to
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generate relatedness. Our languaging in such a space occurs as sharing, as
communion, as service. In such a space there is no need; only wonder,
only grace. Imagine that space among all the others which flicker into and
out of your classroom.
We have now re-invented languaging as sharing. Far from merely
using a language, when we are languaging we are Adam, sharing (we
might say) God's power to share her being with the human family; poets
who make experience as well as subjects who undergo it; designers rather
than only recipients of our life together. We are all, teachers and students
together, parents: bringers forth.
See how far we are now from Descartes, or rather from where
Descartes' Method for Rightly Conducting the Reason led. For Descartes
began with the sole subject, the irreducible "I" sitting by the fire, looking
out from its study and confronting what became the world. Heidegger has
let us notice how inexorable this starting point has become—"What is
more indubitable," he asks archly, "than the givenness of the T?"—and
points to the consequences that attend on starting at this point. For start-
ing with this givenness leads us to "disregard everything else that is
'given'—not only a 'world' that is, but even the being of other Ts."'27
Once we separate subject from object, Heidegger means to say—once we
interpret the cogito as the activity of a solitary consciousness reflecting on
its environment—we have boarded a boat destined to sail in a single
ocean. For then we are imprisoned—in epistemology; in knowledge—
immured, as Keats lamented, in our "sole self." Each of us, in this para-
digm, looks like a single plank. We can build things out of the boards, like
houses, ships, towns, and cities; and each plank and each construction
retains its identity within the larger construction—its "values," its rights,
its individual duties, its political position, its place in a platform, its na-
tional destiny, its holy mission-
In these complementary, mutually reinforcing paradigms of struc-
tured knowledge and individual identity, my parenting of Dustin is an
affair of positionality, of reinforcement, of nailing in place a structure. It is
a struggle of agendas, a manipulation, a battle between right and wrong,
correct and incorrect, proper and improper behavior. I expect to keep
fighting that battle where it is necessary, and (if past is prologue) even
where I am pulled into it when it is not necessary. And there is a way of
being in the battle that engages our freedom and our responsibility for
each other, that derives from and nourishes our mutuality. In the new
paradigm instantiated in the philosophies of Heidegger and of Buber,
individuals are not primordial. Languaging is. Speakinglistening is. In-
venting is. Buber calls it "the common life of the word," and he means to
emphasize two notions—"common life" and "word"—equally.28
Languaging is the house of our common living, of our membership. In
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this paradigm, parenting, as it comes out of encounter, is risky, lucky, an
affair of transformation, generating context rather than generated content.
Here, communion precedes and supercedes communication.
All right, then—what contributes to our openness to communion?
Will we no longer have to plan our lessons in this brave new world of
relatedness? Or do we just depend on our good luck? How can we be
responsible professionals if we depend on luck? Well, what is behind the
opposition between planning and control (work) and luck—and, we may
notice, the implied denigration of "mere luck"? Is not luck different from
skill, maybe even opposed to skill, maybe even a little shady, like gam-
bling? Notice how the conversation has shifted now: we were talking
about the virtue (which means strength) of communion, its power in
parenting; and our listening has wrenched the topic around to the vacuity
(emptiness or inanity) of mere luck. We were talking about the possibility
of power, and we ended up talking about our need for control. We were
talking about the presence to be found in personal encounter, and we slid
into talk of gambling.
Yes, my parenting, of Dustin and with my students, insofar as it
partakes of communion, is a matter of luck. But it is not "just" luck. It is a
matter of availability for communion—and I am not available for com-
munion unless "I" am at risk. It is not that communion entails danger—it is
that going forth to the adventure of communion is in fact a risking of what
I think I know and who I have considered myself to be. It entails a
willingness to commit oneself to something beyond the preservation or
enhancement of an image of oneself.29 When you commit yourself to white
water in a canoe, you have a life jacket on to safeguard your ongoing
identity, to preserve your personal continuity. But why risk a capsizing, a
dunking, if there were not something greater than preservation to be won,
something beyond the horizon of past accomplishments? Either I speak
the basic word I-It, thereby cementing "my" identity as a thinking thing
among extended things, a past with no present; or I speak I-You. What is
it, we are asking, to speak I-You? How is this "speaking" different from
the using of objects and objectives that we will be doing at the same time,
most of the time? For speaking I-You is not a technique. There are three
sides to an answer—or perhaps three related inquiries.
For there to be communion there has first to be the possibility of com-
munion, of an I-Thou knowing—the possibility of ontology as distinct
from the epistemology of I-It. Buber calls this distinct realm the "ontology
of the interhuman."30 It will help, then, to dwell at some length in the
conversation in which the two realms are distinguished. That is the purpose
of Buber's entire work, and it is the purpose of this book to let us begin
listening in on that conversation, partaking of it, participating in its possi-
bility. As we begin to gather in more and more of the vocabulary of being
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together—which is the vocabulary of adventure—we may find ourselves
open to moments of sharing with students that quicken the bloodstream
of our profession.
Since we are Adam, now, we—teachers and students together—can
be responsible for the speakinglistening that occurs. In the beginning can
be our word. We can be responsible, together, for the Saying of the class-
room. Lessons seldom speak to students on their own. They occur for us
in the conversation that gives our world. The question is, what conversation
are we dwelling in? What kind of conversation is it? If it is a conversation
about structures of meaning, about the (correct or correctible) representa-
tion of knowledge, is it also a conversation in which naming is expected and
honored? Is it a conversation that calls for, pulls for, that turning to each
other in which our freedom and our responsibility dwell? Does the class-
room allow for that "personal making present" that is at the heart of
responsible confrontation? Can we greet one another in our classes?
First, then: to open the possibility of speaking and listening "I-You,"
we may remind ourselves of these questions. Keeping them before us
may help open us for communion, even in the midst of communication.
Just voicing these questions may open us for the possibility that arises in
the face-to-face encounter.
Next, look for examples of knowledge conversations—speaking and
listening in which the vocabulary is tuned to the epistemology channel.
You will find them everywhere, particularly in discourse about schooling,
but also in the discourse which makes up the schooling we purvey. Here is
one taken from the commentary printed on a road map of part of the
Pisgah National Forest in North Carolina (the scriptural place name is
entirely coincidental):
Where does the name Pisgah come from?
Mount Pisgah was the biblical name for the mountain from
which Moses saw the promised land after 40 years of wandering
in the wilderness.
Local legend attributes the naming of Mt. Pisgah to Reverend
James Hall, a gun-toting, whiskey-drinking Presbyterian minister,
who acompanied General Griffith Rutherford's 1776 expedition
against the Cherokee into western North Carolina. Impressed by
thebountiful French Broad River basin, visible from the mountain,
he drew upon his knowledge of the Bible to name the peak Mt.
Pisgah.
In this conversation—for the map is speaking as we listen—we hear that
the source of a name is knowledge of the past. The modern peak is named
in analogy with, or in imitation of, a peak with similar characteristics that
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we learned about by studying the Bible. If there were to be a test on this
text, the question would be "Where does the name Pisgah come from?"
And the correct answer would be: it comes from the Bible. To a student
who remembered the analogy triggered by the sight of the French Broad,
we might give extra credit. But how could we bring into our classes the
actual experience James Hall, the Adam of that moment, might have had
when he first saw the great river valley spread before him in the distance,
shimmering in the morning? For the Bible did not name the peak, he did.
Where did he get the name? From being with his fellow soldiers in the
wilderness, legend says. He spoke the name into their listening.
Could we get sharing in the wilderness into our classrooms along with
the knowledge conversations? What if we could take our students out
into the city to name the buildings, the streets for themselves? What if we
could, in the "confines" of our regular classrooms, build with students the
edifice of knowledge as a house of shared names? In the arena of invent-
ing, coming in to the wilderness together, we are present not to our
separate agendas, our scripts, but to each other. As teachers, in the arena
of listening for inventing, what practices or activities would occur as
embodiments of sharing, would enable, among us, presence to each other?
In a lecture, to a hundred or a thousand students, can a teacher listen to and
for the students? Can she hear them listening to the lecture? If we ask
ourselves how our standard practices bring forth the possibility of listening,
we may open a space in our classrooms that enables participation. Refer
back now to the previous chapter (page 121), where you listed the activities
of your class that made sense with the subject/object paradigm of knowl-
edge in the background. Now make up, invent new activities (or re-invent
the old ones) from the alternate paradigm of a sharing that is poetry. (If
you have trouble doing this, read the next chapter first.)
Second, then: looking for, listening for opportunities to educe that
kind of sharing from our daily activities may also help open us for com-
munion. Of course it may have to be a wilderness of words, not woods.
And we will need to inquire into this: what is wilderness? Perhaps the
wilderness students encounter in school is a tabula rasa; but it is one in which
our naming allows for our dwelling. The confrontation Buber means is
not between subjects and objects, and not between subjects and other
subjects, either. Buber's confrontation is "the essence of man"; "contained
in the unity of man with man": it is Dasein that is Mitsein, languaging that
is sharing of this particular undetermined and indeterminate but not
random character.
A conversation that partakes of naming is poetry, not because things
need names, or because anyone can call anything whatever he wants to
call it, but because naming is sharing. At those shining moments of break-
through when we feel that whatever we paint into the canvas of the class
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hour will fulfill the purposes of the lesson, to the curriculum, of schooling,
of our students—then we are poets, existing in our speakinglistening of
each other, sharing as mages of origination, making, naming. This way of
being together is the antithesis of manipulation.
At the beginning of the road, the signs pointed to a simple equation:
Teacher = Inventor, which we quickly re-read as Teacher = Co-inventor.
As we have been re-inventing this wheel of Saying along with Heidegger
and Buber, we now get simultaneous equations, or rather a circle of
values related like spokes:
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Teaching belongs in this wheel by virtue of its affinity with naming, with
poetry, with sharing. Teaching is Saying: listening that speaks our Being
as namers, poets, dwellers in the co-poetic word. The spokes of the wheel
of Saying are not related to each other causally. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,
they are phenomena among which there is "solidarity."31 They are values
in a system, terms in a vocabulary. With this wheel of Saying we have
begun to construct a system of terms, a conversation to embody the prag-
matic ontology of encounter that Buber has been urging. When we had
naming as labelling, we were breathing the vocabulary of representation:
of portrayal, communication, adequacy; of knowledge and skill; of educare.
With naming as sharing, as co-poiesis, as the scent of encounter, we breathe
a rarer atmosphere. True, what we call oxygen is necessary to sustain our
physical life. But must we rely on representation as our founding and
final vocabulary? Can we let the vocabulary of being together and invent-
ing say its Saying to us? Let us return to the dictionary: can we blend the
two vocabularies, can we let them support one another?
As we noted earlier, Heidegger proposes that "Say" means "to show,
to let appear, to let be seen and heard."32 Saying allows for a phenomenon.
Saying provides the space for Being, and it is a space that opens in an en-
counter with another, a con-frontation. When I bend to listen to Dustin's tale
of magic, to take his tale as if it were magic, then we are confronted, not by
but in each other. In confrontation, we be with each other in a world. What
is confrontation? What is it to speak I-You? What is this openness? The
bending down to Dustin's eye-level is not, it seems to me now, a mere
adjunct to being open. While my automati'tity directs me to stand up
straight, to speak to them in generalizations and assertions preformulated
and warranted by my adult experience, the getting out among students,
where they sit in the classroom, and actually bending to them, embodies
for me now some of the praxis, the vocabulary, of openness. More of the
practical vocabulary follows in the next chapter.
But to return to the other embodiment, to the etymological playing—
my German-speaking consultant does not find the sense of "letting ap-
pear for another" under sagen or dichten. Heidegger may be inventing a
sense of Saying that suits his own intentions. To see if it suits ours, let us
investigate this fabrication: can we listen to it? Can we let it confront us?
The imputed sense of poetic co-origination does appear in the Old
Norse saga—legend, fable, myth—also adjoined in Heidegger's "etymol-
ogy" of Saying. And in the myriad English uses the sense of letting or
causing a state of affairs to appear, out of nowhere or out of an indistinct
miasma, mingles with the sense of describing or reporting on an extant
structure of fact.
1829 Gibbon says that the French monarchy was created by the
bishops of France.
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Gibbon's saying, it seems presumed, goes far toward establishing the
bishops' constitutive role. However, we still have less an etymology than
a partial compendium of usage, partial in the sense of incomplete and
partial in the sense of favoring a particular view. Just as you can quote
from Scripture to support nearly anything, so the message from etymol-
ogy seems to depend on who you are.
That is to say, there may be an opportunity for poetry here, for gener-
ating something together. The word arises along with the possibility of
confrontation. In the present foray into the dictionary we have been trying
to find evidence for Heidegger's "definition" of Saying. If we listen now
"through" the wheel of Saying—one of whose spokes is teaching—there
arises a new possibility. And following its hint, we find that the closest
thing to a match for Heidegger's notion of Saying as co- creation occurs
precisely in an old English source for our word "teach":
team: to offer to view, present; to show an object to a person so
that the object may be attained by the person, to show a way, a
place, etc.; to show a person the direction that must be taken, to
direct, to cause a certain direction to be taken; to show the course
that must be followed...33
Even more strongly here, the person of the other is included with us,
present for us, along with and as a condition of the attainment of an end.
We may hear in the old definition an echo of Buber's distinction: to offer,
to present, to show, to direct—all these require and embody confrontation.
So the once primary sense of our word for teaching resonates with what
Heidegger and Buber have been saying about speaking, listening, and
dwelling together:
To speak to one another means: to say something, show some-
thing to one another, and to entrust one another mutually to
what is shown. To speak with one another means: to tell of
something jointly, to show to one another what that which is
claimed in the speaking says in the speaking, and what it, of
itself, brings to light.34
The family resemblance between the Old English word for "teach" and
the ontological sense of "to speak" is unmistakable. Is it not? What do you
think?
Third, then: what if we committed ourselves to this vocabulary of
teaching, this association among the values of the wheel of Saying? What
is the "essence of man"? Is it a structured essence, or is it possibility? Namers,
poets, dwellers in the word, we mortals get to share, for our listening with
language, ourlistening, is sharing. Opening a life and feeling it touch our
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present world, we enter into the area of our dwelling together. Being
together is the possibility of inventing. And the way of our being together—
the way of ourbeing—is listening. Following even further the wheel's
hint, its beckoning toward an area of dwelling together for teachers and
students, we find that the correlative of teaching—of tcecan—is not learning.
It is listening, listening of a particular character:
hlosnian: to listen, be silent in expectation of hearing, listen for
the coming of a person, watch, await, be on the lookout
hlystan: To list, listen to, hearken
H€ sceal bdellium hlystan swyde georne ("he must pay diligent
attention to the teaching of books")
Man Ieire6wum hlyste ("let teachers be listened to")
What I am Saying is not a function of my words only—it is a function of
my listening-for and of my being-toward. Erect or slouching, marching or
sauntering, Saying dwells in posture and carriage as in the remark, in the
lecture. Saying is a function of the body, of bodies as vehicles of spirit, or
maybe as homes for spirit. What is the conversation in which my/our
world occurs? Speakinglistening Showingsaying. How do I know what I
have said? I be silent in expectation of hearing, I pay diligent attention to
the encountering answer, the listening Saying, the Being- toward-others-
and-myself of my fellows. I take us for poets.
One morning, distressed at lost sleep or something else, I asked my
wife: "Is Dustin always like this in the mornings?" As if defending his
right to be a little boy, she shot back "Yep—there's nothing wrong with
the way he's being!" Had I said there was anything wrong with him? Had
my peevish tone implied a denigration of his behavior? Clearly there was
more going on in our interchange than encoding and decoding, than
exchange of information. My question lived partly in her listening and
partly in my speaking: it lived in our Speakinglistening. But what Heidegger
and Buber are saying is not that there is also a psychological side, a matter
of shadings and nuances, as well as the more overt character of the
exchange of words. It would be easy to observe in this interchange that
my wife was listening with a lot of unexpressed feelings in the back-
ground. Perhaps she heard my question as revealing my blindness to the
fact that I had not been around enough in the morning, helping her out;
and the response it drew from her was like a cry of frustration. (This
analysis is eminently plausible.) But our philosophers' writings do more.
They add another dimension to the consideration of Speakinglistening;
not a psychological dimension, freighted with its morass of individual
cathexes, traumas, memories; but an echo and reminder of that naming
which Adam, the progenitor of humanity, brought forth in the simplest
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morning of his being in the world, that voice that filled Eden (and, per-
haps later, emptied it). What is interesting in our exchange is that a world
arises as we speaklisten each other. How do I know what I have said? I
pay attention to world arising in my colloquy with others. As with others
I speak and listen for a world, not merely to the world, we assume the re-
sponsibility of Adam.35 Whether or not we are participants in the religious
consciousness in which Buber's thinking is rooted—religion, by the way,
is from re + ligare, to tie back together, like a ligament—I hope more of us
will take up the spirit of this challenge to our vocabulary of knowledge
and procedural orientation. For unless we can make possible in the class-
room, from time to time and at crucial moments, the "personal making
present" that can occur within a group as in a dyad—unless we have
some commitment to encountering the spirit of persons—we may lose
even the knack of transmitting knowledge, and with it the possibility of
re-inventing our culture together.
We are shifting our central metaphor from picture to listening. The
picture metaphor gives us something to look for—if we are changing pic-
tures, we look for another one—but the listening metaphor gives listening
for or through. Since we can more easily think of listening as an activity, a
power, this puts the attention on the listener, not on something structured
outside him, and it suggests a different technique for being, an artifice
more powerful than hammering.36 "Technique" and "artifice," though, may
evoke the wrong listening: being—especially "being on the lookout"—is
not a matter solely of technique, nor is power acquired through artifice. It
is not a matter of foresight and prediction and control, but a matter of
openness, of communion, of encounter—an epiphany of rain-running
happiness. This point is still a mystery for me, of course: I have had
occasion to ask my child more than once if he forgives me, and though
forgiveness has come into presence on each of those occasions, he cannot
define the word. Can I define it? I know the procedure for looking the
word up, but the definition is not what is present in our encounter. The
definition is like a picture, an explanation of what happened, after the fact.
It is a memory of forgiveness. In educational practice, too, the landscape
of memory could be transformed into a listening for inspiration. This will
require artifice of a different kind. Artifice? Rather, a heuristic for being
together. One that works down in the city streets.
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Language as saying is an ethical openness to the other; as that
which is said—reduced to a fixed identity or synchronized pres-
ence—it is an ontological closure to the other.
—Emmanuel Levinas1
...as teachers learning along with those we try to provoke to
learn, we may be able to inspire hitherto unheard voices... Such
a project demands the capacity to unveil and disclose. It demands
the exercise of imagination, enlivened by works of art, by situ-
ations of speaking and making... We need to teach in such a way
as to arouse passion now and then; we need a new camaraderie,
a new en masse. These are dark and shadowed times, and we
need to live them, standing before one another, open to the
world.
—Maxine Greene2
Because it is address, attending always on the response of the
addressed, infinite speech has the form of listening. Infinite
speech does not end in the obedient silence of the hearer, but
continues by way of the attentive silence of the speaker. It is not




n this final chapter we will begin to construct, in the vocabulary of
Saying, a set of techniques for conducting schoolwork (leading it together)
I
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as being together and inventing. We will be exploring the "saying" and
the "said," asking what is the practical difference between "ethical open-
ness" and "ontological closure." To what extent do we teachers, as bring-
ers forth, practice "infinite speech"? What is there in our silence, our
listening, that calls forth the speech of our students, and how and what
does it call forth? If, as Heidegger says, speaking and listening are the
same, how does my speakinglistening provide the clearing in which is
born Dustin's speech, imitating, mocking, or inventing? How does his
provide for mine? How are the character, mood, and feel of the space
between us, or the space in a classroom, given? What is there about a
"situation of speaking and making" that can bring us into one another's
presence, open to the world?
Now that we have, by re-inventing the wheel of Saying, shifted our
listening away from one that seeks and expects structured knowledge
toward one that invites the being-together of inventing, we may move on
to consider some possibilities of operating in the new environment—
which, you will note when you wake up tomorrow, is the same old
environment. How can a car built thirty years ago be a new car? How can
an education system built on a model at least a hundred years old give
birth to an ever original mode of speaking and listening in which school-
ing is the opportunity for inquiry and shared creation? Having spent all
this time driving a wedge into the log of algorithmic teaching, the proce-
dural model of instruction, and moving toward what I hesitate to call a
model at all, for fear that it will induce imitation (that is, more algorithmic
teaching) instead of invention—I am now in a position to rejoin the two.
The aim is to make room in the heart of instruction for inventing. In our
best moments together in a classroom, we said, because of the being
together that has arisen among us, students discover meaning and purpose
in material new to them: then cognition and invention are inseparable.
What we need, as teachers and as students, is to find ourselves in that
environment which is not a surrounding, like a decorated room, but like
an atmosphere, a breathing-space. Then, even if the procedures we trans-
act remain as procedures, they are now shot through, interpenetrated
with relation, with greeting: cognition immersed in being.
So the questions begin to pile up. In Part One: What is articulation?
How does it work? Are we articulate because we know, or do we know
because we dwell in an articulation? And now: how does the articulation
we dwell in mesh with the possibilities we have available for being and
for being related? What is a more powerful artifice for being? What would
a heuristic for being together look like? To propose an answer, one more
idea.
Just as I remember the moment in my graduate school class when my
teacher presented for us Saussure's idea of the arbitrariness of the sign, I
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recall another idea from that course, the concept of hermeneutic circle.
Hermeneutic means "of interpretation7'—Hermes being the Olympian god
who brings messages from the beyond to mortals. When you get the
meaning of something, when the light bulb over your head lights up and
you say "Aha, so that's it!", you have been visited by Hermes. The
hermeneutic circle is a description of a logical peculiarity that characterizes
this moment of illumination, the arrival of the message, the act of under-
standing anything. We should now re-invent the idea of the hermeneutic
circle, as it bears not only on cognition or understanding, but also on the
provision of mat breathing-space of being related.
So first the logical peculiarity. When you understand something, what
happens? You get the point, the idea becomes clear, the message arrives:
but what is going on when that happens? Here, I hope, is a familiar
example. You are in the car on the highway, driving straight and fast, and
as you crest a tiny rise there appears below you, in the middle of the road,
a pond of water, a lake shimmering in the sun. As your foot touches the
brake pedal, you realize in a flash: but it hasn't been raining... maybe
there's a flooded creek in the next bottom... oh, I know, it's a mirage! As if
three successive realizations had crystallized into one instant, jerking your
foot off the accelerator and in almost the same moment keeping it from
pressing the brake. In the "first," your sense impression is of a suddenly
appearing lake. (Notice that this is Lockean vocabulary: knowledge coming
out of sequential sense impression, input. Descartes, at first, would speak
of your sudden "judgment" of the lake, making you responsible, at least
in part, for the perception.) In the first interpretation of the "data," what
flashes in your apprehension, maybe, is "water" or "lake."
But here is the question: did you get the data first, or the meaning
first? We cannot assign priority here: the "flash" is data and meaning
instantaneously together, and here is the logical peculiarity, the circular-
ity. There is not a one-way causal relationship between data and meaning—
first the data, men the interpretation. Rather, the so-called sense data arise
along with an interpretation. When "lake" springs to clarity, it organizes a
whole system of visual and tactile values, a cluster like X/Y/Z/A/B/Q/
R...: light reflects off smooth surface/color of surface contrasts with sur-
roundings/water seeks its own level/traction fails on wet roads/... That
is, a perception is a relationship between parts and a whole which they
comprise; but the parts are not mere first, so that they can combine one by
one into the whole; and neither is the whole available before the parts that
come with it. A perception is a part-whole relationship; it is an articula-
tion. Articulation is when jointed parts arise together, remember.4 The
system and its values arise together, making each other up. There cannot
be parts unless they are jointed into some relationship, even if the relation-
ship is one of disjunction, like a spilled jigsaw puzzle; no pieces without a
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picture of which to be pieces; nor, conversely, a whole without parts.
When jointed parts arise together in articulation, a hermeneutic circle has
arrived and departed, leaving behind a background, a relationship between
text and context.
Can we think of a room without walls? A sentence without words, a
word without letters? Words without a sentence, yes; but words without
a whole language in which sentences also occur? Hardly. Same for letters.
There is no such thing as one letter—at least as a letter rather than an in-
significant mark—any more than there is one word. What there is are
systems of letters, words; articulations in whose use meaning occurs;
language-games. What we mortals have at our disposal is the power of
distinction. Or perhaps we are that power. Perception is distinctioning, more
like Descartes'judging than like Locke's passive receiving of imprints.5
In this example, as I have partly remembered it from my own experi-
ence and partly made it up, the first hermeneutic circle includes "lake" or
"pond" or "water." This piece, this judgment, instantly fits together with
"road" and "fast" and "slippery," say, and with a million other percep-
tions and memories; all these together make up an interpretation, a rela-
tionship between parts and whole, "data" and meaning. "Whoa!" the
interpretation says. "We're going too fast to make it through a puddle!" In
the "next" instant, though it comes almost simultaneously with the first,
the jigsaw puzzle is spilled and disorganized: how could there be water if
it hasn't been raining? The lobes of those pieces—the fact of what appears
to be water and the fact of no rain—do not join. This is still a hermeneutic
circle, though; the message it brings is that further facts must be added to
the picture, and the pieces re-arranged, re-joined, so the picture will make
sense. But for now it appears as a disjointed picture. Perhaps this "sec-
ond" hermeneutic circle slows your foot as it starts on its sudden trip to
the brake pedal, as if a little bit of hypothesis-testing had occurred almost
along with the flash of the first hypothesis, the first meaning, the first
"impression." I hope by now the Lockean vocabulary of sense data that
arrive uninterpreted and are impressed onto the tabula rasa is beginning to
appear as, exactly, a vocabulary: one possible way of articulating things.
But it is a way that cuts off the "impressed data" from the interpretation
where they appear, without which they cannot appear.
Then the third "hypothesis" suggests itself—a flooded creek around
here? Again the pieces of the puzzle would coalesce, crystallize into a
clear picture; except that now the final hypothesis arrives, the one that
gets accepted as relating all the parts into a coherent whole. Of course, I
should have known—it's a mirage, like the ones I've seen plenty of times
before!
Two things ought to be noticed about this "sequence" of nearly si-
multaneous events. First, it is not solely a matter of arriving at a true
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interpretation, the correct cognition of the sense data. For your actions,
too, are elicited, almost without your control, pre-consciously. With a
quick reflex, your foot is pulled off the accelerator toward the brake.
Again, I am making this up as an illustration. Maybe your foot would be
more reasonable. But can you think of cases like it where the reflexive,
non-thinking or pre-thinking character of your actions is obvious? Suppose
I threw a chair in your direction when you weren't expecting it, or a book,
an actual, physical, heavy dictionary—say, a volume of the OED—com-
ing at you through the air. Would your hands fling themselves up to catch
or deflect it? What happens when I fling etymologies at you?
The second thing to notice is that you do arrive, in a split second
perhaps, at an interpretation that satisfies you. But why does the one that
gets accepted satisfy you? What is it about that one that marks it as
correct, so that you proceed with confidence in the scene it delivers? For is
it not with the first circle, just as with the final one, that the parts, the data,
are integrated by a whole, a meaning? Why does the scene given in one
part/whole composition contain, as it were, a seed of doubt that uncloses
the circle so that a new circle may form? Indeed, why does a spilled jigsaw
puzzle—since that too is a part/whole circle—usually not satisfy you?
(And are there times when the spilled puzzle is exactly what you want?)
What is the difference between a hermeneutic circle that works—a hy-
pothesis, a guess that promises to be fruitful—and one that doesn't? Is it
that one "fits the facts" better? If the data come into being only in the
presence of an interpretation, then outside that interpretation there are no
facts to fit!6
So where does this "fit" come from, this picture that combines thought
and perception and action? Do the three successive-simultaneous
hermeneutic circles progress from least to most representative of natural
facts? Rain puddle>flooded creekmirage: is this the window of
representation getting progressively clearer? Certainly, one of these hy-
potheses accords better with our previous experience and knowledge of
facts. Then where does our previous experience and knowledge come
from? Do we accept the notion nowadays that the Earth is round because
we have better evidence than the ancients? Do 7 have that evidence, per-
sonally? No. It is not even that I hear that the Earth is round, that I see the
rain puddle or the mirage: I have heard that it is round, maybe seen some
bit of the evidence and reasoning that supports the proposition. I have seen
the mirage, plenty of times before. As an interpretation from the past, it is
now one of those anchors that hold fast for me, its flukes dug into the sea
floor. As part of my language, now, it looks as if it had to exist. A mirage is
now a represented structure, and looks as if it had to exist! Even as I drive
along by myself, there is something off here. I am not talking with any-
body, but language is giving me a world, a system of fittings, each one
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held in place by those that surround it. There is some vicious circle at
work here, in this polyreflex of fittings.
A classroom, for all its presumptive emphasis on knowledge acquisi-
tion, is pre-eminently a social place. Unlike the automobile with a sole
driver, it envelops its occupants in company, and thus in colloquy. Inevi-
tably, the learning in a classroom occurs in a social field, is born out of a
social matrix. What does the magnetic field of being together in a shared
space have to do with hermeneutic circles—particularly with vicious ones?
When I taught introduction to literary interpretation in the eleventh
grade, part of my purpose was to give students practice in carefully
supporting their own ideas about what a literary work means, paying
close attention to the significant features of the text, examining its details
to see how and why they fit together. This kind of activity is new to most
students at this level; they are accustomed to clearly demarcated stan-
dards of right and wrong, handed down from previous teachers' superior
authority or from textbooks. It is important that much of their previous
scholastic experience has occurred in "content'7 courses—especially sci-
ences—where the teacher's superior position is associated with his broader
and deeper command of a body of knowledge. My course was not in-
tended to teach the content of pre-formed structures of knowledge, but
instead the skill of creating these structures, so if most students were to
understand the nature and purposes of many of the course activities, the
paradigm by which they would usually operate—their stereotype of the
teacher and of schooling in general—had to shift. They had somehow to
get into a different hermeneutic circle, where the parts—the class activities,
homework, tests, etc.—appeared as contributions to a different whole.
I could talk about the various aspects of a text scholars and critics
must consider in formulating an interpretation, but my talk would be
wasted unless the students knew how to take it, how to use it, what to do
with it. And this is never a matter of their knowing something. You can
always tell, can you not, when your lecture, or your attempt to start
discussion, or even the discussion you have started, is going right out the
window? In a diary I made for a class I taught once, I find: "[I was] not in
my class today. Sense of dislocation, disconnection, like I was a talking
statue, a curiosity to be observed, not a presence to be lived with." You
can sense when students are engaged with you in what you are saying,
just as Dustin can always tell when I am listening to him and when I am
not. When I am open for business, ready to set forth on an expedition, I
can feel him listening and he can feel me listening. We can travel together.
But unless the compass needle, swayed by that unseen magnetic field,
keeps pointing North, no journey can occur.
Rather than entering now onto a systematic prescription of ways to
generate that magnetic field of listening, or to keep it going, I want to ask
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you to listen for something that is not a system, not a prescription, not an
answer to the question "How do I...?" We are talking about a classroom as
a social place, a place in which people be together, for a purpose or at cross-
purposes, a place where we are interested, first and foremost, not in what
is being taught and what is being learned, but rather in how the students
and teacher are being together. For the way of their being together is the
medium in which will grow the possibility not only of their instruction
but, aforteriori, of their education. It is not a question of making the com-
pass point North. If Dustin is not open for business, I cannot be, either. In
telling you my war stories, then, I am not presenting techniques or recom-
mendations. I am listening, even as I write and re-write, for ways in which
I am called to be, by and with my students. Trying to catch a whiff of
mutuality, I am listening from the question that Heidegger raises and Buber
deepens: what is being-with?
To shift the paradigm, the set of expectations and rules and heuristics
that the students brought with them into the classroom, to bring their
hermeneutic circles into service so that I could begin a new journey with
them, I would begin the first class with a dittoed handout, an item with
particular significance in the society of that school. Because of its social
history—teachers of the lower grades had used it as a device for distribut-
ing text materials in parcels suited to their courses—it had a role in
generating the schema with which students began to understand my
course, the hermeneutic circle that occurred as they walked into my class-
room.7 The tenth-grade English teacher (to take the most pertinent ex-
ample) would issue a weekly "Error Sheet," a compendium of grammati-
cal gaffes and clumsy diction from student writing, which he would
correct with students as a class exercise. The ERROR SHEET, so called in
capital letters, activated the old accustomed paradigm of teacher-corrects-
student, or teacher-supplies-correct-information, so students automati-
cally knew how to use it, or to ignore it. The function of a cognitive
schema is to provide for automaticity.
But the Error Sheet worked in other ways, too. Since the author of
each error was identified by name, and because there was a certain notori-
ety in having one's work displayed ("making the Error Sheet") as well as
in not making it, my colleague's handout embodied students' feeling of
participating in the course. In the hands of this particular teacher, the
Error Sheet was a powerful tool; he could use it, with laughter and a little
irony, to elicit a community that valued improvements in writing.
At the beginning of my course, the handout consisted of several
verbal puzzles and a Doonesbury cartoon, followed by two short poems
(see Figure 7.1).
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The office was cool because the windows were closed.
The trip was not delayed because the bottle shattered.
The haystack was important because the cloth ripped.
* * *
Watching a Peace March from the fortieth floor?
The view was breathtaking. From the window one could see
the crowd below. Everything looked extremely small from such
a distance, but the colorful costumes could still be seen. Every-
one seemed to be moving in one direction in an orderly fashion
and there seemed to be little children as well as adults. The
landing was gentle and luckily the atmosphere was such that no
special suits had to be worn. At first there was a great deal of
activity. Later, when the speeches started, the crowd quieted
down. The man with the television camera took many shots of
the setting and the crowd. Everyone was very friendly.
* * *
"Doonesbury" cartoon strip:
Zonker: Boy, Thomas Hobbes was right. Life is nasty, brutish,
and short.
Mike: Zonker, I think you're making too big a deal of this.
Zonker: Where do we have to go, anyway?
Mike: The Post Office.
Zonker: The Post Office, The Post Office is in charge of register-
ing everybody?
Mike: Right.
Zonker: I feel better already.
Mike: I told you there was nothing to worry about.
* * *
Kisses
Give me the food that satisfies a guest;
Kisses are but dry banquets to a feast.
* * *
Heaven-Haven
I have desired to go
Where Springs not fail,
To fields where flies no sharp and sided hail
And a few lilies blow.
And I have asked to be
Where no storms come,
Where the green swell is in the havens dumb,
And out of the swing of the sea.
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The office was cool because the windows were closed.
The trip was not delayed because the bottle shattered.
The haystack was Important because the cloth ripped.
Watching a peace march from the fortieth floor:
The view was breathtaking. From the window one could see the crowd
below. Everything looked extremely small from such a distance, but the
colorful costumes could still be seen. Everyone seemed to be moving in
one direction in an orderly fashion and there seemed to be little children
as well as adults. The landing was gentle and luckily the atmosphere
was such that no special suits had to be worn. At first there was a
great deal of activity. Later, when the speeches started, the crowd
quieted down. The man with the television camera took many shots of
the setting and the crowd. Everyone was very friendly.
Give me the food that satisfies a guest;
Kisses are but dry banquets to a feast.
Heaven-Haven
I have desired to go
Where springs not fail,
To fields where flies no sharp and sided hail
And a few lilies blow.
And I have asked to be
Where no storms come,
Where the green swell is in the havens dumb,
And out of the swing of the sea.
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The meaning of each "text" is not clear until someone supplies the proper
context, or a perspective in which it makes sense. One of my puzzles, for
example, asks what imaginable state of affairs the following sentence
could be describing:
The haystack was important because the cloth ripped.
At the beginning of the course it is usually the teacher who supplies the
missing context—the cloth is a parachute—and this fits again into the
superior teacher paradigm. But imaginative students will often find a
different interpretation, especially if I ask for it. Maybe the cloth is a
guerilla's tent containing plans for a surprise raid, into which a spy for our
side has cut his way, undetected because of the adjacent haystack. Now
we are in a place where paradigm shift can occur. I point to the fact that
differing interpretations have arisen, and ask which is better. In the space
of our being together around my handout—which started out like the
space of being together around the Error Sheet—this is now a new ques-
tion, to be answered not with information supplied by the teacher but
with inventing from the students.
Now we need criteria for judging relative merit. And what is peda-
gogically important here is the character of our need, the quality of the
space in which our need for criteria has arisen, not (at first) the merits of
whatever criteria might be proposed. In the hermeneutic circling of the
classroom—the already givenness, the interpretive inertia, the way people
have already learned to do school—there is now the possibility of a listen-
ing for invention. This listening offers, in Carse's words, a silence that
makes the speech of others possible. There is now the possibility not only
of hermeneutic circling but also of being together, of being-with. In this
space we can invent together not only interpretations but criteria for
judging interpretations. There is now the possibility, at least, that the
compass will point North.
Sometimes, though, what rushes in to fill the slight vacuum that has
been created is whatever criterion of judgment is always already present
in a particular culture of students. In my school, the funnier or more
outlandish interpretation would usually take over the attention of the
class. I might have tried to change this automatic criterion per dictum, fol-
lowing the old superior-teacher paradigm. But in order to decide between
readings, both of which might now earn credit, we can pay the kind of
close attention to the text that I was aimimg to teach, that critical care for
details contributing to meanings that I want to let appear. I ask whether
the phrase "the cloth ripped" implies an unintended and unforeseen
event, or an adroitly executed step in a careful plan. Now there is the
opening for a consensus (con + sentire, to feel together), an answer that is
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not delivered and received but invented together and thus owned. The
possibility of being together has made ownership possible.
To develop the same opening in a conversation about a literary text, I
ask at the end of my Interpretation Sheet who the speaker might be in
Hopkins' poem "Heaven-Haven." (I omit the telltale subtitle: "A Nun
Takes the Veil.") Heaven being a popular metaphor for the easy life, my
students will usually decide that we are hearing in this poem from a
weary sailor longing for dry land. In the speaking and listening of the
society of interpretation that is my classroom, this kind of "heaven" reso-
nates with the gloss on "haven" as a harbor, as well as with the final line
of the poem, in which the speaker wants to remove himself from "the
swing of the sea." When I reveal Hopkins' subtitle (sometimes after filling
out the weary sailor interpretation as convincingly as I can and then
announcing "I have misled you") there is new information about the
poem available, but it is available now in a particular way. The new
information has a certain character; we feel an inclination to use it in a
certain way, to incorporate it into our conversation, to honor it according
to the space of our being together.
It is true that the space of the classroom at that point might be named
"You tricked us!" Sometimes the students would give voice to that feel-
ing, and I then had the opportunity of speaking into that listening, their
listening that maybe I had tricked them, that now I was going to give
them the real answer to what the poem means. What they got, they might
be thinking, was incomplete information, and what rushed in to fill the
vacuum was something they made up about my intentions, or something
ready-made for them by the culture of schooling, say. "Teachers are really
just out to trip us up and make us feel stupid." "Does that ready-made
space prevent you from using the exercise for yourselves?" I could ask.
But in the space of an invitation to play, to invent, my use of the
Interpretation Sheet provides an opportunity, an inclination toward care-
ful re-reading of the poem to make all the images fit. In light of the
subtitle, the sea and the harbor that linked it to dry land have become
metaphorical. Now, it might be said that they were always metaphorical,
and the metaphoricity has just now been revealed by the teacher who
knows and is at long last telling his students what he has known all along.
That is indeed the space of trickery. But now there is another possibility
available. The Interpretation Sheet, like its predecessor the Error Sheet,
has provided for another way of seeing the "data"; it has allowed for the
transformation of the facts of the poem. The new facts about the poem—
and all of them are new, now—have become metaphorical, now that the
possibility of metaphor has arisen between us. Metaphor, like humor, is a
between-us phenomenon. In the space of metaphor, we can now embark
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on the first large unit, on lyric poetry, which one student called the "boot
camp" of the course. (I think it was this same student who said in aston-
ishment, "Mr. McHenry, you never tell us anything!")
Later in the course, when the question arises whether, in A Streetcar
Named Desire, Stanley or Blanche is to be blamed more, we may summon
out of the background this space of invitation to a dialogue in which the
text gets created and owned by us, a space in which debate about the
interpretation of the play can bear the fruit of engagement. At the begin-
ning of the play, Blanche's behavior looks like snobbery, as she holds
herself aloof from the raffish Elysian Fields. Then, as she disparages Stanley
and Stella for a sexual appetite that we know is healthier than her own, it
looks like hypocrisy. Then, as Stanley rapes her, she seems a victim of her
own compulsions, not a free agent to be held responsible for her behavior.
Though my students usually liked this play, most seemed to stop inter-
preting it at the first or second of these stages, rarely seeing in the final
scenes anything to change the moral that snobs and hypocrites get their
just deserts. But in the space of the Interpretation Sheet, they have experi-
enced that they can participate by fitting all the evidence together in
different ways, with the purpose of finding the most persuasive account-
ing for it. In this space of invitation to dialogic play, the drama of Stanley
and Blanche becomes more than a soap opera with stock caricatures and
predestined plot. It becomes a locus of sharing, of invention.
So what about the test? After all, that is the question already always in
the background of whatever happens in the classroom, is it not? How am
I going to be graded on this? In the space of transmitted knowledge,
grading is easy for both teachers and students, because a structure of
information, since it is a structure, persists, stands up to examination.
How does the space of shared inventing allow for distinctions between
right and wrong answers? Certainly students can be expected to share the
common knowledge, say, that a sonnet has sixteen lines, divided into
octave and sestet or quatrains and couplet. But in what context are we to
teach this? In what way are we to let it appear as a fact, an item to be
known?
One design that worked with my students was a modified multiple-
choice test. There were three types of question; in the first, students read a
short poem and chose from five statements the one that best expressed the
poem's meaning. A second type of question asked them to divide a short
poem into the sections that best accorded with its meaning. The poem
might be a sonnet, and the answer choices would include a division into
octave and sestet, or quatrains and couplet. In a third type of question,
students would read an excerpt from a work they had studied, think how
it fit the author's purpose and pattern of ideas in the whole work, and
then choose from four phrases the one that best expressed the most im-
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portent connection of ideas made by the passage given. In a multiple-
choice test, there is one most correct answer for every question, and I
constructed the answer choices and scored the test according to this model.
But I immersed this standard, expected structure in another context by
requiring students to justify their choice of answer. A well-written and
persuasive justification earned full credit, even if the answer chosen was
not the most correct one (and some credit was deducted for "correct"
answers that were poorly justified).
What is the space that this test helps to articulate? In the classes in
which I used it, it supported a shift in the paradigm of knowledge: from
the private use of memory to the art of interpreting persuasively, from a
binary standard—right or wrong answers—to "infinite speech." It called
for argument between us, for the colloquy of interpretation. Since this
kind of discussion of the texts has a sharper edge than rinding out what a
dead poet had to say about life, most students were engaged in it, and I
supported their engagement by encouraging them to re-argue orally those
answers that did not get full credit. About half the time they would
persuade me that their answer deserved more credit, and in half the other
cases I would persuade them that it did not. But in any case they usually
came to see that the new kind of problem on the test was a genuine one;
the chance to raise their grade lured most students to try the new paradigm.
Re-arguing for credit was a bit of angling that worked not because of the
structure of ideas in the text material or the test question, but because of
the possibilities of the social situation, the space in which the ideas were
placed. It was a space that, by calling for invention, allowed for our being
together powerfully.
What else about that eleventh-grade course contributed to the articu-
lation of a powerful space? What else in the hermeneutic circling of that
classroom gave me the possibility of listening for the students' authentic
participation in encounters with literature? Here is something else that
happened.
After the Interpretation Sheet, and then the lyric poetry "boot camp,"
we would read my favorite book, Faulkner's The Unvonquished. It opens
with these two sentences:
Behind the smokehouse that summer, Ringo and I had a living
map. Although Vicksburg was just a handful of chips from the
woodpile and the river a trench scraped into the packed earth
with the point of a hoe, it (river, city, and terrain) lived, possessing
even in miniature that ponderable though passive recalcitrance
of topography which outweighs artillery, against which the
most brilliant of victories and the most tragic of defeats are but
the loud noises of a moment.8
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Though mild by the standard of later works in their squinting, layered
density, this passage presents, in theme and technique, the opportunity to
encounter the authentic Faulkner. To make that encounter available to
students, I began class once by noting a parallel between Faulkner's first
two sentences and a familar classroom event. "When you come into a
classroom/' I began, "you sometimes find the teacher writing on the
blackboard, maybe an outline or a list of things to be covered that class
period. The teacher might start off like this: Today well be talking about
the topics I've listed here, as they show up in the poem I gave you last
time../ Right? He's doing straight exposition, speaking to you as a public
audience, and you're listening for certain kinds of things, too; you're
listening for a sequence of ideas, for logical relations. You're listening to
that outline, ready to transfer it to your notes. But then after he's started,
the teacher begins thinking to himself about the implications of what he's
saying, maybe feeling a private emotional significance in the poem, and
he looks out the window for a moment while he's talking. His voice
changes a little, and you can tell now that he's not addressing you in the
same way. Now he's talking more to himself than to you; and you're
listening in a different way, too—for different kinds of meaning."
By now my students were indeed listening intently, because the outline
had become a personal matter in the space between us, and I could make
the transition: "That's just what happens in the first two sentences of this
book: Faulkner starts off with a very conventional opening for a story,
almost a 'once upon a time/ and then in the second sentence his gaze
turns inward; he looks back over the whole long calamity of the Civil War
from his perspective as an old Southerner, and he's not just telling his
story to you any more, he's thinking to himself about its significance." The
next question—"What do you think mat significance is?"—leads naturally
to Faulkner's sense that human striving is inevitably subject to repeated
defeat, and thence to one of his central metaphors, that of flags in the dust.
Within this developing context, speaking into our listening made manifest,
I could then expand our perspective on the opening sentences by inform-
ing students that Faulkner's first novel was titled Flags in the Dust and by
reading passages from later novels in which the same metaphor appears,
and we could ask what Faulkner thinks about human flags: trivial, futile,
noble?
Before I began designing classes around the sociality of invention, I
had been starting off the first class on Faulkner with the question about
metaphor: "Read the first two sentences, keeping in mind that Faulkner's
first novel was titled Flags in the Dust. Where do you see this metaphor in
the opening of the book?" Such a leap, from pre-class socializing to intel-
lection, excluded all but those who already cared about metaphor and
how it functions to embody feeling in a novel or a poem. Students less
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well versed were tuned out of the class at the very outset because of my
disregard of what I would have called the social conditioning of learning.
Heidegger might have called it the Being-with of classroom talk. Buber
might have fixed me with a challenging gaze and asked: "And where
were you when you asked them about that metaphor?" It is not that the
question itself excluded some of the students. At the beginning of particu-
lar classes, in my use of it, it had that effect. I am describing what I did
with my students, and what I did may not address the problem you have
with your students, at a particular classroom moment, in your school-
community. There may be little power in my description as a tip or a
technique that you can use, but there may be considerable power in
noticing the listening in which any technique is used. The listening of each
classroom (let us call it) is unique, depending as it does on Bakhtin's
integral and unrepeatable authenticity of being with others. There may
indeed be certain kinds of activity, certain designs, that are likely to work
better than others. But whether they work depends at least as much on the
character of the relatedness available in the classroom as it depends on the
character of the technique itself. When you hear "model"—are you listen-
ing for a structure of parts, like a model airplane; or for a person?
The being-together of the classroom can never be accomplished by
me, can never be accomplished without me. It is our being-with that
makes the difference for our students, not just the structure of the activi-
ties and content of our classes. Indeed, we can say that the structure of a
class comes out of the ongoing conversation deriving from the listening of
teachers and students in concert. For techniques apart from our related-
ness are empty. By itself, a technique may have no character at all. There
can be no treat in a technique.
So the arrival of a hermeneutic circle is the provision, and the provi-
sioning, of the space of our being together. The room it makes comes with
furnishings, with a decor. As perception, it makes the Gestalt of figure
and ground. As language, it organizes systems of values so as to "limit
arbitrariness" (this is Saussure's phrase9) so that each value, each word,
can appear to refer to some thing; thus it lets the world appear for us as a
structured place in which prediction and control are possible. As a com-
ponent of "the listening," it shapes the character of the space between us,
conditioning what we give to and get from a classroom situation. As a
continuous event, the arrival of the hermeneutic circle is described by two
science teachers as the inter-relation of text and context, background and
form, that occurs in our speaking:
Every speech act occurs in a context, with a background shared
by speaker and hearer... background is a pervasive and funda-
mental phenomenon. Background is the space of possibilities
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that allows us to listen to both what is spoken and what is
unspoken... The background is not a set of propositions, but is
our basic orientation of "care" for the world.10
In a book about computer design, here is a contribution to a new vocabu-
lary of teaching. Let us expand on it. To get at the "basic orientation of
care" with our students, what tools do we have? What access do we have
to this phenomenon of "background," if we cannot use prepositional
handles in our customary descriptive way? If the philosophers are right,
the phenomenon of background springs up along with our languaging,
making it possible for us to listen and understand; and languaging is what
occurs when the intuition ego sum, ego existo springs up along with our
naming, our common humanity, our being-with-in-a-world, the judging
or distinctioning we live in together.
So how can we get languaging, judging, distinctioning—naming—into
the world of the classroom? Is it possible to declare an "orientation of care,"
to manage the arrival of spaces, of possibilities; or is our conversation
always emprisoned in the hermeneutic circle, the structure of the past?
The philosophers suggest that an art of background might dwell in the
area of inventing a languaging. The rest of this chapter will be devoted not
to questions, but to a proposal. If there are enough questions, enough
inquiry in the background now, the context it provides will give what
follows the character of a proposal, a putting forth for consideration. It is
important that we hear it as a proposal rather than as advice; for only if it
occurs as proposal can we engage with it as a possibility to be explored
rather than an option to be evaluated. Only then will we be able to re-
invent it for particular students in particular classrooms rather than use it
as a standard procedure.
In the Harvard Educational Review, Maxine Greene reminds us of an
ideal of caring, for people and for the world, that is at odds with the
contemporary perspective. She envisions "a reaching out towards becom-
ing persons among other persons, for all the talk of human resources, for
all the orienting of education to the economy":
To engage with our students as persons is to affirm our own
incompleteness, our consciousness of spaces still to be explored,
desires still to be tapped, possibilities still to be opened and
pursued. At once, it is to rediscover the value of care, to reach
back to experiences of caring and being cared for... as sources of
an ethical ideal."11
Reaching back to experiences of care surely nurtures that reaching for-
ward for possibilities that can so enliven a public discourse. But what I
envision here is not so much the declaration of solicitude for the rights
and feelings of individuals of different ethnicity or cultural provenance as
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it is the prior possibility of establishing in a classroom a background of
"infinite speech," an orientation of care in which speaking, languaging,
occurs as the condition of freedom, that is, of ethical openness to others.
So I propose as follows. As teachers we have the opportunity to open
and maintain conversations that make a difference for our students. As
Ms. Greene suggests, conversation that makes a difference is an event of
"unveiling and disclosing," a "situation of speaking and making," an
ongoing work of art. What makes a difference is being engaged in invent-
ing. The House of Being is one that, unlike language, can be entered
together: for it is not a structure, but an invention. In other words, the
context we want to set up for our students is probably not "doing school-
work," for that is an exercise in language rather than languaging. What
context, what background conditions the relatedness of teachers and stu-
dents as they interact, as they use the materials, the worn books, the
chalkboard, the video? What gives us our dwelling-place? What is the
name of the space you inhabit with your students? The conversation for
inventing, the conversation that enables engagement, dwells in four areas
or realms of speakinglistening. These are: the realm of speaking the basic
word I-You, in the face-to-face encounter; the realm of speculating, asking
"what if...?"; the realm of promising, of pledging; and the realm of acting,
performing. For the pragmatic ontology of the encounter to be fully func-
tional, students and teacher must participate together in all these realms,
if not simultaneously, at least in fair proximity.
After Dewey, such an ideal space might be called something like
"learning through living." But even if that were the motto of an actual
school, embossed beneath the shield on its coat of arms, say, what tran-
spires in the classrooms, the dining hall and the dormitories of that school
will always be pulled back into the realm of the objective, of the I and the
It, of the I as an It. Hard as it is to surmount that "tortuously dual"
twofold, we are working on bringing it about that we turn to each other in
inventing, in Saying, opening the world to the touch of our living. As in
the previous chapter we focused on a story about an encounter between a
parent and child, here I am telling some stories from the sites of actual
classrooms, hoping to show how the background of sharingnaming can
be introduced even where social class and racial distances, all the incom-
mensurabilities of cultural discourses, are the ineluctable foreground.
Except for five or six rows of synthetic-wood and tubular metal desk-
chairs, with wire notebook-size shelves beneath the seats, the classroom at
first seems empty. Absent the students who will pour fitfully into the
room next period, and the teacher who will arrive purposefully, cautious
and expectant, the room exudes space, a space filled with qualities, at-
tributes, predications. Of course the chairs, self-contained on their four
legs and re-arrangeable, are not the only contents of the room that speak
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these predications about the students and the kind of enterprise they will
be expected to pursue when they get here: things written and drawn on
the two chalkboard walls (assignments, perhaps); the television on a swivel
shelf high in the corner; the teacher's desk jammed into the opposite
corner. The third wall, separating the classroom from the hallway, consists
of large panels of glass; inside the panels, tiny filaments of wire form a
cross-hatch like a chicken-wire fence. Across most of the glass panels,
taped paper signs and posters announce the school play, the visit of the
representative from the yearbook manufacturing company or the class-
ring salesman, interrupting the view into the corridor. (One poster is
mounted to be read from the corridor as students pass by the classroom. It
says "Free Knowledge: Bring Your Own Container.") Adjacent to the
entrance door, part of the glass wall is obscured by a massive double-door
cabinet, also of hard composite (resin-impregnated sawdust perhaps). On
the opposite wall (made partly of some stuff to which notices can be
pinned) a hip-high bookshelf contains some frayed paper workbooks, and
textbooks with the pictures on their once-hard covers worn through and
doodled on.
As I walk into the already brimming classroom, I am not blank, either.
With my platform in hand, I am both worry and elan. I have been here
twice before, on Mondays just before 12:30, to introduce myself and my
project briefly, and ask the kids (twenty-five "basic level" eleventh-graders)
if they would be willing to work with me. Since they could sense the
prospect of something outside the ordinary classroom English which most
of them had already learned to dismiss as boring and useless—I had told
them that when I visited, we would not be doing standard kinds of
activities in the classroom, and would be going outside from time to time
to do what I called "challenges"—and since, perhaps, they saw in me
another opportunity for having fun instead of doing schoolwork, they
had accepted my invitation. In the space of that emptyfull classroom,
though, I worry that as soon as they see through my plan, which is in fact
to re-engage them in schoolwork, they will shut me off as effectively as
they have been shutting off teachers for most of their time in school so far.
This is in fact what happened. But it happened more than once. Several
times, these recalcitrants opened up to the Monday activities, to the possi-
bility that school could be different than it had been, only to close down
again the minute they got a whiff of standard operating procedure—as
when I first handed out my Interpretation Sheet.
But now about that platform, and about the elan. At Outward Bound,12
on the first day when students have arrived together from their separate
homes and lives, before exchanging their clean travelling clothes for the
shorts and T-shirts, before exchanging leather for rubber-soled shoes,
before even being introduced to one another, still mostly just human faces
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to each other, persons with this or that history, these or those relatives,
one or another regional accent or identity—these individuals might en-
counter each other on one of these platforms. Two-and-a-half feet square
and raised ten inches off the ground on stubby anchored legs, it is called
the "All Aboard," and the object is to get all ten or twelve members of the
group up onto it, standing, leaning on each other, braced or hooped or
cantilevered in a controlled balance, for, say, three seconds. As they con-
front the challenge to their slippery leather soles and the clothes they still
need to keep clean for the trip home after the course—a challenge that
they think they will meet with their strength or their abilities, their skills
of communication and cooperation—there arises between them the pros-
pect of something that does not depend on ability or skill or effort: an
unencustomed being-together, a moment of communion as unsettling as
it is enticing. It is not something that will be prolonged past the three or so
seconds of their almost-airborne clustering on the platform, but its voltage
feeds my elan, charges my step as I enter the charged classroom. Plain
nerves has a lot to do with it, too.
To bring that moment of blank synergy into the classroom, I built a
portable platform out of some scraps of lumber, two-by-six cedar decking
left over from a poorly built deck that had collapsed under my wife at our
old house. (She wasn't hurt.) I had mitered the corners of the four edge
boards so they would fit together snugly like the corners of a picture
frame, and nailed more lengths of decking across this frame, leaving an
inch or so between these top boards so it would work out that none of the
top boards overhangs the frame. In fact, some of the left-over boards had
been bevelled forty-five degrees at the ends, and I placed these ends with
the bevel sloping in toward the center from the outside edge of the frame.
Even if two people stand on one edge with no one on the opposite edge
for balance, this deck will not flip up out of place. If this piece of classroom
engineering is to succeed, it has to be safe. Its safety is as critical a part of
its design as its outlandishness; craftsmanship, and not accident, is inte-
gral to designing breakthroughs.
Cedar at these short lengths is as strong as pine, but since it weighs
less, I can carry the platform into and out of schools and down corridors
with no strain. As an itinerant teacher, I keep it in the trunk of my car
along with several other items designed to educe that moment of related-
ness and possibility.
The moment of synergy—I call it so not only because there is muscu-
lar cooperation involved, but because because there arises in the moment
a kind of sharing that is not as obvious as the cooperation of carpenters
raising a joist. That is a task they already know how to perform, have
already performed ten or a hundred times. Unless there is something
special about this joist, some circumstance that makes raising it into posi-
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tion unlikely, that requires that instead of repeating the task they invent it,
the kind of relatedness that appears on the platform does not occur. To be
sure, there is teamwork among carpenters, camaraderie and effective
action; but there is not necessarily this space of creating out of nothing.
When students have been attempting to mount the platform for a
minute or two, beginning to have fun with it and be frustrated by it,
someone will usually ask some version of the question "how are we
supposed to do this?" Relishing the moment—it is Bakhtin's "once-occur-
rent event of Being"—I answer: "I don't know. No group just like yours
has ever done this before. It is yours to do." Now the space between us is
blank: if I have created it freely, it is free of history, of preconditions, of
directives, of reasons. Or at least, these have been attenuated momen-
tarily, and what the participants are facing is not a picture from the past to
be copied, but a possibility for a future to be invented. They are standing
before each other, open for a moment to a world they can create. Between
us, we have Nothing. They have the chance to Name a system, a way of
getting more people balanced. There is before them a world to be brought
into being.
Now, it is true that not all of the eighteen or so kids present for that
third class session were involved in this conversation. At first, only five or
six had volunteered to get up on the platform together. But gradually,
with my own cheerleading and the coaxing of the regular teacher, one by
one several more were persuaded to join in the fun. Against the grain,
against and alongside the norm of stolid non-participation, there is devel-
oping a light-heartedness, a willingness to cooperate, a speaking and
listening for participation, for relatedness, for sharing in the possibility of
creating together. The context of the classroom is changing, though slowly
and stiffly.
The stiffness, in some measure, is probably embarrassment at the
prospect of close physical contact. As some of the kids feel safe enough or
comfortable enough to begin, though, to approach one another and hang
on, it begins to be possible for others to relinquish their stand-offishness.
With personal, grinning, in-their-face appeals from me and their teacher,
they get up out of their chairs—which we have moved to the periphery of
the room—reach a hand across the laughing, groaning amalgam on the
platform, and are absorbed. (Among the notable characteristics of Mrs.
Zajak's teaching, in Among Schoolchildren, is that she gets up close to them,
in their faces, and touches them a lot.) If I see in the eyes of one or two a
longing to be involved, to play, I may ask them to get up and be "spotters"
around the periphery, for it often happens that, as enthusiasm outstrips
judgment, the whole mass of people will come tumbling off one side of
the platform, and it's good to have someone standing by to brace the
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floormost person. The platform thus becomes an occasion for Greeting,
not only for the participants, but (at least partially) for the observers as
well.
In the context developing, I can now bring in the other realms of
speakinglistening in which engagement dwells. As the number of people
on the platform approaches its apparent limit, I can say "Good work, you
guys! Now how about it: do you want to try for one more?" I am asking
them, in the space of encounter and possibility, for a commitment, a
pledge. As the wheel of Saying is gathering speed, engaged by our sociable
action, our being-together around and on the platform, and accelerated by
the possibility of inventing a new way to get more people up, naming a new
system, it begins to look as if setting ourselves a goal and going for it all-
out might be the same thing as having fun. Somehow it is worth it, for the
participants in this event, to give an honest effort, even to fail several
times; to improvise, to use their heads as well as their arms and legs and
shoulders; to commit themselves to trying to do what they don't yet know
how to do. In the midst of the almost-melee, though, I am not yet specu-
lating on the parallels between this surpass-your-best-because-you-say-so
event and an irregular verbs contest.
The platform, of course, is Deweyan. It nurtures shared construction
of a reality that is social through and through; it provides for moment-by-
moment invention of community. Mind occurs on the platform as sociality.
But though this may be hands-on, multisensory learning, what is going on
here is not merely that. For one thing, there is nothing that we would
recognize as conceptual happening in the group, unless we would want
to say that figuring out a new way to get more people up is conceptual—
and I don't think it is. The absence of conceptuality would be enough to
disqualify this event as learning, in the "knowledge model" of education
currently in question; but even if we admit the non-conceptual into the
arena of learning, we still have not captured what transpires on the plat-
form. The transactions here involve the physical being, they generate
uninhibited conversation, and they enable a certain authenticity among
the participants. If an elbow pokes you, you let it be known vociferously.
We have confrontation; we are bathed in the presence of the basic word I-
You. (We can smell each other, too.) If some members of the class want to
hog the platform, or to show off, it becomes clear among the participants
that that way of being will not get the job done; the task requires instead
delicate cooperation, timing, and patience. Rather, it requires these if we say
it requires them and act accordingly. In an activity of this kind, it can
become clear to the participants that what is being said has a powerful effect
on what is happening. What is going on here, it gradually appears, is that
we are inventing a process and an outcome by Saying them. And we can
invent according to an old pattern, expecting an outcome already avail-
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able in the past, or we can invent according to our commitment, our
declaration of a possibility for one more person up on the platform, or for
one more second of stable balance, of cooperation, co-invention, co-poiesis.
What is happening on the platform is a re-inventing of the wheel of Being.
It is this presence to each other that will enable the main work of teaching,
once we return to the cognitive curriculum.
In one physical education class where I tried the platform, for in-
stance, there began to develop a kind of horseplay, a competitiveness
between cliques which, I suppose, had existed prior to my visit. There
seemed to be two leaders in the group, and as each asserted her own
dominance over the game, its character shifted from cooperation to com-
petition, and then to see-who-can-push-who-off. After a few moments of
this, I called a time out, and asked: "What's the name of the game here?
Are you all playing King of the Mountain? or Cooperation? Or is the
name of this game Revenge? What are you saying here?" Just this question
was enough to re-establish the common purpose that time, though it is
true that there may have been some mild reproach in my manner of
asking it. The question revealed to the participants their own responsibility
for what was going on. It asked them to examine their commitments in
the matter, bringing those commitments up as commitments rather than
as a structure of habits. "Oh. You mean we have a say in how things go.
So it doesn't have to be the way it usually always is."13
What about the kids who resist being involved the whole time, sitting
passive in their immovable chairs? I can ask them—though by now I am
shouting above the din—"What do you think is keeping you in your
chairs?" So it's not just about doing another stupid activity, so as to come
away with some equation or formula or list of facts about people—it's
about who you are, what you do in situations, or what does "you"; what
owns your life; and about owning what owns you. It is not an offer of
freedom from academics or from homework. It is an offer of responsibility
for one's own experience. (Buber would correct me here: No, he would
say, it is an offer to trade experience for responsibility, to let responsibility
supplant experience.)
In the basic-level English class, it was always usually noisy; the kids
had made disruption and inattention into a fine art. And they had been
captured by the system they had created, so that when I arrived with my
platform it was literally impossible for them to pay attention to a lesson.
They would have said that they were in charge of their lives in that
classroom, that except for being made to come there one period a day they
were free to do pretty much as they pleased. They needed to be impressed
with the degree to which they were not free, the extent to which the
pattern of disruption and inattention owned their lives. So I used another
exercise with them to shift the class from being the effect of its system, to
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generate the possibility of being its cause, actually, instead of apparently,
owning what went on in the classroom.
The exercise, as I designed it for this class, consisted of two parts. First,
since I had the advantage of outsider status for my first two or three visits,
I could propose an activity that seemed to have no relevance to the
practical tasks of schooling: Count Off. It is easy to count off the number
of people in a line or a circle; the first person in line says "one," the second
"two," and so on to the end of the line. But as they sit in their individual
chairs (movable or not), a class of students usually does not see in itself
the potential for such an organization as a line or a circle. So the task I
gave them is to count the class off, without planning which person was
going to say which number and without any two people saying a number
simultaneously. The task, that is, is to invent this perfect count-off out of
thin air, with nothing to start with except a simple "begin" from me and
nothing to go on from then on except whatever is there in the silence of
their listening for each other to speak the numbers consecutively. Since
what is going on here is obviously not School, it becomes possible again
for the students to pay attention to each other. Perhaps Buber would not
call the students' experience in this exercise one of "bodily confrontation,"
but it does bring Presence into the room. The listening it allows for is
exquisite.
And I can point out to them, when they have completed this part of
the exercise, that what they did was invent something that would not
have existed otherwise. They invented a medium, a way of being together
for accomplishing a task. The medium of their accomplishment came
from nowhere but themselves. While I can imagine that a class might hit
on the expedient of counting up and down the rows of chairs, it has never
happened that they spontaneously achieved this organization as a me-
dium for accomplishing the task, though such a stratagem would itself
qualify as an invention if it came out of the silence of their listening,
instead of as somebody's bright idea of how to beat the game. Whatever
happens, I can point out to the students that a perfect count-off can be
achieved without pre-planning and without tricks—most classes can get
it after three or four tries. Thus I can distinguish inventing, the silent en-
gagement of listening, from those other ways of being together.
On the next Monday, perhaps,14 I might carry out the second part of
the exercise, which we could call "Invent Silence." The game here is
simply for everyone in the room to be perfectly silent for a specified
period of time, say a minute at first. It is remarkable how difficult this is in
the eleventh-grade class. Why is it so hard to be silent, I ask them. Inevitably,
the quick response: I was quiet, but those guys were talking. But notice the
game you are playing, I say. You're playing "I be quiet for one minute."
What game are those guys playing? Maybe they're still playing "I talk no
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matter what." But the game I proposed is different from either: we be si-
lent for one minute. Now how about that game? Do you all want to play
that? If they Say yes (and this is different from their just saying "yes"),
then the space of the classroom is suddenly given by their commitment to
inventing the game, inventing a mode of engagement with each other,
rather than by what always automatically happens in that room. As it
actually happened, the students in the eleventh-grade Basic English class
invented silence for nearly two minutes at the end of the Monday period,
and afterward, when they noticed that they were being noisy and that I
wanted to say something to them, would sometimes cry "Invent silence!"
This became partly a joke, and it never worked perfectly, but in the few
sessions I had with them, it began to take hold as a possibility they could
return to. With the experience of inventing in their repertoire now, they
could begin to assume the responsibility of having a say. Accordingly, the
hermeneutic circling of the classroom began to admit of something beyond
hermeneutic circling, to allow for new possibilities.
In that class, then, we had begun to set up a conversation for freedom
and for responsibility. At first it was very tenuous, lost more often than
found, as the old hermeneutic circle of disruption and inattention claimed
its patrimony time and time again. But as the wheel of Saying gathered
momentum, as my initial request and their acceptance began our relation-
ship, as inventing possibilities and acting on them nurtured our relatedness,
our sharing provided the space for more inventing of possibilities and for
more launching out into the unknown of possibility, more committed
action. Occasionally, some of the students began to listen/or something that
we had ourselves generated. On those occasions, the questions for the
class become: "What are we saying here? Would it be possible to say
something else, something different? Do we commit to trying out that
possibility? How are we doing with enacting our new commitment?" You
could print those questions on a standard business card and hand them
out as reminders to everyone in the class. On the card I actually handed
out, the questions were:




Who has a say about what
conversation you live in?
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Of course, like all the material we give out, anything that has the stamp of
Schoolwork on it, this card is soon lost in the shuffle of papers into and
out of the wire shelves below the seats. But I have plenty more of them to
replace the first ones; and besides, it is not that the little card contains
anything the students need to have. As teachers, what we want our
students to have is the blank space of freedom/responsibility on the
platform. We want them to say "You" to each other and to schoolwork, so
that they may have nothing. So I give out the card, not hoping they will
lose it, but intending that it cease to be an item of Schoolwork.
The scenes above describe my first attempts to bring the spirit of
encounter into some classrooms. The mechanics by which this was ac-
complished, when it was, were activities with which I had become com-
fortable through practice at Outward Bound and elsewhere; it is not
unimportant that they are connected with my life experiences and with
the cluster of commitments that seem to have clung to me, organizing my
identity not only as a teacher but as a person. They are the mask through
which my person sounds. But the mask now actually becomes a resonator,
a channel through which we make real our relatedness. Of course, teachers
need to master the material content of their courses in a way that students
cannot. But we need to know our stuff in another way, too. We need
practice in bringing who we have been and who we are to the classroom
in such a way as to establish a voltage, a potential energy that can result in
the spark of encounter, the moment of "personal making present." In the
classroom group, Buber affirms, even where there has been an institution-
ally sanctioned and rationalized draining of You from the lifeworld, there
remains the possibility of authentically facing each other not as roles but
as persons. There is in the flatness of the institutional floor an actual
invitation to step into the presence of another, to step onto the slope of
being together. We need teacher trainings that focus our energies, our
personal histories, and our commitments through the lens of this invitation
to encounter. "What can I do to help them learn?" then becomes several
interrelated questions: "Who are they? Who am I? How can I, with my own
history, predilections and idiosyncracies, make available in the relatedness
of my classroom a mutuality of commitment? How can I greet my stu-
dents so that we can name our world together?" For asking these questions
so as to enable personal making present is, among a host of other things,
what it is to be present as a teacher.
We say confidently that we draw upon knowledge. Perhaps we know
that what we draw upon really is being together, being human, in the
wilderness. Of course, in some cases, the past actually harbors the ecology
of encounter; teachers and students dwell in it without forethought. But
the crisis of our time is the destruction of wilderness: as the trees fall and
the It-world consolidates, Adam has nowhere to turn. If we got greeting,
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sharing in the wilderness into our classrooms, would a present world open
to the touch of our living? What if we could take our students out into the
city to name the buildings, the streets for themselves? What if we could, in
the "confines" of our regular classrooms, build with students the edifice
of knowledge as a house of shared names'? What if the poster announced
into the corridor:
Free Being
Bring Some, Get More
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12. Outward Bound is an international organization of schools and centers
whose programs are dedicated to ensuring not the survival of individuals,
but of what its founder, the philosopher Kurt Hahn, regarded as the most
important qualities of individuals' lives in society: "tenacity in pursuit, an
enterprising curiosity, an undefeatable spirit, readiness for sensible self-
denial, and above all, compassion." Most of the Outward Bound schools are
located in remote wilderness areas and use back-country expeditions and
challenge to show participants the possibility that a human life is most
powerfully and happily lived as contribution. Compassion is "bearing or
suffering with others"; contribution is "giving with others." The work of
Outward Bound, in my experience at least, is to bring into being that living
and genuine We of which Buber spoke.
13. There are many, many other exercises of this kind available for, and
inventable by, teachers who, if they are willing, can set their old identities
aside for a class period or two and take up the role of an "outsider." The
largest collection I know about was assembled by Karl Rohnke of Project
Adventure, and is available from Kendall Hunt Publishing, P.O. Box 1840,
Dubuque, IA 52004 (1-800-338-8290). They will send you a price list for
Cowstails and Cobras, Silver Bullets, and The Bottomless Bag, each of which
contains descriptions of numerous "initiative games" and instructions for
building or setting them up. Used as vehicles for breaking up habits,
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dynamite.
14. I say "perhaps" because I am designing the experience of these students
almost minute by minute in my limited time with them. It might be that this
piece of the design would fit better before the Count-Off exercise. It depends
on how I can see to fit what I have with what they need on a given day. I am
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prior plan, or just plain making it up without a plan.
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